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ABSTRACT 
 
LEVIATHAN’S RAGE: 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
FEBRUARY 2009 
 
CECIL BRYANT LAWSON, B. A. MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
M. A., UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY 
 
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by:  Professor Robert Alejandro 
 
 
 
This dissertation explores the relationship between state sovereignty and major 
instances of crimes against humanity committed in the latter 20th century.  In order to 
examine this dynamics of this relationship, the author analyzes the history and theory of 
the concept of sovereignty and examines five case studies of crimes against humanity:  
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Argentina during the military junta from 1976 to 
1983, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda in 1994, and the ongoing conflict in 
the Darfur region of Sudan.  State sovereign power is shown to be an important 
facilitating factor in these atrocities as well as a major source of contention during the 
civil conflicts in which these crimes have taken place.  International efforts to control or 
mitigate the damaging effects of state sovereignty, including humanitarian intervention, 
the International Criminal Court, and the promotion of democratization, are shown to be 
largely ineffectual and often end up strengthening state sovereignty.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  While it may seem like I am stating the obvious, we need to ponder this: large-
scale crimes against humanity have become a common occurrence within my own 
lifetime (I was born in 1971).  Over past few decades, we have witnessed the last 
paroxysms of the Cold War – détente, renewed conflict with the “Evil Empire,” the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its satellite allies; the rise 
of a “new world order,” heralding globalization and a new respect for international law; 
and another descent into global conflict following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States.  While the earlier events might have been a cause for some optimism in world 
politics, it instead turned into a period of horror and sadness.  Although instances of 
crimes against humanity took place all throughout the decades prior to the 1990s, the 
ideological conflict of the Cold War did much to obscure the murder that happened; the 
global conflict between capitalism and communism seemed to figure at the very least into 
the atrocities that took place throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Central and South 
America and Southern Asia.  With the passing of the Cold War, however, these crimes 
continued and were more preeminent in an ever-increasing number of locales around the 
world.  Western nations and prominent members of the United Nations stood by as 
governments openly repressed, tortured and killed millions of their own citizens, in the 
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name of national unity or to stifle political dissent.  This unwillingness to act, to 
intervene, was always followed by condemnations after the face, always too late. 
 This in itself should tell us something about the nature of these kinds of crimes –  
their occurrence transcends ideological conflict, nationalism, or authoritarianism, and 
their scale, in fact, is made possible by the modern state.  We know that genocide and 
atrocities do not take place in a social and political vacuum; at least since the Second 
World War, we have learned to see how ethnic individuals’ hatred and authoritarianism 
have used the means of the state to carry out crimes against humanity, how those hatreds 
are provoked and sustained, and how the control of information in a political regime 
distorts public perspectives.  The murder of 6 million Jews, Gypsies, Slaves, and other 
minorities in World War Two by the Nazis in Germany should have been enough of a 
lesson for the people of the world in how genocide gets carried out, or even for a 
generation before that, with the slaughter of the Armenians in Turkey during the First 
World War.1  The world community proclaimed, “Never again.”  It erected the edifice of 
the United Nations with a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed a convention 
on genocide in 1948 as well as various conventions against torture, the persecution of 
minorities, and the ill treatment of women and children.2   
                                                 
1
  The Armenian genocide , unlike the Holocaust was reported around the world while it was being 
undertaken, although the term “genocide” had yet to be coined.  See Arnold Toynbee, ed.  The Treatment of 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916 (London, 1916); Arnold Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities:  The 
Murder of a Nation (London, 1915); Leslie Davis, The Slaughterhouse Province:  An American Diplomat’s 
Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, 1989); Henry 
Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918); Isreal Charny et al. eds., Encyclopedia of Genocide 
(1999). 
2
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); and Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (1992). 
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However, the world community’s actions tell a different story.  Nonintervention 
has been the practice and the rule of international law, and it is a foundation of modern 
world politics.3  World leaders may wring their hands while genocide is taking place, but 
there is legally4 no course of action at the international level,5 and several centuries of 
international custom have made it acceptable to look down on one nation interfering with 
the internal affairs of another.  Thus, while we may cite motives such as national self-
interest or apathy as reasons why nations generally refuse to intervene in order to stop 
genocide, the more fundamental reason, it seems, lies in the structure of modern 
international relations, i.e. in the principle of sovereignty. 
 In this dissertation, I want to explore the degree to which state sovereignty is 
implicated in the occurrence of crimes against humanity in the late 20th and early 21st 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3
  In Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, the principle of non-intervention is 
invoked as contrary to the purpose of the United Nations:  2 (4) “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity  or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” 
and 2 (7) “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [which deals with the enforcement of UN Security 
Council resolutions in relation to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression against other nations].”  The 
principle of non-intervention was codified subsequently in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, G. A. Res. 2131/20, 1965; the Declaration on the Principles 
of International Law, G. A. Res. 2625/25, 1970; and in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G. A. Res. 36/103, 1981.  For the application 
of the principle of non-intervention in cases of international law, see the Corfu Channel case (1949), ICJ 
Reports, 16 ILR, and the Nicaragua case (1986), ICJ Reports, 76 ILR. 
4
  Article VIII of the Genocide Convention states that , “Any Contracting Party may call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such actions under the Charter of the United Nations as 
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”  In other words, 
signatories to the Convention have to take action through the United Nations bureaucracy in order to have 
their concerns legally recognized. 
5
  The idea of “humanitarian intervention” gained a certain hearing in the 1990s with the crises in 
Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo.  However, in order to be acceptable within the legal structure of international 
sovereignty, the United Nations had to construct a concept of humanitarian intervention which took into 
account the fact that the sovereignty of surrounding nations was being affected by civil conflict and/or 
refugee flows.  See U. N. Resolutions 713 (1991) in relation to the former Yugoslavia and Resolutions 733 
(1992) for Somalia and 688 (1991) in Iraq.  This idea of humanitarian intervention has been given a 
different footing under the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” which will be explained in Chapter Five. 
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centuries.  The term “national sovereignty” has had several centuries of usage and has 
become a commonplace expression at the beginning of the 21st century.  Both 
contemporary international law and the United Nations are built upon a respect for 
“national sovereignty.”  It is recognized that international law and all treaties, 
agreements, and alliances are based on the consent of the nations involved; if a nation 
chooses to back out of any of the above, it may do so (it may not earn the good will of the 
other nations party to them, but that is not the issue here).  Today, nations continue to 
want to strengthen their sovereignty,6 and ambitious nations want to assert theirs, but the 
central concern remains the issue of sovereignty itself.  What does sovereignty mean?  In 
the context of modern political theory, sovereignty means the most powerful legitimate 
authority within a political community, that power which has the final word on matters of 
law and enforcement.  In the context of international relations, it refers to the ability of a 
nation-state to determine its own decisions and actions.  Taken in its totality, the concept 
of sovereignty has two sides:  one in relation to other nation-states, and the other in 
relation to itself – it is concerned with the boundary between outside and inside.  While 
international law determines the legal boundaries of a country, it ultimately falls to 
sovereign authority to decide what is outside and what is inside, and more importantly, 
who is inside and outside.   
It is the nexus between political theory and international relations that I am going 
to examine in order to more fully understand sovereignty; I am going to bring insights 
                                                 
6
  Recent debate on national sovereignty has focused on the “decline” of sovereignty in the era of 
globalization; for the most comprehensive treatments of this issue, see Held, David; McGraw, Anthony; 
Goldblatt, David; and Perraton, Jonathan, Global Transformations (Stanford, 1999:  Stanford University 
Press), Gilpin, Robert, The Challenge of Global Capitalism:  The World Economy in the 21st Century 
(Princeton, 2001:  Princeton University Press), and Sassen, Saskia,  Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age 
of Globaliztion (New York, 1996:  Columbia University Press) 
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from political theory regarding the relations between citizens and governments into 
international relations and bring insights from international relations regarding the unitary 
nature of sovereign power  into political theory.  Speculation upon this line between 
inside and outside shows us that this line is moveable, due to war, internal conflict, and 
changes in national law.  It cannot be overstated, however, that this concerns not merely 
national boundaries (although geography is a crucial element of sovereignty) but is more 
generally about belonging, the collective sense of what is “ours” and what is “theirs”.  At 
its most fundamental levels, sovereignty is about identity. 
In the first chapter, I am going to introduce a history of the concept of 
sovereignty, beginning in Europe’s Middle Ages.  The purpose of this is to show that 
sovereignty is not an eternal category of political authority but rather the outcome of an 
historical political conflict among a number of authorities claiming ultimate authority 
over the others.  The medieval Christian Church and its protector, the Holy Roman 
Empire, stood at odds with one another from the beginnings of the empire in the 9th 
century.  By the late Middle Ages, feudal relations were breaking down and consolidating 
under a number of powerful national monarchs, and this created yet another source of 
authority within the conflict.  The waning of both the power of the Church and the Holy 
Roman Empire left a number of monarchs and their national states with the claim to 
supreme political authority over their territories and populations.  As these countries 
began to extend their influence through colonization, the idea of sovereignty spread 
across the world and become the dominant mode of conceptualizing the authority of the 
state in the contemporary world.   
 6
 Since sovereignty retains in the predominant status, in the second chapter I return 
to the early modern period and examine the ways in which sovereignty was theorized.  
Sovereignty essentially moves along an axis between two poles, which I call monarchical 
and popular.  I examine the development of monarchical sovereignty in the works of Jean 
Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes.   Monarchical sovereignty is initially 
formulated as being limited by ideas of natural law and natural right, but in its operation, 
it remains essentially unfettered.  By the 17th and 18th centuries, a constitutional 
revolution takes place in Europe which moves the concept of sovereignty along the axis 
toward popular rule; supreme authority is said to lie in the people themselves.  However, 
I demonstrate that there remains the same formal idea of a power, once instituted, which 
remains unaccountable, especially in national emergencies.  The Italian philosopher 
Giorigo Agamben argues that this is the essential nature of sovereign power; it remains 
outside of the limits which seek to bind it.   
 In the next section of the dissertation is a series of five case studies in which I 
explore the implications of this concept of sovereignty in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries.   In the countries of Cambodia, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, 
crimes against humanity have been committed against broad segments of their own 
populations; I will examine the degree to which political authority claiming sovereignty 
is implicated in each set of crimes.  By way of contrast, I will also examine the role 
played by each country’s political culture in these crimes.  In my conclusions to these 
case studies, I will show that, apart from the motivations behind the crimes committed, 
state authority and the state’s institutions were implicated to a very high degree, and that 
political culture itself can fall within the concept of sovereignty.   
 7
 In the last chapter, I will turn to an examination of the ways in which sovereignty 
may be modified and/or challenged as a way to prevent future large-scale crimes against 
humanity.  I will look at the role of humanitarian military intervention as a preventative 
measure; the International Criminal Court as an institution that does away impunity for 
these crimes; and the process of democratization around the world as a long-term means 
of creating political environments that value human rights.  I conclude that these 
measures, while important for curbing future atrocities, only wind up recreating 
sovereign authority at the national level; they do not limit the abuses inherent in 
sovereign authority itself.  Until humanity is able to come up with a way of insuring 
protection of basic human rights outside of a context of absolute control over the means 
of violence, sovereignty will remain with us, with all of its dangers.   
 Because I am trying to make connections across several areas of the social 
sciences – including political theory, international relations, comparative politics, and 
history – this dissertation will sacrifice much depth for breadth.   My treatments of the 
different subject matters will undoubtedly not impress specialists in each of those fields, 
but I hope that that my arguments will open doors for futures areas of research.  
Understanding the role played by sovereign authority in the commission and justification 
of crimes against humanity remains a central task in creating a more just, more secure, 
and more humane world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 8
CHAPTER 2 
RISE OF LEVIATHAN 
 
In order to understand the dynamics of sovereignty, the first step I want to take is 
to show how the concept of sovereignty came into existence.  Sovereignty, like all 
concepts, has a history, but the success of the institutions of sovereignty in the 
contemporary world tends to obscure rather than elucidate the understanding of 
sovereignty.  The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is usually regarded as the “beginning” of 
the modern sovereign state.  However, prior to this date, a number of historical events 
had already taken place which laid the foundation for sovereign political authority, and 
developments would continue after 1648 to ensure that the sovereign idea became the 
dominant model of political authority by the end of the 20th century.   
 Thus, I think it is necessary to create an historical narrative of the origins of the 
concept of sovereignty.  Sovereignty had its beginnings in the Middle Ages in the debates 
between Church, Holy Roman Empire, and national monarchs over political primacy on 
the European continent.  While the Church and the Empire, often linked and also often at 
odds with each other, claimed symbolic primacy in the temporal world, it was the local 
feudal lords, and eventually, the national monarchs, who ended up with military and 
political control over their populations and territories by the end of the Middle Ages.  
Using theological concepts to legitimate their rule, national kingship was transformed 
into sovereign authority.  The development of state bureaucracy in the early years of the 
Modern era borrowed these same legitimating ideas for what was largely a matter of 
secular administration.  Finally, through colonial expansion, the idea of sovereignty was 
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spread throughout the entire world, laying the foundations for its eventual predominance 
in world affairs.   
 
The Political Foundations of European Christendom 
 
In 313 C.E., the Roman Emperor Constantine officially recognized Christianity, 
and seventeen years later, he moved the administrative center of the Empire east to 
Constantinople, an event which is generally regarded as the advent of the Byzantine 
Empire.  During the following century, Byzantium began to lose its control over the 
Roman territories of Western Europe after a series of invasions by Germanic peoples into 
the heart of the Italian peninsula.  Much of subsequent Byzantine foreign policy focused 
on regaining control over this region.7  At not point had relations between the two regions 
been particularly close.  While a number of ecumenical councils of Western and Eastern 
Church officials in the early Middle Ages attempted to maintain ritual and doctrinal unity 
within the realm of Christendom, centuries of growing geographic, linguistic, and 
ideological separation eventually led to two separate and competing domains of 
Christendom.8 
 Traditionally within Christendom, the Bishop of Rome was considered primate, 
first among equals.  From the fifth to the early thirteenth centuries, the Pope struggled 
with the lack of recognition of this role by Byzantium.9  As the last remaining outposts of 
imperial rule in Western Europe succumbed to the Germanic invasions, and the Patriarch 
of Constantinople rose in prominence and power in the eastern empire, the Bishop of 
                                                 
7
 Walter Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (Baltimore:  Penguin, 1975), 72  
8
 John Julius Norwich, Byzantium:  The Early Centuries (New York:  Knopf, 1989),120 
9
 Ullmann, 96-7 
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Rome began to assert that he could appoint an emperor in the west, and this signaled a 
different kind of power to Eastern Christians.10  Around the year 750, there appeared in 
Rome a forged document, The Donation of Constantine, which claimed to have been 
written by the Emperor Constantine himself, which stated that he had merely "retired" to 
the Byzantine capital and left the crown for the Pope to bestow on the next emperor of 
the Romans.11    
In the wake of this growing rift between Western and Eastern Christendom, a 
"siege mentality" developed in the West in the 8th and 9th centuries, as the European 
continent came under further invasions:  the Islamic caliphs into the Iberian Peninsula; 
the Norsemen, the Slavs and the Magyars from the east; unfriendly Christian kings in 
western France; and hostility from princes in northern Italy.  It fell upon the papally-
appointed emperor to organize the defenses of Western Christendom against these 
invasions.12  In the late 8th century, Pope Leo III led the coronation of Charlemagne as 
"Emperor of the Romans."  Later, the papacy turned to the German kings as protectors of 
Western Christendom, and potentially, as instruments of the Pope's power.  Once the 
authority of Western Christendom was consolidated in the Bishop of Rome, separate 
from the authority of Constantinople - made official with the mutual excommunication 
between Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael I in 1054 - the papacy then began to 
establish its authority in relation to the rulers within its own domain. 
 As the earlier Germanic invaders had settled throughout Western Europe, they 
began to convert to Christianity.  At the same time, their focus was not on the role 
                                                 
10
 Ullmann, 77 
11
 Norwich, 119 
12
 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution:  The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1983), 100-1 
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emperor, who to them was just another local ruler.  They acknowledged the authority of 
the Bishop of Rome, but the idea of a united European empire faded from their concern.  
This loose network of local kingdoms and authorities developed their own political and 
religious institutions, influences by Christianity and by local custom.  They looked to 
their elders, folk custom, and tribal leaders for their immediate protection and the 
maintenance of social order.  Isolated from the Church and from the office of the 
Emperor, this situation provided an opportunity for the development of the law of the 
king, which began to evolve alongside the already-existing law of the community.13  
These separate communities passed beyond a tribal stage of social development, with the 
ruler governing as a representative of the community and so being bound by the 
community's sense of justice.14  This network of custom and traditions within these 
communities allowed people to assert their rights and privileges against those of the ruler; 
these arrangements came to be regularized under the spread of feudal and manorial 
relations throughout Western Europe.  Through the influence of Christianity, the 
authority of local rulers was viewed as an extension of the authority of God and the 
Church; the need for governance was seen to be a result of humanity's fallen nature, in 
need of tending and guidance.  Because of the heritage of the Roman Empire, all rulers 
were looked upon as divine, or taking on divine qualities, consecratio.15   Because of the 
Christian heritage, rulers were viewed as Rex Gratia, king by the grace of God, and as 
"vicar of Christ," God's regent on earth.16   
                                                 
13
  In a few centuries, it would eclipse the law of the community in the guise of monarchical aboslutism. 
14
 F. H.  Hinsley, Sovereignty 2nd ed. (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1986), 107 
15
 This was reflected in coronation rites, which were developed in the 9th century throughout Western 
Europe in the wake of the Carolingian Empire; see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies:  A Study 
in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, N. J.:  Princeton University Press, 1997), 89-92 
16
 Also known as "sacral kingship," in Kantorowicz.   
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 This tension between the Germanic ideal of kingship and the Christian ideal was 
never resolved,17 but as suggested above, the line between secular and ecclesiastical 
authority was not sharply drawn.  The Western Church had adopted the political structure 
of imperial Rome; imperial Rome had had its own set of religious legitimations and 
functions, whose trappings the Church had also variously ignored and incorporated.18  
Pepin, king of the Franks, agreed to be protector of the Romans after meeting with Pope 
Stephen II in 754, consecrating his service to the papacy.  His grandson, Charlemagne, 
declared himself "Rector of Europe" and cast his rule in theocratic terms.  A century and 
half later, the Ottonian kings of Germany19 assumed leadership of their local churches 
through a proprietary system, in which bishops were treated as princes of the empire and 
as such secured privileges, becoming feudal lords over their districts. 
 These political and institutional developments were followed by wide-sweeping 
changes in the socio-economic conditions in the 10th and 11th centuries.  This was a 
period of economic development, with the introduction of new technologies and new 
methods of cultivation, which in turn led to agricultural surpluses that supported both a 
general increase in the population of Western Europe and an increase in trade and 
merchant activity.  These last two developments were central in the growth of urban 
centers, the rise of a merchant class, fairs and markets, credit, banking, insurance, and the 
growth of handicrafts and crafts guilds. 
 
The Papal Revolution 
                                                 
17
 Ullmann, 55-6 
18
 The Eastern Church, on the other hand, remained openly subordinate to the Byzantine Emperor, which 
kept alive the older practice of Roman emperorship.   
19
 beginning with Otto of Saxony, who was named imperator and augustus by Pope John XII in 962 
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 The 9th century was a period of renewed piety within the Church, and this was 
given institutional form with the founding of the Clunaic system of monasteries in 
France.  The initial aim of the reformers was to end the inter-related practices of the 
purchase of clerical offices, clerical marriage (and the problem of clergy fathering 
children in and out of wedlock), and the influence of local barons in the selection of 
bishops.  Once these reforms were set in motion, a more fundamental set of questions 
emerged:  if church offices were not inheritable and could not be purchased, could their 
appointment be left in lay hands?  Were kings and lords qualified to make what would be 
a large number of appointments of bishops and priests once the latter were no longer 
allowed to marry and have heirs?  Until this point in Western history, the Church retained 
the right to appoint its own officials, but in actual practice, local rulers under customary 
authority could invest bishops and priests with their offices. 
 The Church’s first act against investiture was at the Synod of Reims in 1049 and 
was followed by similar acts in subsequent decades.  This initially caused conflict with 
the Emperor and the Pope's Norman allies, leading to the ignonimous sack of Rome in 
1084.  In its conflicts with King Henry II of England and Emperor Henry VI of Germany, 
the Papacy was not able fully to establish its supremacy over issues of investiture, but it 
did secure a number of advantages for the Church in the long run.  In the Concordats of 
Bec (1107) and of Worms (1122), which brought the Investiture Controversy to a 
resolution, the Pope was able to insist that:  1)the future ordination of clergy would 
require his approval; 2) he would establish the functions and powers of clerical officials; 
3) rulers could not create new bishoprics, divide or suppress old ones, or transfer or 
dispose of bishops; 4) the Pope would become the principal dispenser of all Church 
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property; 5) he was supreme in all matters of worship and  belief; 6) he could grant 
absolution of grave sins, canonize saints, and distribute indulgences; 7) he was able to 
summon church councils, preside over them, and declare their decisions official; 8) he 
would issue decretals to settle Church controversies; 9) he was the supreme legislator and 
interpreter of the law; 10) the papal court was the court of appeal of all Christendom and 
has jurisdiction over all cases submitted to it by anyone.20  
 Many of these aims were first articulated in a document attributed to Pope 
Gregory VII, the Dictatus Papae, in 1075.  In this list of twenty-seven propositions, the 
Pope set forth his jurisdiction as God's sole human representative on earth, described later 
as fullness of power, or plenitudo potestas.  This was an important part of the worldview 
shared by the Church reformers, as the secular world (the saeculum, the world of time 
and human history, and mundus, the material world, in contrast with aeternitas, eternity, 
and ecclesia, the Church)21 was in need of reform and guidance, which was to be carried 
out through the proper administration of the sacraments22 and the further institutional 
establishment of the authority of the Church.23  
 The Church slowly undertook this monumental, if not ultimately impossible, task 
of governing the entire secular world within Christendom.  It sought to establish itself as 
an independent, self-conscious identity, as the supreme institution from which flowed the 
power of kings and princes.  The Pope ruled Christendom as an inheritance of Saint 
Peter, while the Emperor (and by extension, all kings) ruled by delegation from the Pope.  
During this time, the Pope began to see himself as the chief prince of the Christian 
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polity,24 and he began to refer to himself as "the vicar of Christ", taking the title from the 
emperor.25  Similar statements made by later Popes sought to define the supremacy of the 
Papacy in relation to worldly rulers and the reach of the Pope's powers.  Innocent III's 
bulls Quanto personam and Per venerablis (both 1202) created important distinctions 
between the Pope's ordinary powers of office and his powers as vicar of Christ.26  
Boniface VIII's Unam sanctum (1302) asserted the supremacy of his powers in relation to 
those of worldly kings.   
 The Church went about this wholesale reordering of the social and political life of 
Western Europe.  In order to carry out this mission, it created an enormous bureaucracy, 
whose jurisdiction would come to straddle both secular and ecclesiastical realms.27  There 
was also a great need for a coherent body of laws, and the Church supported efforts at 
systematization of canon law and civil law.   
  In no European country in 1100, and not even in the church, was there  
 anything approaching a comprehensive and organized legal system.  In attempts 
 to assert their authority in society and to provide a measure of order and justice, 
 the secular governments of Western Europe were hampered by limitations of and 
 conflict among the various German customary legal traditions.  In Mediterranean 
 countries Germanic legal procedures and principles further clashed with debased 
 fragments of the much more sophisticated Roman legal system.  In northern  
 France and England feudal law presented yet another group of competing juristic 
 traditions.  A new political order and the slow shift toward a money economy 
 demanded legal rationalization and codification.28 
 
The private efforts of individuals such as Ivo of Chartres (1040-1116) and Irenius (1066-
1125) paved the way for the codification of law, particularly Gratian's organization of 
canon law in the Decretum in the 1140s and the development of a standard law 
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curriculum in universities around the continent in order to teach the newly revived 
Roman civil code.  This revival of Roman law laid groundwork for the further 
development of concepts of political authority already in circulation – potesta (power), 
auctoritas (authority), imperium (discretionary authority), and iurisdictio (jurisdition). 
 The influence of Justinian's code was felt most strongly on the continent, less so 
in England.  Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa of Germany began to use it to buttress his 
claim to absolute authority over the city-states of northern Italy, and his grandson 
Emperor Frederick II used it as the basis of his Constitutions of Melfi.  In France, the 
Capetian monarchs of the 12th and 13th centuries realized the utility of the Code in 
expanding their administrative control their territory and began to employ the same 
absolutist claims to rule as used by the German emperors.  French legal scholars 
developed the legal maxim rex imperator in regno suo (the king is emperor in his own 
realm) as an interpretation of the imperial office found in the Justinian Code.29 Finally, as 
noted above, remnants of Roman law were already a part of the legal systems of the 
Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean region.  Yet, there has always been some 
question as to why Roman law was not as influential in England.  The Norman kings of 
the 11th and 12th centuries would not have resisted the absolutist implications of Roman 
law, which provided a definite contrast with the community-based Germanic law which 
was predominant.  Instead, the Norman kings utilized existing institutions to strengthen 
their royal power.  As a result, no permanent administrative, judicial, and legislative 
bodies operated on their own autonomous authority, as on the continent.30  All local and 
feudal institutions became absorbed under the control of the king.  This had two 
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important implications for the political culture of England.  First, this led to the 
development of strong checks on royal power, despite the king’s administrative control.  
An abstract idea of the “state,” divorced from the local people administering it, never 
developed in England.31 The local “King’s men” remained a visible and approachable 
part of the community.  Second, there developed the system of common law, another 
innovation of royal power under King Henry II.  Under common law, the king used the 
local nobility to carry out his administration of justice, who performed unpaid services by 
acting as judges and serving on juries.32  The king also made use of writs to carry out his 
orders, but this also had the unintended consequence of placing limits on the king's 
jurisdiction, by holding him to the letter of his own law.   
 The Church was also strongly influenced by Roman law concepts during this 
period.  Despite the initial reluctance of the papal reformers to embrace secular law for 
spiritual ends, especially the pagan legacy of Rome, the usefulness of the vocabulary of 
the law proved irresistible.  The canonists had already described the Pope's authority over 
the Church and Christendom as plenitudo potestas; to this list was added iudex ordinarius 
omnium, ordinary judge of all; lex animata, the living law; and omne habet in pectare 
suo, all the laws are in his breast.  Later, these same terms would be borrowed to describe 
the office and powers of the national monarchs.33 
 Despite the influence that the Church and Roman law would come to have within 
Western Europe through both the civil code system and canon law, the administration of 
affairs at the local level remained within the province of custom (consuetudines) and long 
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practice and were supplemented by the laws of the king (constitutiones), and the 
mechanisms of enforcement and adjudication were strengthened by the expansion of the 
kings' courts (curia).34  The authority of monarchs and nobility continued to flow from 
existing Germanic law and feudal customs, with their emphasis on contractual obligations 
between the ruler and the people.35   
 
[The] law curricula for university instruction from the twelfth to the eighteenth 
centuries in Europe were exclusively based on the laws of Justinian, the Corpus 
iuris civilis, and the corpus iuris canonici, but judges and notaries did not usually 
apply these laws.  Furthermore, as is known, the contents of these bodies of laws 
gave no guidance and provided no norms for those who had responsibilities for 
governance or administration on the local level, in the commune civilis or the 
regnum, in the seigniry or the principality, in the hierarchy of the Church or in the 
monastic orders.36   
 
Thus, two kinds of law existed:  utrumque ius, the one and the other, i.e., the duality of 
civil and canon law; and the ius proprium, the local laws of Europe. Thus, the authority 
of the Church over Western Europe was to remain ultimately religious and ritual, and it 
was left to the local rulers to fill in the blanks of governance.   
 
Opposition to Pope and Empire 
 
 The Papal Revolution was not without its opponents.  From the very beginning, 
resistance emerged from other centers of authority within medieval society.  While 
remaining respectful of the Church's position as spiritual shepherd of the Christian 
community, lay critics began seeking to refute the Papacy's hierocratic concepts and aims 
                                                 
34
 Hinsley, 50f 
35
 Post, 426 
36
 Manilo Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe: 1000-1800, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, 
(Washington, D. C.:  Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 124 
 19
by developing a number of arguments.37  The writer of the 11th century tract On the 
Preservation of the Unity of the Church, argued that the primary source of the Pope's 
power, from Christ's commission to Peter "to loose and to bind,"38 was not a 
comprehensive jurisdiction and did not apply to local rulers.39  Peter Crassus, who taught 
at the University of Ravenna, argued that the Pope had set aside the “sacred laws” of the 
Emperor by arrogating to himself the function of law-giver.40  Reiterating the Gelasian 
doctrine of the "two-swords,"41 defenders of Emperor Henry IV said that Christ had 
established two governing authorities over Christendom, Pope and King, and in asserting 
his sole power to invest clergy, the Pope had usurped the power of temporal rulers.42  A 
tract written by an anonymous defender of the Norman king showed that "the concept of 
the king as a person endowed with spiritual qualities was still in bloom and had hardly 
passed its heyday."43  Guido of Ferrara sought to preserve the supremacy of the king's 
power by focusing on the issue of material possession and the importance of regalian 
rights within the feudal system.  In the feudal understanding of property, the property of 
the king was inalienable, and therefore, anything conferred by the king to anyone, 
including the office of bishop, made that person a usufruct of the king; they had the right 
to the “fruits” of the office but not ownership of it.  Thus, the Church would be seizing 
the king's prerogative if it took away his power of investing the bishop with his office.44 
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 In the 13th and 14th centuries, direct opposition to the Papacy by both the emperor 
and the regional monarchs continued to grow.  While the Church was successful at 
dominating rational discussion of both theological and political issues, it never actually 
established its supremacy as a political authority.  The relationship between the emperor 
and the Pope had always been tenuous at best, but it reached a low point during the reign 
of Emperor Frederick II (1220-1250).  Under the influence of Roman law and his own 
sense of having a world-historical role, Frederick resisted the coercion of the Pope and 
carried out his rule despite being excommunicated a number of times.  Frederick's 
approach to his own authority was based on the assumption of a dual vicariate of Christ:  
Christ was both king and priest.  The royal function had passed into the hands of the 
emperor, and while the priestly function was in the hands of the Pope.  Within this theory 
of political power, the Pope had no power to issue laws which affected the royal 
domain.45  In 1231, Frederick issued the Constitutions of Melfi, a law code for the 
kingdom of Sicily, which asserted the predominance of the role of the Emperor over the 
secular affairs of Christendom.   
After Frederick's death, the Holy Roman Empire imploded over a succession 
crisis.  In 1320 another conflict arose, this time between Emperor-elect Ludwig IV of 
Bavaria and Pope John XXII, over papal interference in the election of the emperor.  This 
ultimately led to the promulgation of the Golden Bull in1356, which reformed the 
election procedure of the emperor and implied the absence of papal control over the 
empire.  This episode also inspired thoughtful lay reaction to the claims of the Church, 
including Marsilius of Padua in his Defender of the Peace, and William of Ockham, in 
his Dialogues.  Both argued (on very different grounds) in support of the temporal 
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authority of the emperor as necessary aspect of keeping the peace among the kings of 
Europe; they also argued for a greatly diminished role for the Church in the 
administration of the empire.   
 In the midst of these clashes between emperor and Pope, the power of the regional 
monarchies was growing.  England and France were at war with one another in the late 
13th century, and both countries sought to levy taxes on the clergy and Church property to 
help finance their war efforts.  Pope Boniface VIII issued his bulls Clericos Laicos 
(1296) and Unam sanctum (1302) during this conflict in order to protect church property 
and to reassert the Church's supremacy over temporal matters with a version of the “two 
swords” argument; both lay and ecclesiastical officials were threatened with papal 
interdict and excommunication if they took part in the provision of church revenues for 
lay purposes without papal approval.46   In reponse to this, King Philip IV of France and 
his chief minister William de Nogaret had the Pope kidnapped and were going to have 
him brought to France to try him on charges of heresy; Boniface soon escaped with the 
help of locals but died shortly thereafter.  From that point on, French cardinals began to 
dominate the College of Cardinals, and they elected a Pope who was subservient to 
French national policy.  These events would directly contribute to the Great Schism 
within the Church and its subsequent loss of prestige and legitimacy among the 
population of Europe.47 
 By the end of the 14th century, the power of the Church over the secular affairs 
was on the wane.   The seeds for the Protestant Reformation were already sown.  The 
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power of the Holy Roman Emperor was on the decline, whose realm now consisted only 
of a number of independent and loosely united principalities stretching across central 
Europe.  The Italian principalities and city-states variously acquiesced to papal or 
imperial control or else asserted their independence.  England and France emerged as 
independent kingdoms in their own right, and Spain arose a century later, following the 
Reconquista, becoming a powerful kingdom in its own right.   
 All of these changes pointed to the emergence of new circumstances which 
inspired new approaches to the question of political supremacy.  The word "sovereign" 
made its first appearance during this time in Philippe de Beaumanoir’s the Coutumes de 
Clermont en Beauvais (1283).  He argued that while each baron was "souveran" over his 
own barony, the French king was "souveran" over all of his barons.48  The realm of the 
king, his regnum, has less and less to do with the authority conferred to him by Pope or 
emperor than it did with the territory under his actual administration.  Following the 
defeat of Pope Boniface VIII, Pope Clement V issued the bull Pastoralis curia in 1313, 
which supported the claims of independence of Robert of Naples from Emperor Henry 
VII. This was the first time that the empire had been recognized as a territorially-limited 
entity, from which other political communities were separate.49  This only confirmed the 
obvious, that territorially-based rule50 was becoming of central importance in conceiving 
of political authority, and the French legal maxim cited earlier, that a king is emperor in 
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his own realm, contained the foundational idea of what would emerge as sovereignty in 
the West.  
 
The Modern Era 
 
 With the decline of the authorities of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman 
Empire, the territorial state was poised to assume its central position as the dominant 
political institution throughout Europe.  As noted earlier, the territorial state was but one 
of a number of political institutions existing in the late medieval period, one of a number 
of loci of authority in the complex web of feudal society; the national monarch was but 
one of many feudal lords and princes.  A number of changes lead to the emergence of a 
new political order in Europe.  The Black Plague had significantly reduced the population 
of Europe by the mid-14th century, but this had also created agricultural surpluses and a 
need for labor in the urban areas.  Latin was being supplemented by vernacular 
languages, first in literature, then in religion, and finally in government.  The loss of 
confidence in the authority of the Church led many throughout Western Europe to 
embrace the various strands of Protestant reform, which in many instances allied 
themselves with the national monarchs against the Church.  The Protestant Reformation 
itself signaled the end of a united Christendom and, in most instances, split Europe along 
national lines.   
 At the same time, the priority of the spiritual life and its identification with public 
life, once assumed during the medieval period, gave way to a pronounced divide between 
public and private lives, where authority in spiritual matters migrated to the private 
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sphere, whether in terms of individual conscience or a local congregation or the 
individual choice of a ruler; the nature of public authority was left open to be filled, 
although the legacy of the spiritual underpinnings of that authority still existed.   
  The efforts . . . to provide the state institutions with some religious  
 aureole, as well as the adaptability and general usefulness of ecclesiastical thought 
 and language, led the theorists of the secular state very soon to a more than super- 
 ficial appropriation of the vocabulary not only of Roman Law, but also of Canon 
 Law and Theology at large.  The new territorial and quasi-nation state, self- 
 sufficient according to its claims and independent of the Church and the Papacy, 
 quarried the wealth of ecclesiastical notions, which were so convenient to handle,  
 and finally proceeded to assert itself by placing its own temporariness on a level  
 with the sempiternity of the militant Church.51 
 
As much as the complexity of social and political relations that developed within feudal 
society was an attempt to deal with the breakdown of the Roman Empire's power across 
Europe, now the independent territorial states sought to build upon the remnants of feudal 
society. It was inevitable that the dominant political institution would borrow its 
conceptual self-understanding from previous institutions, including the religious idea of a 
supreme power, only now in secular form. 
 In fact, what made the situation of the European territorial monarchies unique was 
this absence of a supreme authority, such as the Pope or Emperor, above them to settle 
disputes and broker agreements among kings and princes.  Kings had supreme authority 
over the people within their own realm but were beholden to no such authority 
themselves.  In the absence of sovereign, or supreme authority, among kings there began 
to develop an entire body of norms and practices which would become what we today 
call "international relations" – rules of war and peace, laws of the seas, establishment and 
maintenance of diplomatic relations, rules of trade, and so on.  The relationships of 
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independent territorial states grew out of ongoing negotiation and conflict among their 
rulers, unimpeded by external authority.   
 The first inkling of this situation can be seen in the work of Niccolo Machiavelli.  
Although his reputation precedes him in the modern era as an advocate of political 
manipulation and "reason of state," at the time of his writing in the early 16th century the 
political geography of Europe was unsettled, and the larger territorial states were 
jockeying for control of the Italian peninsula as well as for control of trade routes to Asia.  
Although the Church retained some control of the Italian peninsula and had some 
influence through the kings of France and Spain and through the Holy Roman Emperor, 
its preeminence as an arbiter of conflict was clearly on the decline.  Machiavelli's 
experience in the diplomatic office of his native Florence gave him a unique perspective 
on the ways in which these newly emerging territorial states had to negotiate their actions 
with one another.52 Conflict among states was becoming increasing destructive at that 
time, reaching a nadir during the Thirty Years' War, and diplomacy would assume a 
decisive role in the following decades.53 It was out of this conflict that the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) recognized the role of monarchs to determine the dominant religious 
institutions within their territory (cuis region, eius religio); it was also one of the first 
major diplomatic congresses in early modern Europe. Permanent embassies and 
ambassadors were becoming a necessity as territorial states carried on unilateral and 
multi-lateral relations with one another.  Diplomacy and the norms of international law 
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would come to embody these developing means of coordinating international actions in 
the absence of a supreme authority.   
 While rulers of these territorial states were developing rules and norms amongst 
themselves, domestically another set of changes were taking place.  In the earliest 
decades of the modern era, monarchy seemed to be the form that sovereign statehood 
would take.  It went without question, at least for a time, that monarchy was the most 
"natural" form of government, the most familiar to European experience.  However, 
social relations were in continual ferment, and beginning during the time of the Protestant 
Reformation and continuing until the late 18th century, a few of the territorial states in 
Europe would undergo "constitutional revolutions" in one form or another.  The 
Kingdom of Poland, and later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, established a 
representative assembly of the nobles, the Sejm, in 1493, and instituted the principle of 
"nihil novi," "nothing new" without the consent of the assembly.  Its last dynastic 
monarch, Sigismund II August (ruled 1548-1572), made changes that allowed the country 
to become a constitutional republic with an elected monarchy.54  The Dutch Republic 
declared its independence from the Spanish monarchy in 1581, and it adapted the 
medieval institution of the States-General to create a system of representation and 
constitutional limits on the chief stadtholder.  England already had a strong constitutional 
tradition, growing out of the institution of common law, the use of writs, and the 
occasional demands for specified rights by the landed nobility.  The nobility and the 
commoners continued to make demands on the King through the institution of 
Parliament. In the 17th century, the tensions between Parliament and King would turn into 
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the English Civil War (1642-1651), the restoration of the monarchy (1660), and the 
“Glorious Revolution” (1688) which broke the absolute power of the monarchy.   
  In the kingdom of France, while the Estates did not have the same ability to make 
demands of the king, there still existed a strong strain of demand for constitutional 
controls on the monarchy, visible particularly during the French Wars of Religion (1562-
1598).  It would ultimately take the violence of the French Revolution to topple the 
monarchy and create some semblance of constitutional rule.  Louis XIV, who reigned 
from 1638 to 1715, did more than any other French monarch to establish the strength of 
the centralized, absolutist government. The other monarchies of Europe followed 
France's lead in promoting their own versions of absolutism. The Habsburg rulers 
undermined the elected office of the emperor in the Holy Roman Empire by turning the 
office into a hereditary entitlement for themselves, following the reign of Charles V in 
1556.55  Furthermore, the rule of the Habsburgs remained personal, not constitutional; 
their empire remained a collection of feudal estates, and each domain had its own 
traditions and institutions and regional interests, with no interest in administrative 
centralization.  Attempts at centralization and administrative reform under Empress 
Maria Theresia (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II (1765-1790) eventually failed.  Spain 
and the Italian peninsula were two areas least affected by the Protestant Reformation, and 
they retained their strong alliance with the Catholic Church.  Spain eventually became a 
united country under centralized control under Bourbon rule after the War of Spanish 
Succession, ending in 1714.  The 18th century saw the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia in 
northern Germany, especially under Frederick Wilhelm I, who introduced some 
Enlightenment ideas for pragmatic reasons, such as improving the efficiency of public 
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administration, and sought to have all realms of public life emulate military discipline.56  
Absolutist monarchy was also a feature of political life in the Kingdoms of Sweden and 
Denmark in the 17th and 18th centuries.   Finally, the Empire of Russia was influenced by 
this same strand of Enlightenment absolutism through Peter the Great and Catherine the 
Great, also ruling in the 18th century.   
 
Colonialism 
 
 While constitutional revolutions were taking place in some countries and 
enlightened absolutism was being established across the rest of the European continent, 
the foreign policy of these new territorial states was wedded to the exploration of the 
globe and the establishment of settler colonies, trading posts, and plantations in other 
parts of the world.  This grew out of attempts to circumvent the Ottoman Empire's control 
of trade routes with the Far East, a mercantilist preoccupation with accumulating precious 
metals and acquiring monopolies over trade routes and the trade of valuable products, and 
national support for Christian missionary activity in the newly discovered lands.  Spain, 
Portugal, France, and England controlled the Americas until the early 19th century, when 
European influence was decisively eliminated on those continents, and the newly 
independent countries became sovereign, constitutional, territorial states in their own 
right.   
 Portugal and the Dutch Republic dominated trade with Asia in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.  England established a colonial presence in India in the 17th century, and this 
provided it with a gateway to inner Asia and a base for the dominance of trade in the 
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region by the end of the 18th century.  By the early 19th century, the British East India 
Company effectively controlled the Indian subcontinent.  Traditionally resistant to 
outside presences, both Japan and China would eventually yield to Western pressure and 
open up their interiors to trade and commerce.  The Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60) 
and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) weakened the Chinese Empire, opening the way for 
the European states to carve out their "spheres of influence."  The collapse of the Mughal 
Empire in India, already weak in the early 19th century, allowed the British government 
to assume complete administrative control of the region in 1858.  Following attacks on 
French Catholic missionaries in the empire of Vietnam, the French government managed 
to convince the Vietnamese Emperor to cede control of its Southeast Asian provinces 
(Cochin China) and placed them under French "protection" in 1862; France would 
directly control all of Southeast Asia by 1884.  The United States Navy under 
Commodore Perry paid a number of visits to Japan between 1852 to 1854 and managed 
to convince the Japanese emperor to open up to trade with the Western nations; what 
made the case of Japan different from the course of other Asian countries was that, in 
another decade, after the beginning of the Meiji Era, Japan undertook an ambitious 
course of Western-style technological and economic development.  In the following 
years, Japan would take control of Korea, Taiwan, and sections of Manchuria.   
 Africa also had contact with European countries in past centuries, but the 
European presence was not large, consisting of Portuguese trading posts in coastal areas 
in the sub-Sahara regions, and Dutch and English settlers in the Cape Colony in the 
south.  France began the conquest of northern Africa in the 1830s, beginning with 
Algeria, later annexing the kingdoms of Tunisia and Morocco.  France also enjoyed good 
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relations with the viceroy of Egypt, and it was under French auspices that construction of 
the Suez Canal began in 1854.  Because of debts incurred for its war against Ethiopia, the 
viceroy of Egypt, Ismail Pasha, was forced to sell his shares of the Canal to the British 
government in 1875.  France and Britian assumed financial control over Egypt four years 
later.  In 1882, following a period of civil conflict, British troops began their occupation 
of the country.  Following the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the major European powers 
agreed to guidelines on how to lay claims to their colonial possessions, and this marked 
the beginning of the "scramble for Africa."  Belgium gained control of the Congo Free 
State; Germany controlled Togoland, the Cameroons, South West Africa, and East 
Africa; Britain controlled Kenya, Uganda, the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, and 
Tangyinka; and France controlled Guinea, French West Africa, and French Equatorial 
Africa.  Italy followed suit by claiming Libya and Chad and making incursions into 
Ethiopia. 
 This period of colonial expansion would continue until the First World War, after 
which there was a broad (though shallow) international support for the national 
independence and self-determination of peoples.  Those regions in the Middle East that 
had been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire were transferred to the administration of 
Britain and France.  Between the First and Second World Wars, there was a period of 
growing domestic support for national independence in the Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa.  The Second World War weakened the ability of the European powers to 
administer their colonial holdings.   
After 1945, the push for decolonization had begun, both at the local level and 
through the newly-created United Nations.   However, a number of factors stood in the 
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way of former colonial dependencies becoming sovereign states.  The Cold War began 
shortly after World War Two, and the ideological battle between the United States and 
the Soviet Union subsumed practically every movement for national independence in the 
years that followed.  Many of the countries striving for independence were economically 
weak and underdeveloped, eventually making them dependent on foreign aid, and thus, 
on the national and international agendas of the aid providers.  These two factors created 
domestic situations in those countries which often polarized the population, undermining 
attempts to create broad popular support for new governments and often leading to civil 
conflict; some of these conflicts still continue today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the idea of sovereignty sought to provide populations of European 
countries with some semblance of political order and security in the decline of the feudal 
era, this has not always been the case for a great many countries which have sought 
political independence in the 20th century.  For them, sovereignty has become a kind of 
trap – a political ideal that seems to work for many Western nations but which has 
disastrous effects when put into practice in their own political communities.  It was 
thought that after the end of the Cold War, struggling nations around the world would 
then have the opportunity to escape of the ideological conflict and to pursue their own 
courses of development, but this has been far from the case.  In the five case studies of 
crimes against humanity that will follow, three of them occurred after 1990.  Two wars 
have been fought in the Persian Gulf region and southwest Asia, and civil conflict has 
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raged through Sub-Sahara Africa.  Although national borders exist, and international 
recognition has taken place, sovereign authority has failed in those regions.  Even 
Western nations haven’t escaped these problems.  The European states were born out of a 
crucible of war and civil conflict in the early modern era.  The settlement of the Americas 
led to the extermination of native peoples, the institution of slavery and varying degrees 
of racial segregation, and extremes of economic inequality; sovereignty has apparently 
existed for the benefit of some people but not for others.   
This history of the concept of sovereignty demonstrates three things.  First, 
sovereignty is not a “natural” or self-evident concept of political authority.  Rather, it is a 
mode of political authority whose origins can be traced to the breakdown of feudal modes 
of the authority at the end of the Middle Ages; it was one solution to a set of political 
problems confronting the peoples.  Other legitimate modes of authority existed alongside 
of the national monarchies until the modern era.  In the contemporary world, no other 
means of organizing political authority is considered legitimate by the community of 
states.  Second, the idea of sovereignty is a theological-political concept; the idea of a 
political authority that knows no accountability to any authority higher than itself is one 
that takes over the theological language of the debates between Pope, Emperor, and King 
in the Middle Ages.  This aspect of sovereignty became obscured after the Enlightenment 
period, as political language became more secularized.57 When we speak of sovereignty, 
we are still speaking in theological, even metaphysical terms. Finally, there exist two 
poles of sovereign authority, as evidenced by the constitutional revolutions in the early 
modern period: absolutism and constitutionalism.  In the next chapter, I will explore this 
                                                 
57
 see Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab, (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press, 1985) 
 33
in greater depth, but at this point, it is enough to say that theorizing about sovereignty has 
not moved far beyond these two poles.   
Taken together, these conclusions point to a facet of sovereignty that remains 
unrecognized and “un-thought.”  There is a dangerous aspect of sovereignty that is often 
overlooked but which becomes visible in times of social and political instability; the 
sovereign authority has the ability to define threats to its existence, to define its enemies 
as it sees fit; the perception and definition of threats to the body politic is one of the 
central roles of sovereign authority.  In times of war, this role seems straightforward and 
receives its institutional form as military power.  At other times, the body politic is 
protected from internal threats by police power.  The paradox is this: by the late 20th 
century, there is never a time when the body politic is not threatened.  I will examine this 
assertion in more depth in the case studies and in the conclusion, but at this point, it is 
enough to say that this situation ensures that the sovereign authority is always justified in 
defending against or attacking threats.   
However, this authority remains beyond the reach of accountability - there is no 
limit to what it may do, within its own material capabilities.  Accountability here means 
the condition of being answerable for one’s actions to a higher authority.  As I have 
shown in this chapter, the development of sovereign authority slowly does away with the 
notion of authority that is higher than that of the state itself, drastically curtailing the 
degree to which a state is accountable to any entity.  In the next chapter, theorists of 
monarchical sovereignty such as Bodin and Hobbes define the limits of monarchical 
power by arguing that the law of God and natural law are the boundaries of sovereign 
authority.  In turn, theorists of popular sovereignty such as Locke and Rousseau sought to 
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reign in the claims to sovereign power by absolutist monarchs by relocating sovereignty 
in the people, by making the sovereign authority answerable to the people themselves.  
Under either monarchical or popular theories of sovereignty, through its prerogative 
power the sovereign has a wide authority for interpreting and defining threats to the 
existence of the political community.  When threats are seen as an internal, then the stage 
may be set for atrocities to be committed, because the very people that the monarch or the 
elected government is supposed to be protecting comes to be viewed as the enemy.  This 
is why it is important to understand the internal dynamics of sovereignty in theory, in 
order to make sense of this permanent state of war.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NAMING THE BEAST 
 
 
 Out of the medieval period emerged both new practical arrangements of power in 
the institutions of both absolutist and constitutional states and a new theory of power 
constructed around the concept of sovereignty.  The most influential philosophers of 
sovereignty in the early modern period were Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas 
Hobbes.  During the period of the “constitutional revolutions” in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, thinkers such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the framers of the 
American Constitution began to advocate a different configuration of sovereignty, one 
which relocated the source of sovereign authority away from God and the monarch 
towards the people. Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes were almost contemporaries of one 
another,58 and they wrote in response to the events of the Protestant Reformation in their 
respective countries.  The later writers rethought the structures of sovereignty advocated 
by Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes, while retaining the concept’s broad delineations of 
authority within the country’s boundaries.  These variations in the concept of sovereignty, 
developed over the course of three centuries, have proved to be enduring until the present 
day.     
 What these two poles of sovereignty, which I will call monarchical and 
constitutional, have in common are their positions toward the security of the population 
and territory under sovereign authority.  Questions of subversion and the role of defining 
threats to the existence of the state fall to the sovereign authority.  This becomes a 
troublesome duty in the advent of civil war.  Almost by definition, civil conflict occurs 
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when the basic unity of country breaks down and one part of the population fights against 
the sitting government or another part of the population.  In the process, a government’s 
legitimacy is called into doubt; its sovereign authority is called into question.   Civil 
conflicts can ultimately decide when legitimacy is restored.  This points to a deeper issue, 
the very foundation of sovereign authority itself, which is grounded in control over the 
means of violence, without regard to the historical origins of that authority.  These 
theorists of sovereignty, from Bodin to Rousseau, consistently defend a conception of 
authority rests on control over the means of violence.  Borrowing an argument from 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, this means that, because it controls the means of violence, 
sovereign authority partly lies outside the sphere of the law it enforces and further, it lies 
beyond all accountability, even in constitutional settings.  The ability to define threats, 
the control over the means of violence, and the lack of accountability together create the 
potential for atrocities within a country’s own borders.   
 
 
 Sovereignty and Monarchy 
 
Bodin 
 
 
 Bodin’s treatment of sovereign authority is a codification and clarification of the 
already-existing political relations of his day in France.  In particular, he sets out to 
distinguish the relationship between sovereign authority and subject from the network of 
feudal relationships of the previous era.  In doing so, he is describing the emerging 
relationships between government and subjects in the other two prominent monarchical 
states of his era, England and Spain.  For Bodin, what differentiates sovereign authority 
from the feudal modes of authority is the absence of reciprocal rights and privileges:  the 
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subject obeys, and the prince commands and protects them.  Subjects have no rights 
except for those conferred upon them by the sovereign himself.  On a social level, this 
represents the rise in preeminence of the king’s law, which supplanted and in many cases 
superceded the laws of the towns and villages, the Church, guilds and fraternities; a 
multiplicity of laws was trumped by laws emanating from one source, as all other modes 
of authority in late medieval/early modern Europe were falling under the jurisdiction of 
the king’s law.  The king’s relationship with his subjects was to be direct and 
unmediated.  “The highest degree of compulsion is the power of life and death . . . This is 
the highest attribute of sovereignty, proper to the majesty of a prince, and inherent in him 
to the exclusion of all other public persons.”59   
 The nature of this sovereign authority is explained by reference to two other 
fundamental modes of authority, that of a father over a household, and that of God over 
creation.  Bodin focuses on the correspondence between these three modes of authority, 
the centrality of command.  “[T]here is none that has a natural right to command save 
only the father, who is the image of the Almighty God, the Father of all things.”60  
Sovereign power, in its essence, is paternal power, the power of a father over his 
household, which would include wife, children, and servants.  Bodin defined sovereignty 
as the absolute right to command.  “[He] cannot in anyway be subject to the commands 
of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and 
amends absolute law.”61  As has been noted, the power of a sovereign is power over life 
and death, and it is also the absolute power of command in a political community.  Bodin 
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considered these two attributes as making up the quality of “majesty” that also defined 
sovereign authority, from the Latin term maiestas, describing absolute and perpetual 
power to hold a commonwealth in awe.62  In summary, the power of sovereign authority 
is the power to command, backed by the means of violence.   
 Yet even for Bodin sovereign authority has limits.  “[All] princes of the earth are 
subject to the laws of God and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all 
nations.”63  Bodin consciously distinguished his concept of sovereignty from mere 
tyranny, which he defined as rule in which the laws of nature are ignored.64  First and 
foremost, the sovereign prince is subject to the laws of God.  God is the ultimate 
sovereign, the Father of creation, and the princes of the earth are His lieutenants.65  By 
treating earthly princes as part of the divine hierarchy, Bodin sidesteps the issue of the 
authority of the Church, which is probably a function of his intention to focus exclusively 
on the role of the sovereign prince; the unique position of the French monarchy within 
Christendom, as the unofficial protector of the Church’s interests in Europe; and the Wars 
of Religion in France.  As a lieutenant of the Almighty, however, the sovereign prince 
will one day have to answer for actions before God, so it falls upon the prince to behave 
in a godly manner.66   Second, the prince is subject to the laws of nature.  For Bodin, this 
concept of nature covers everything from honor and equity, to the sanctity of covenants.  
The law of nature is what is reasonable and equitable.67  Bodin eloquently describes a 
prince who governs in accordance with the laws of nature as one who 
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  fears God, is merciful to the afflicted, prudent in his undertakings, 
 brave in action, modest in prosperity, constant in adversity, true to his plighted 
 word, wise in counsel, careful of his subjects, helpful to his friends, terrible to  
 enemies, courteous to men of good birth, a scourge of evil-doers, and just 
 towards all.68 
Finally, the sovereign prince is subject to the laws that are common to all peoples.  Bodin 
does not discuss these at length, but they include just war, property, and the constitutional 
laws of the realm.  The latter refers to the rules that make up the foundation of a 
commonwealth, and the sovereign prince may not alter them.69  As Bodin summarizes, 
justice is the end of law, the law is the work of the prince, and the prince is the image of 
God, so the law of the prince should be modeled upon the law of God.70 
 A heavy burden rests upon the sovereign prince.  He is the father of his nation and 
is responsible for its common welfare.  It is his law, his command, which brings this 
about, but primarily, it is his good faith and example that holds the commonwealth 
together.  “The surest foundation of a commonwealth is public confidence, for without it 
neither justice, nor any sort of lasting association is possible.  Confidence only arises 
where promises and legal obligations are honoured.”71  The sentiments of faith and trust 
in the sovereign prince are what allow him to be able to carry out the demands of justice.  
For Bodin, trust, more than justice, is the basis of a political community.  Justice 
considered alone is without sympathy, since it demands “the strict exaction of rights” 
without regard to persons.  “But mutual affection leads men to make concessions.”72 
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This explains the necessity of divine and natural law for the political community, since 
their sole end “is to foster love among men, and between men and God.”73 
 The concern with trust and public confidence will lead a prince to observe the 
principles of just war and the sanctity of agreements with other princes.  “[Seeing] that 
they are the guarantors of good faith and sworn engagements, what assurance will those 
subject to them have of their own mutual undertakings if the rulers themselves are the 
principal breakers and violators of good faith?”74  For reasons of domestic stability, it is 
in the interests of sovereign princes to carry on their affairs with one another in good faith 
and without ill-will, even in warfare.  They will observe the right of conquest in war with 
one another, which creates its own form of legitimate rule in its wake, instead of mere 
tyranny.75 
 There is a significant religious dimension in Bodin’s understanding of 
sovereignty.  There exists a cosmic hierarchy, and a relationship of correspondence 
between the cosmic macrocosm and the social microcosm.  God rules over the physical 
creation as father and judge; this is mirrored at the level of the political community, by 
the rule of the prince over his subjects; and at the level of the family, but the rule of the 
father over the household.  These forms of rule are perpetual and absolute, the rulers of 
the lower orders subject only to the rule above them.  The will of the sovereign authority 
is expressed as law.  However, instead of being a mere arbitrary exercise of power, 
sovereign authority is held in check by divine and natural law.  Power is exercised in 
accordance with the dictates of divine mercy and justice and by the standards of right 
reason and equity.  Absolute authority, in this case, refers to the degree of a subject’s 
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obedience rather than the reach of the ruler’s power.  In a well-ordered universe, political 
community, or household, the subject owes obedience to the ruler in exchange for 
protection, mercy, and justice.  God respects a human’s dignity in the form of free will; a 
prince respects a subject’s life and property; and a father respects his wife’s, children’s, 
and servants’ humanity by treating them well.  At the level of relations between political 
communities, princes observe the sanctity of covenants with one another as well as the 
rules of just war.   
 Within Bodin’s concept of sovereignty there is little room for popular rule or 
democracy; even aristocratic governments get no sympathy in his account of sovereign 
power. “All the laws of nature point towards monarchy.”76  This should come as no 
surprise in the late medieval/early modern context in which Bodin lived.  Democratic, 
republican, or popular government was viewed either as decadent, because of its 
association with ancient Greece and Rome - where it was castigated by the ancient 
Roman and Greek writers themselves - or as violating the Christian ideal of a unitary 
authority.  Given these assumptions, how can those who are subjects of the law also make 
those same laws? Bodin reluctantly and briefly considers the possibility of popular 
government. 
  The first attribute of sovereignty is the power to make law binding on the 
 subject.   But in such a case who will be the subjects that obey, if they also have a 
 share in the law-making power?  And who will be the law-giver if he is also  
 himself forced to receive it from those upon whom he has imposed it?  One is  
 forced to the conclusion that if no one in particular has the power to make law, 
 but it belongs to all indifferently, then the commonwealth is a popular state.77 
Bodin’s difficulty with popular government also stems from his assumption that the law 
is not binding upon the lawmaker himself.  This applies not only to rulers in other 
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political communities, but also to subsequent rulers in the ruler’s own community.  “[All] 
laws, ordinances, letters patent, privileges, and grants whatsoever issued by the prince, 
have force only during his own lifetime, and must be expressly, or at least tacitly, 
confirmed by the reigning prince who has cognizance of them.”78   
Bodin postulates an essential division within a political community under 
sovereign authority between those who rule and those who are ruled, and this is what 
distinguishes Bodin’s concept of sovereign authority from earlier feudal modes of 
authority.  Feudal modes of authority incorporated reciprocal duties and privileges 
between lord and vassal, while sovereign authority counts on their absence.  Under 
sovereignty, the subject obeys, and the prince protects.  Subjects have no rights except 
those conferred by the prince himself.  Political and social relationships are reduced to 
those of subjection and command, which makes it so difficult to conceive of any form of 
popular government that is stable.   
 Bodin is also unable to conceive of any power-sharing arrangements between 
kings, aristocrats, and people.  Sovereignty is not divisible, and any division of sovereign 
rights would inevitably lead to civil war.79  In Bodin’s own lifetime, the Estates General 
began to exert some power against the French monarchy, but Bodin did not see the 
Estates as anything more than a ratifying body for the king’s laws.80  “[If] the authority of 
the monarch is to be limited, and subjected to the popular estates or to the senate, 
sovereignty has no sure foundations.”81  To drive home his point, Bodin points to the 
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tendency of aristocracies and democracies to turn to dictators in times of emergency82 as 
proof that sovereign authority should reside in the hands of one person. 
 
Grotius 
 
 When Grotius refers to sovereignty, he says that he is not interested in looking at 
“civil acts,” the outward form of daily administration of the state, but at the body of law 
upon which the administration rests.83  Furthermore, Grotius only defines sovereignty 
insofar as it is useful in answering his primary question, can a public war be waged by an 
authority who is not sovereign?84  For Grotius, only a civil power can wage a public war.  
Civil power is defined as the moral faculty of governing a state.85  Grotius uses the term 
“faculty” to denote active ability, as opposed to aptitude, or potentiality.86  This in turn 
leads Grotius to ask, exactly who or what has this active power to govern the state?  This 
leads him to consider the question of sovereignty. 
 Central to Grotius’s idea of sovereignty is the idea of a people. He defines this 
term from both legal and theoretical points of view.   
An association in which many fathers of families unite into a single people and state 
gives the greatest right to the corporate body over its members.  This in fact is the most 
perfect society.  There is no lawful act of men which does not have relation to this 
association either of itself or by reason of the circumstances.  And this is what Aristotle 
expressed in saying that ‘the laws prescribe concerning matters of every kind’.87   
 
                                                 
82
 ibid., 197-198 
83
 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace:  The Translation, Books I, II, and III, trans. Francis W. 
Kelsey in collaboration with Arthur E. R. Boak et al., (Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1962 [1925]), 125 
84
 ibid., 98 
85
 ibid., 101 
86
 ibid., 35 
87
 ibid., 253; the reference to Aristotle is from the Nicomachean Ethics, 5.2, “practically the majority of the 
acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a 
whole,” trans. W. D. Ross, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1980) 
 44
From a legal point of view, a people is the households belonging to the class of bodies 
made up of separate members but who are comprehended under a single name, a kind of 
public association (in terms of Roman law, a collegium or universitas, or what today 
would be called a corporation).  “[Those] who unite to form a state form a kind of 
perpetual and lasting association by reason of the character of those parts which are 
called integral.”88   From a theoretical point of view, a people is an association of families 
or households, borrowing from Aristotle’s understanding of the constitution of the polis 
(civitas in Roman terms), which seeks to realize the common good.  This association has 
a singular essential character or spirit, which is the “full and perfect union of civil life, the 
first product of which is sovereign power,” the bond which holds together the state.89 
 Following this, Grotius takes the relationship between king and people as 
paradigmatic in his understanding of sovereignty, and he begins to question the validity 
of contemporary ideas of popular sovereignty.  While not wholly consistent in his chain 
of arguments, he shows that claims to sovereign authority by the people do not stand on 
their own.  Interestingly, the central importance of the concept of the people can be seen 
most clearly in a number of arguments Grotius used to specifically refute popular 
sovereignty.  First, Grotius argues that all men possess the legal right to enslave 
themselves to another for private ownership;90 a people with legal competence may 
submit itself to another (people or king) in order to be governed, thereby transferring its 
sovereignty over itself to the dominion of another.91  Second, a people may select the 
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form of government it wishes,92 thereby indicating a collective agency in its decision-
making powers. Third, a people may have recourse to any number of justifications to 
renounce its right to govern itself and thus vest this right in another.93  Fourth, citing 
Aristotle, Grotius argues that some men are by nature suited for slavery, and thus, some 
peoples are by nature better off being ruled by others rather than ruling themselves.94  
Fifth, throughout history, a number of nations have lived happily and prosperously under 
monarchical rule.95  Sixth, Grotius cites the principle that property may be acquired by 
means of just war and then draws from it that notion that public authority may be 
acquired by conquest independently of any other source (not only from the people).96  
Seventh, some peoples have other peoples under their sway as subject to them.97  Eighth, 
history shows that monarchs have not always derived their power from the will of the 
people.98  Ninth, among people who are not permanent subject to kings, there are 
temporary kings, who are not subject to the people, as when Republican Rome turned to 
dictators in times of crisis.99  Tenth, it is not always true that the one who vests another 
with authority is superior to him upon whom that authority is vested (a people is not 
superior to their king).100  And eleventh, not all governments are established for the 
benefit of the governed (as with peoples who are made subject during wartime).101 At the 
end of this section of the text, Grotius goes on to make a further point, that a king and a 
people are not mutually dependent upon one another, and that if a people can decide 
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whether or not to obey a king’s command, sovereignty is divided and thereby rendered 
ineffectual.102 
 What may we draw from these arguments about the nature of a people?  As noted 
earlier, a people is a legal body and a corporate entity.  It has legal competence to make 
decisions about itself, in the same way as an adult male may make decisions for himself 
(since, for Grotius, it is made up of adult males); peoples exist within an international 
system of laws and may choose for themselves how they are to be governed.  At the same 
time, while sovereign authority is created through consent,103 Grotius is at pains to show, 
as noted above, that this does not imply anything about the idea of popular sovereignty, 
an idea that was gaining currency at the time, particularly through the writings of another 
Dutch contemporary, Johannes Althusius.104   Popular government is but one possible 
outcome of popular consent, and it is not a necessary outcome; more often than not, 
history and practice shows that peoples have usually been ruled by kings, and their 
governance has been transferred from one king to another.   
 Grotius seems to treat the people as a kind of property of the king, but he is aware 
of this problem, and in order to clarify his argument, he turns to a discussion of Roman 
property law and its distinction between property and right of ownership.105  He proposes 
an analogy between sovereignty and the right of ownership.  The king does not possess 
the people; he possesses sovereign authority.  First, he argues that in the case of both 
ownership and sovereignty, there is a distinction between a thing and its modes of 
possession.  Here, sovereignty is regarded as incorporeal object, and it may be held with 
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full right (as when a king subjugates a people in wartime); with usufruct106 (when a king 
is chosen to rule, and others succeed him); or with temporary use (as when republican 
Rome was ruled by a dictator during crises).107  Second, Grotius makes a distinction 
between civil liberty and civil subjection, analogous to the Roman distinction between 
the personal liberty of a property owner and subjection to a master. “Just as personal 
liberty, then, excludes subjection to a master, so civil liberty excludes subjection to a king 
or any other form of control properly so called.”108  It is in this distinction that Grotius 
finds a basis for popular sovereignty, in the Roman idea of the personal liberty of the 
adult male property owner, but instead of developing this, he continues his focus on 
monarchical rule.  Finally, Grotius follows this analogy between sovereignty and private 
ownership by examining the distinction between the right of sovereignty and its exercise; 
he uses the examples of a king who is an infant, or who has been captured in battle, or 
who is insane.  In all of these instances, the king possesses the right of sovereignty, but he 
is not able to exercise it, making necessary guardians or regents to exercise power for 
him.109  Sovereign governance, whether of a people over itself or by a king, is foremost 
an exercise of right.   
 So, given that a people is a legal actor, how should the position of the king be 
characterized?  The king is also a legal actor who possesses rights (whether absolute or 
partial) over a people; he represents the people at the international level.  Grotius at one 
point goes as far to ask, to whom in a nation does the sovereign power belong, but instead 
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of directly answering the question (whether it lies in the king or in the people, or derives 
from some other source), he makes a series of distinctions regarding sovereign power:  
principatus (chief authority) is distinguished from regnum (royal power); power that is 
wholly sovereign from that which is less than sovereign (for example, that of a king 
versus that of a magistrate under the king); and between sovereign power in itself and its 
modes of possession (again, using Roman law terms, ownership, usufruct, and temporary 
use).110  What Grotius seems to be doing is something other than rendering a simple 
account of the origins and sources of sovereign authority.  Instead, he defines the term as 
a power whose actions are not subject to the legal control of another, actions that cannot 
be rendered void by the operation of another human will.111  He then goes on to say that 
the state is the common subject of sovereignty.112  Sovereignty becomes a neutral legal 
term, existing within an international system of laws and rules, and no reference is made 
to its sources or origins, nor is it infused with any normative content.  In contrast to 
Bodin, whose central effort is to describe the source of source and domestic form of 
sovereign authority, Grotius’s primary concern is to elucidate the laws of war and peace 
between states, and whether a state is a monarchy or a republic is not important.  History 
demonstrates that sovereign states can take any number of forms, so for Grotius there is 
simply no point in making arguments about the validity of this or that form of the state 
when attempting to analyze the legal principles which underlie the interactions between 
states.   
 Despite the analogy he suggests above, Grotius distinguishes between sovereignty 
and private ownership in his discussion of the mode of original acquisition, by which 
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private property and sovereign territory are created.  Until this point in his discussion, 
Grotius has not made such a distinction; in fact, it seems as if he was proposing an 
analogy between sovereignty and private ownership.  However, when he begins his 
treatment of the mode of original acquisition, by which previously unoccupied or 
unclaimed things are occupied or claimed, he makes the point that a distinction does in 
fact exist between sovereignty and private ownership.  He says that they are both 
acquired by a single act, by occupation, but the sovereign has power over all things under 
his occupation, while individuals have only proprietorship over what is allowed by the 
sovereign.113  The law of nature establishes the right of ownership, but insofar as 
individuals submit together under a sovereign power for the protection of their lives and 
property, then the sovereign authority trumps their rights to privately defends themselves 
and their property, in the interests of public tranquility.114   
 
Hobbes 
 
 Hobbes’s Leviathan begins as a polemic against a number of conceptions of 
political theory by way of his own extreme nominalism.  Scholasticism, the dominant 
mode of education and philosophical argument since the 11th century in Europe, is based 
on deduction from first principles and on the synthesis of conflicting arguments.  For 
Hobbes, first principles have often been shown to be unclear, and this ambiguity can lead 
to erroneous conclusions in the process of argument.  Hobbes seeks to proceed from 
precise and consistent definitions of his terms, taking his cues from the science of 
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geometry.  Only with precise and consistent definitions throughout the chain of reasoning 
can one be guaranteed the certainty of the conclusion.115  Hobbes also sees his work as a 
critique of the centrality of prudence in politics.  Prudence is dependent upon experience 
and memory and upon the ability to realize a design the flux and movement of things.  
While this may be a laudable quality, it should be not provide the basis of a theory of 
politics; Hobbes argues that what is needed is a science of politics, which will grant a 
foundation of certainty.116  Finally, Hobbes is critical of the role of custom.  To him, it is 
ignorance of the causes and the original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice that 
dispose men to make custom and example the rule of their actions.117   Rejecting these 
classical and medieval understandings of political life, Hobbes sets out to provide a new 
foundation for the study of politics in human nature.  Political life proceeds from the 
consequences of human nature.  Hobbes begins with the primacy of thoughts and ideas 
and the motions of the passions, and from there he considers the social significance of 
both understanding and feeling (in terms of honor, manners, and religious belief).  
Another facet of Hobbes’s work is his religious project.  In rejecting Scholasticism (and 
implicitly, Catholicism), his work moves toward a more naturalistic understanding of 
God and the Christian religion, and perhaps more importantly, the role of religion in 
stabilizing the political order.  This explains his approval of the Church of England, 
which was under the authority of the King of England.   
 Hobbes’s work can be clearly placed in the social contract tradition.  For him, 
people are already sociable, possessing language and the ability to reason, but they 
originally live in a conflict-ridden state of nature.  By using their reason, human beings 
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will always seek to protect themselves and their possessions, and for Hobbes the most 
reasonable way of ensuring this protection is within a civil society and under a sovereign 
authority, under which all agree by way of a covenant or contract.     
 Within Hobbes’s system of thought, the concept of authority is necessarily 
connected with the concepts of representation, personhood, and covenant.  A person is 
either one whose words and actions are considered his own or which represent the words 
and actions of others.118  The word “person” comes from the original Latin persona, a 
disguise, referring either to one who acts on the stage or in a court of law.  The persona is 
the same as to be an actor, and to act, or to personate, or to represent, is to bear a 
person.119  In the case of artificial persons (corporations, or corporate persons), the actor’s 
words and actions may be owned by those whom he represents.  The person is always an 
actor, while those who actually own the words and actions are the author of them; thus, 
the actor always acts by authority.120  When an actor makes a covenant, he binds the 
authority that he represents; but no authority is obliged by any covenant that he did not 
authorize or which is made against himself, and the actor himself is similarly not bound 
by covenants that violate the law of nature.121  Hobbes discusses covenants in Chapter 14, 
as the second of his laws of nature, which describes how men give up their original 
natural right in exchange for peace.  This is done by way of a covenant, an exchange for 
mutual good.  In the covenant of which Hobbes speaks, to lay down a right creates an 
obligation and a bond (in other words, a duty), and this is done by some means of 
declaration (express consent).  Also, to transfer a right is to transfer the means of 
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enjoying it.  “[They] that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty, are 
understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing 
magistrates for the administration of justice.”122 
 This leads to an interesting question.  Hobbes notes that, in order to ensure that 
covenants are performed, there must already exist a common coercive power over the two 
parties, because trust in itself is not enough.123  If this is the case, then how was the 
original social covenant created?  In a state of nature, there is by definition no confidence 
or trust, so how is it possible for men to even come into agreement with one another, 
except through the use of force?  Hobbes assumes that human beings are reasonable 
enough and tired enough of the state of war that they will exchange their natural right for 
something more secure for themselves.   
 With the above definitions in place, Hobbes then proceeds to describe the process 
by which sovereignty is created.  Men will  
confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may 
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will;  which is as much to say, to 
appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and 
acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall 
act or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and 
therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment.124   
 
This conferral by the multitude to a few or to one in the interests of the common good or 
common peace and safety is the process of representation or authorization writ large.  In 
this case, it is an absolute and irrevocable grant; the subjects may not decide to change 
the form of government or free themselves from their subjection.  They effectively turn 
their lives, strengths, and judgment over to the sovereign.  The subjects’ liberty becomes 
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what the sovereign himself permits.125  “[Nothing] the sovereign representative can do to 
a subject, on what pretense soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury; because 
every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to 
anything, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to 
observe the laws of nature.”126  At the same time, Hobbes carefully examines the 
implications of this statement.  Earlier, he pointed out that covenants are void which seek 
to transfer a man’s right to save himself from death, injury, and imprisonment.127  Thus, 
there are some conditions under which a subject is released from his obedience to his 
sovereign, particularly those involving the risk or harm.  This in turn raises some 
interesting issues:  What about military service?  What about punishments for crimes 
involving prison sentences or the death penalty?  The individual retains the right to refuse 
(and therefore suffer the consequences of refusal), but the sovereign has absolute control 
over the peace and safety of the commonwealth, and he is the sole judge of what is 
necessary for the peace and defense of his subjects.128 
 The grant of these sovereign rights is irrevocable, and the rights themselves are 
indivisible and non-transferable; this, Hobbes argues, is central to the peace and security 
of the commonwealth, and this can be witnessed from Hobbes’ experience of civil wars 
in England.129  Hobbes follows this with a consideration of the dangers of such an 
unlimited fount of power, weighing it against the miseries produced by civil war, the 
human condition, and from “masterless men.”  He concludes that any criticism of 
absolute power that proceeds from a defense of human freedom amounts to a refusal to 
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see that, on their own, people will not contribute to the common defense, because they 
care only for themselves and do not see the long-term consequences of their actions.130 
Hobbes distinguishes between the right of nature (jus naturale) and the law of 
nature (lex naturalis).  The right of nature is the liberty each man has to preserve himself; 
in pursuing self-preservation, he has the liberty to do what he will with other men and 
their possessions.  A law of nature is a general rule discovered by reason which indicates 
that which is a man is forbidden to do, specifically, to harm himself or to allow harm to 
come upon himself.131  Hobbes does not favor the right of nature as a positive condition 
but instead views it as the cause of the negative situation which makes necessary civil 
government.  Without restraint, the right of nature inevitably gives rise to a state of war, 
and people are wholly insecure.  In consulting reason, people are first and foremost 
counseled to find the best way to preserve their lives, and if not through peaceful means, 
then through whatever advantages may come by way of war.132   
 Within the law of nature, men are commanded to seek peace amongst themselves.  
If this condition prevails, then there follows, as noted, the second law of nature, in which 
men are counseled to seek peace by means of giving up their rights of nature and 
retaining only as much liberty against others as he would allow himself from others.  
Hobbes says that this is a restatement of the Law of the Gospel: whatever you want others 
to do to you, do to them.  The law of nature points to the covenant as the only sure means 
of preserving life and security.  The third law of nature requires that all men observe the 
covenants they make.  Hobbes says that this is the fundamental meaning of justice, to 
keep good faith, and it is the coercive power created by the surrender of the right of 
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nature that creates the distinction between justice and injustice.133  Hobbes divides the 
laws of nature into nineteen topics, but they all fall into a number of general categories 
(peace, good faith, justice, gratitude, equality, and equity); they are all ultimately 
reducible to the Golden Rule.  Without the existence of a sovereign power, these laws of 
nature do not hold much sway over the hearts of men.  Without power and a source of 
fear, men are wont to continue following their passions and the right of nature.134   Thus, 
without fear and subjection, there is no security and no peace.  The laws of nature by 
themselves have no “teeth” without violence to back them up, because in nature, humans 
do not follow the law of nature, but rather natural right alone.   
 
Popular Sovereignty 
 
 As noted above, the idea of popular sovereignty was beginning to gain currency 
by the end of the 17th century, in the work in the John Locke, and in the 18th century, in 
the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the writers of the Federalist Papers.  Their 
defense of popular sovereignty was not an equivocal support for democratic government 
but rather a rejection of monarchical supremacy, an increased emphasis on the rights of 
property owners versus the privileges of titled nobility, and a focus on the importance of 
settled constitutional arrangements in the body politic.   These men sought to adapt the 
idea of sovereign authority away from a monarchical basis and absolutist rule to a more 
popular basis and toward more limited powers, particularly in the domestic sphere.  
During this process of adaptation, they retained many of the features of sovereign 
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authority as developed in the earlier writers just examined, in particular, the inability to 
limit sovereign power in instances of emergency or national threat.   
A recurring feature of popular sovereignty is the difficulty of reconciling the 
inevitable rise of dissent from within the body of the people with the need to maintain 
public order.  As noted, these theorists were not fans of democracy as understood in the 
sense contemporary sense of universal suffrage and participation in government; instead, 
they set strict limits on the role of factions and parties and the expression of opinion, and 
they exhibited a profound distrust of popular political movements.  The “popular” aspect 
of popular sovereignty referred instead to a more abstract sense of the public good, not an 
authority arising directly out of the will of the people en masse or as expressed in what 
today would be called public opinion.  Instead, democratic impulses within the political 
community were seen more as threats to public order; the body of the people was as 
much distrusted as the members of government.  Because of this, the concept of 
sovereign authority acquires interesting shades of meaning.   
 
Locke 
 
 The work of John Locke, particularly his Second Treatise of Government, is 
usually cited as a defense of individual rights and popular sovereignty against absolutist 
government.  While this may be the case, Locke’s work still adheres to the same formal 
definition of sovereignty outlined in the works of Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes.  Locke is 
unique in the history of the social contract tradition in making property rights absolute; 
for him, the task of government is to protect individual property.  “Hence it is evident, 
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that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the 
world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government 
at all”.135   Locke is also unique in that he highlights a separation between legislative and 
executive authorities, leaving the supreme authority in the hands of the legislative.  
“[There] can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are 
and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain 
ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, 
when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them”.136   
At the same time, Locke invests the executive with the power of prerogative, 
which is the “power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the 
prescription of law, and sometimes even against it.”137  Ordinarily, prerogative power is 
used for areas in which the law is silent or to call the legislative to consider issues at 
hand.  However, the potential for abuse of this power exists.   
“But who shall judge when this power is made a right use of?  I answer:  between an 
executive in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will 
for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the 
legislative and the people, should either the executive, or the legislative, when they have 
the power their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them.  The people have 
no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to 
appeal to heaven . . . where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their 
right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then 
they have a liberty to appeal to heaven . . . “138   
 
Locke supports the right of rebellion on the part of the people against unjust government, 
but again he acknowledges that no judge on earth may adjudicate such a conflict and that 
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it is left to war to decide, similar to the way Grotius looks upon just war as part of an 
adjudication process between states.  “[Force] between either persons, who have no 
known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a 
state of war, wherein the appeal  lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party 
must judge for himself, when he thinks fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself 
upon it.”139  
 
Rousseau 
 
 The idea of popular sovereignty is most fully developed in Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract.   The creation of a people as a people is the 
foundational act of the political community.  Like Hobbes, and unlike Locke, individuals 
cede all of their rights and powers toward the creation of the public person; this process 
has to take place as a unanimous act in order to encompass all who wish to be full 
members of the community.140  Out of this act is created the general will, which provides 
the body politic with a common self and direction.141  
 Since sovereignty is created by the individuals who make it up, Rousseau goes on 
to argue that the sovereign cannot have an interest that is contrary to their own, nor can it 
ever harm them in particular.  “The sovereign, by the mere fact that it exists, is always all 
that it should be.”142  This is because, in binding themselves by means of the social 
contract, the people create a two-fold commitment within themselves:  one as members of 
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the sovereign in relation to themselves as private individuals; another as members of the 
state in relation to the sovereign itself.143  In becoming a party to the social contract that 
creates the sovereign, each person becomes a private individual (who participates in the 
social contract), a member of the sovereign (Rousseau calls him a citizen) and a subject 
(that is, subject to the laws of the state).   Because each person embodies these three 
identities, the sovereign (the public person) is, by definition, unable to act wrongly 
against the individuals who make it up.  At the same time, an individual’s private interest 
can run be contrary to the interests of the general will144 as can a majority of concurring 
private interests.145  This is because “what makes the will general is not so much the 
number of votes as the common interest that unites them, for in this institution each 
person necessarily submits himself to the conditions he imposes on others”.146  The 
general will rises above a simple majority decision, encompassing the interests common 
to and every citizen within the body politic.   
 Rousseau emphasizes the difference between sovereignty and government.  For 
him, the social contract creates a people, but it is a people that create a government.  
“Power can perfectly well be transmitted, but not the will.”147  Governments have to be 
adapted to the character of the people they serve, and to this end, Rousseau points to the 
need for an outside legislator to draw up a set of fundamental laws for them, including 
the form of government.148  Government acts as an instrument of mediation and 
communication, forming a link between the people in their capacity as sovereign and the 
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people in their capacity as subjects. “His force [the prince, Rousseau’s generic term for 
administration] is merely the public force concentrated in him.”149  Rousseau argues that 
the government itself is in continual conflict with sovereign authority and will always 
prove to be its undoing, either through the reduction of the base of participation from 
democracy to monarchy, or through the attempted usurpation of sovereignty by the 
government, which destroys the social contract and releases all individuals from the 
general will.150   
 
The American Founding 
 
 The supporters of the American Revolution and the framers of the Constitution 
fall within the social contract tradition and embrace the tenants of popular sovereignty as 
both reason for their support of the revolution and as a basis for the new American 
government.  Both in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the 
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison lay the foundations of political 
authority squarely in the hands of the people: “[A]ll men are created equal . . . they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed”;151 and “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this 
Constitution”.152  These same considerations are also present in the The Federalist 
                                                 
149
 ibid., 176 
150
 ibid., 192 
151
 Thomas Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html , accessed 9/5/08 
152
 “The Constitution of the United States,” 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html, access 95/08 
 61
Papers, when James Madison notes in No. 49 that “the people are the only legitimate 
fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the 
several branches of government hold their power, is derived.”153   
 Concomitant with popular sovereignty in the American context was the idea of 
limited government.  What Americans of the Revolutionary period experienced as 
absolutist and arbitrary government from the English Crown led them to embrace a 
number of institutional features which sought to curb the ability of the government to 
impinge the free exercise of basic rights.   
  The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the intro- 
 duction of legislative checks and balances; the institution of courts composed 
 of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the 
 people in the legislature by deputies of their own election:  these are wholly 
 new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in 
 modern times.  They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies 
 of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or 
 avoided.154 
  
While limited government carried the more general meaning of restraints on the exercise 
of a government’s power, it also sought to curb the “passions” of the people themselves.  
Although the people remained the source of a government’s authority, the smooth, 
efficient, and regular exercise of power required that the tendency of people to develop 
factions,155 foment revolutions,156 and continually change the laws be limited through 
these same institutional means.  Infamously, Madison remarked in Federalist No. 51, 
“you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”157 
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 The revolutionaries and the Framers had to contend with the necessity of 
providing security for the people, the highest end of a government that aimed at the 
protection of individual rights.  As noted above, domestic security was as much of a 
concern as was external threats, particularly with recent memories of both the war for 
independence (ending in 1782) and Shay’s Rebellion (1787).  Internal tranquility, it was 
hoped, would be managed effectively through the mechanisms of limited government, 
while the threat posed by external enemies would be dealt with through both diplomacy 
and the creation of a national army.  Alexander Hamilton also considers the existence of a 
standing army as a deterrent against future domestic problems.158  Common defense 
under the new constitutional arrangements is of such importance that Hamilton suggests 
that no limits be put upon the authority necessary to carry them out.  “The circumstances 
that endanger the safety of the nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”159 
  
Conclusion 
 
  As I argued in the last chapter, the concept of sovereignty emerged from the 
historical conflicts between Church, Empires, and the early monarchical states.  By the 
late 16th and early 17th centuries, we can see an effective break taking place between the 
national governments of France, the Dutch Republic, and England from the Catholic 
Church.  While this change was less pronounced in strongly Catholic areas such as Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, and central Europe under the control of the Habsburgs, it is from these 
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other regions that we see the most extensive development of the idea of the sovereign 
authority of the state.160  The leaders of the national governments of France, the Dutch 
Republic, and England realized they were going to have to take a stronger hand in 
maintaining civil order after the rise of Protestant sects, and this concern is reflected in 
the works of Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau.  In France, where the Catholic Church was 
the national church but remained subordinate to the authority of the French monarchy, 
Bodin argued for strengthening the king’s powers when it came to dealing with the 
Huguenots and settling matters of religious dispute.  The Dutch Republic freed itself from 
Spanish and Catholic control, and afterwards its government was seized by Calvinists; 
Grotius, in turn, sought to understand sovereign control in terms of law and constitutional 
order instead of by particular religious sects.  In England, the Anglican Church was 
subordinate to the Crown, and Hobbes took upon himself the task of redefining the 
powers of the Crown in order to deal with what he took to be predations by the Puritan-
controlled Parliament.    
 This historical era was also beginning the process of exploration and colonization 
around the globe, and this led to the need for an idea of an international system in which 
national states and other entities interact with one another.  The interests of Western 
Europeans were no longer confined to the European continent itself but also spread to far-
flung areas of the world where European influence did not exist at the time.  They began 
to encounter a multitude of different peoples, so over time this made necessary some 
centralized concept of foreign policy, and it fell here to the national government, whether 
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monarchy or republic, to assume the decision-making process regarding foreign 
interests.161 At the same time, the exhausted governments of Europe used this foreign 
policy-making process to deal with the consequences of the Thirty Years’ War, 
formulating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  Indeed, it fell to the heads of national 
governments to actively formulate the idea of what was in the national interest.  Thus, at 
the beginning of the modern era, the national state becomes the center of sovereign 
authority, both at the domestic level and at the international level.   
 Since Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes were now free to think of an independent 
sovereign authority located in the state, they had to rethink the relationship between the 
king’s authority and both natural law and divine law.   Here, Bodin is unique in that he 
does not rely on the arguments of natural law and divine law to buttress the sovereign’s 
authority; instead, he sees them as self-imposed limits on the king’s power as sovereign.  
A true and responsible monarch, in Bodin’s world, would graciously take those upon 
himself as befitting a Christian king, but they are not necessary for the exercise of 
sovereign power.  Natural law takes a much more prominent role in the works of Grotius 
and Hobbes, but it is more and more distant from its medieval Christian form.  For 
Grotius, natural law, particularly as it is expressed through Roman law, is the foundation 
of sovereign authority and international law; while for Hobbes, natural law is viewed as 
inherent in the process of reasoning that leads humanity out of the state of nature and 
towards the creation of sovereign power.  Hobbes also makes natural law coextensive 
with the Law of the Christian Gospel, arguing that they are two different means of 
making the same point.  Divine law for Grotius is an important point of reference, 
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particularly in elaborating upon the principles of war and peace, and it serves to buttress 
his arguments from natural law.   The important element being registered here by all three 
thinkers is the slow un-linking of state authority from moral and ethical considerations.  
During the feudal era in Europe, the Church argued that natural and divine law was 
inherent in the exercise of sovereign authority by both Church and King.  By the early 
modern era, natural law and divine law no longer had any means of enforcement apart 
from the authority of the state, which was now believed to exist independently from it.   
Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes also shared a general rejection of popular rule.  The 
idea of popular sovereignty was beginning to gain currency in Western Europe during 
this era, but it would not be more fully developed until the late 17th century in the works 
of Locke and in the 18th century in Rousseau and in the leaders of the American 
Revolution.  For Bodin, popular rule was simply unthinkable within his understanding of 
sovereignty; as noted above, how would it be possible for one to be able to both give 
commands and obey them?  Grotius was not outright opposed to popular rule, but he was 
no advocate of it either, and he presents a great many arguments against it in his 
discussions of sovereignty.  In the work of Hobbes, power may not be divided between 
the ruler and the people, as that undermines sovereign authority.  Related to this point is 
their support for the status quo governments of their time.  Both in their personal lives 
and in their works, these three thinkers sought to uphold the royal governments of their 
national states.  Bodin was a staunch supporter of the French monarchy; Grotius 
remained a strong supporter of the Dutch government of the staadtholders as it had 
existed prior to the Calvinist coup in which he was imprisoned; and Hobbes sought a 
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return to preeminence of the Crown in English government over the Parliament after the 
Civil War.    
 Finally, while none of them sought revolutionary change in the political order, 
they were revolutionary in terms of their methodologies for understanding politics.  
Bodin was directly influenced by the historical school of jurisprudence, which grew out 
of Renaissance criticism of Roman law (at least as understood in medieval times) as 
flawed and ignorant of the laws of other ages and peoples.  Grotius, in contrast, remained 
within the classical school of jurisprudence, at the same time acknowledging history and 
non-European law as important for the natural law tradition and extending the reach of 
Roman law concepts to the international level.   Hobbes sought a fundamental rethinking 
of how to understand politics, rejecting Scholastic deduction from religious and 
philosophical first principles and turning toward mathematics, geometry, and science for 
certainty of method and toward human nature as the foundation of political thought.    
 The proponents of popular sovereignty relocated the basis of political authority 
away from monarchy and royalty and toward the people.  The constitutional revolution of 
the 17th and 18th century sought to impose definite limits on the power of the monarchy 
and to include the interests of rights-bearing property holders into the sphere of 
government.  No long was it trusted that the king would rule in the interests of all; 
instead, the rise of individualism and the idea of individual rights became the core of 
theories of popular sovereignty, and the idea of a binding legal contract between two 
parties became the model of political community.  Hobbes popularized this idea, and 
from there it received fuller development in the work of Locke, Rousseau, and the 
American writers.   
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 Despite this seeming revolution in sovereign authority, all of these writers 
remained deeply distrustful of the people themselves.162  While ultimate authority may 
indeed originate in the members of a political community, their actual participation in the 
resultant government remained limited.  For Locke, legislative authority, the embodiment 
of sovereignty, is limited to periodic meetings, while the executive authority is always 
active;163 Locke’s executive also possessed prerogative power, which acted as a kind of 
blanket grant of power to deal with political issues where the law had been silent. 
Rousseau’s conception of the sovereignty of the people is less limited.  Although the 
people require an outside legislator to create fundamental laws for them, the people in 
their role as sovereign authority meet periodically to make law for themselves; 
government administration, as a separate entity, is a recipient of the sovereign’s power to 
execute the laws on a daily basis. However, in order for Rousseau’s republic to work 
effectively, it requires a consistent common interest among the people in order to produce 
the general will, and this is be ensured by maintaining a high degree of cultural and social 
homogeneity, as well as by keeping the republic small in area and population. The 
American revolutionaries and framers of the Constitution seek to limit the people’s 
participation in government through divided government and a strong standing national 
army.  Whereas for Rousseau, social and political homogeneity was practically necessary, 
the framers of the American Constitution assumed the relative impossibility of creating a 
common interest across the original thirteen colonies.     
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 For both the proponents of monarchical sovereignty and those of popular 
sovereignty, sovereignty turns out to be something deeply paradoxical.  Hobbes proposed 
that all men possess the unalienable right to defend their own lives, while sovereign 
authority had the ultimate power over life and death as it sees fit.  Grotius providea a 
number of bases for popular sovereignty but then rescinded them in his discussion of the 
monarchy.  Locke argued for the centrality of individual rights as the basis for 
government but then provided no normative basis to defend them, apart from violent 
revolution, when absolute power tries to usurp the government.  Rousseau’s concept of 
popular sovereignty assumed its own demise over time, based on the inherent conflict 
between the sovereign authority and the administration of government, which often 
works against the general will.  The Americans spoke of the inherent right of revolt, but 
the defenders of the new constitution saw the need to put down domestic insurrection.  
Only Bodin escaped from these paradoxes relatively unscathed, because his theory of 
sovereignty did not rest on the foundations of right or the social contract.   
 Although the concept of sovereignty has generally come to be accepted in the 
West in its popular form as the basis for political rule, what I have sought to emphasize in 
this chapter is that the idea of sovereignty does not undergo a drastic change, whether in 
its monarchical or popular form.   In the early centuries of the modern era in the West, the 
meaning of sovereignty was essentially defined and has changed little since then, and it 
has become a permanent fixture of Western political thought.  Sovereignty is a mode of 
authority which stands alone, once constituted.  It remains autonomous and indivisible 
and answers to no authority higher than itself.  In modernity, it is difficult to come up 
with any such higher political authority.  This is the consequence of the national state in 
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the West becoming independent of any religious associations (even if certain countries 
retained national churches, these still remained subordinate to state authority) and 
existing apart from any imperial government (especially after the decline of the 
Habsburg’s Holy Roman Empire).    
 Although individual rights, and later, human rights, have been elaborated which 
may not theoretically be violated by sovereignty authority, in all instances, these rights 
exist only within the context of the sovereign’s authority, and while in international law 
they are designated as non-derogable, they exist at the discretion of the sovereign; the 
word of the sovereign is primary law.  Rights may be suspended in times of crisis.  Italian 
philosopher Girgio Agamben argues that this is, in fact, the very nature of political order 
in the contemporary world; this “clause” is built into the very definition of sovereignty.164  
When it comes to conceptualizing political authority in the world today, sovereignty is 
the dominant mode of understanding it. With the waning of religious authority and ideas 
such natural law as a check on sovereignty, the national state remains unchecked by 
anything except other states.  When we speak of the domestic sphere, democratic states 
are considered as embodiments of popular sovereignty, while non-democratic states 
similarly consider their governments as sovereign over their own people and territory.  In 
the international sphere, states with standing in the world community are considered 
sovereign in relation to one another.   
Sovereign authority, considered in this light, exists to a) provide the primary 
source of domestic stability, and b) provide the primary source of protection against 
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external threats.  The sovereign state has provided the foundation for the extensive 
technological, economic, and social developments of the modern world, and in 
democratic states, it has allowed for their continued existence.  At the same time, this 
authority has been complicit in numerous atrocities and crimes against humanity in the 
modern era.  It has allowed states to engage in crimes against humanity with impunity, 
since there is no greater authority to step in and prevent them from being undertaken.  On 
the one hand, once a sovereign government begins to commit atrocities within its own 
territory, particularly when it does so against what it identifies as an internal threat, there 
is nothing citizens can do to effectively stop it.  The state, sole repository of sovereign 
authority, retains monopoly control over the means of violence.  On the other hand, it is a 
central norm of international law that no state may interfere in the internal affairs of 
another state (non-intervention).  Although this norm came under renewed scrutiny 
beginning in the 1990s and will be examined in greater depth later in this dissertation, it 
remains a defining element in the international system.   
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
 
All national states that claim sovereignty today share certain basic characteristics:  
each has a center of political power, usually a national government administration; they 
have defined territorial boundaries; they have a population that lives within those 
boundaries and whose membership is defined by internal rules of citizenship; and they 
are recognized as sovereign states by other sovereign states.  As noted in the first chapter, 
this system of sovereign states did not come into existence ex nihilo but rather developed 
out of the decline of the feudal system that existed across Western Europe before the 
1500s.  These early sovereign states were monarchies in form, but following the 
constitutional revolution in the 18th century, the source of sovereignty was relocated in 
some countries in the body of the people.  During those same centuries, the colonial 
enterprises of the European states began to encompass the globe, and by the middle of the 
20th century, the entire world belonged to this system of sovereign states.   
 While all states165 in the international community share these basic features, the 
differences between states outweigh what they have in common.  Each state has a unique 
history, or rather, a set of multiple and overlapping histories, involving both the peoples 
within the borders of the state as well as those of neighboring states.  States differ greatly 
in their constitutional arrangements, in their levels of economic development, in 
population density, in urbanization, in ethnic and religious composition, to list just a few 
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of the characteristics.  While certain regions of the world may share common features, 
whether religion (Catholic Christianity in Latin America, Sunni Islam in North Africa 
and the Middle East, Buddhism throughout Asia) or political institutions (social 
democracy in Western Europe, councils of village elders in Sub-Sahara Africa, the 
mullah in predominantly Muslim countries), each country has its own unique set of 
histories and institutions.   
 In order to ascertain the precise role sovereign state power has played in the 
crimes against humanity that have occurred in the latter part of the Twentieth Century, it 
seems important to take a closer look at specific instances of those crimes and the 
historical and political context in which they took place.  To that end, I have constructed 
a number of case studies of relevant countries.  In particular, I examine the cases of 
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime; Argentina under the military junta from 
1976 to 1983; the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the atrocities committed during 
the subsequent civil conflicts; the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and the ongoing conflict 
in western Sudan in Darfur, which began in 2003.   
I have selected these cases according to a number of different criteria.   The first 
thing I wanted to do was to examine a number of cases that are geographically, 
historically, and culturally different from one another.  This allowed me to examine the 
role of sovereign state power in the commission of atrocities under a number of different 
circumstances.  Second, I wanted to situate these cases historically after World War II, 
the creation of the United Nations, and the adoption of an accepted worldwide doctrine of 
human rights; I wanted to deal with recent cases of atrocity, against the backdrop of a 
world community that espoused at least basic ideals of acceptable and unacceptable 
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treatment by political regimes of their citizens, embodied in the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights’ treaties.  Finally, I 
chose cases which were extreme examples of crimes against humanity, where personal 
injuries were extensive, everyday life was disrupted, and torture and murder ran into the 
thousands of casualties.  At the same time, because of limited time and space, I had to 
leave out other cases that fit these criteria, such as the murder of the Kurds in Iraq in the 
late 1980s and of the East Timorese by the Indonesian government in the 1990s.   
In order to examine the role of sovereign state power, I focus on those institutions 
and practices of state power that flow from the (presumed) legitimacy of the state.  In 
most of these cases, crimes against humanity have been justified in the name of 
protecting the security of the country and eliminating threats to the population.  To this 
end, the means of state power are employed, and this includes both military and police 
power, usually at the behest of a given state’s executive authorities.  As the reader will 
see in these case studies, state authorities that commit these crimes often go to great 
lengths to cover up their crimes if they cannot find adequate justification for them.  In 
times of civil crisis, the constitutional order is usually either suspended or ignored, so the 
role of executive authority becomes less clear; also, those extra-governmental groups 
struggling with the state’s authority often seek to gain control of the state themselves.  
Sovereign power itself comes up for grabs, and atrocities have often been committed 
under these circumstances.  Those groups that do assume control of the sovereign state 
institutions also often justify the atrocities they commit as a way of protecting the “new” 
order or a restoration of an “old” order.   This struggle for control of sovereign power 
should be kept in mind while reading these case studies. 
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The format of these case studies proceeds as follows.  I present a short narrative 
for each country while highlighting elements of both the country’s institutions of 
sovereign state power and the country’s political culture (explained below).  Each case is 
chronological; most of the historical detail follows after World War Two, but there is 
considerable attention devoted to the earlier history of the political development of each 
country.   Within the chronology, I make digressions into the deeper facets of the 
country’s sovereign institutions and practices and political culture.  The chronology 
finishes after the atrocities have been committed.  Following the case studies, I make an 
analysis of all of the case studies, examining the role of both political culture and 
sovereign state power in the commission of those crimes against humanity.  This analysis 
looks specifically at the roles of identity, civil conflict, and constitutional order and their 
relationships to both political culture and sovereign state power.   
These cases have been chosen on the basis of the issues to be explained, massive 
atrocities and crimes against humanity, so it may be argued that they run the risk of 
selection bias; that is, these examples involve occasions in which crimes against 
humanity have been committed on a wide-scale, and this study seeks to understand the 
role of sovereign state power in those crimes.  The risk involved here is that I will choose 
cases that will only highlight the role of sovereign state power and that I will interpret the 
events in light of that power and will thus avoid considering other factors that might 
better explain why and how these crimes against humanity have taken place.  In order to 
avoid this dilemma, I concomitantly examine the role of a country’s political culture in 
the commission of these atrocities, looking at factors that exist outside of or beyond the 
institutions of sovereign state power that have made a contribution.    
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Political culture is an analytic concept that seeks to capture the subjective 
elements of political life, beyond institutions:  values, beliefs, rituals, symbols, and ideals.  
The role played by political culture in countries where crimes against humanity are 
committed is complex and varied, so this dissertation examines only the most obvious 
elements of that influence and draws only tentative conclusions about causation.  In the 
concluding analysis of the case studies, I make some brief remarks about the relationship 
between state sovereignty and political culture, arguing that the two concepts share a 
mutually reinforcing relationship in defining the limits (or lack thereof) in the political 
life of a country.   
The concept of political culture made its first appearance in the work of Gabriel 
Almond in the mid-1950s and 1960s166, where it was used as a way of making sense of 
the differences between civic institutions in the United States and other countries.  Since 
that time, a number of approaches toward the analysis of political culture has developed 
within political science, drawing from the resources of other social science disciplines, 
including anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics.167  Because of this, no 
single methodological approach to the study of political culture exists.  Indeed, as one 
scholar suggested, “Political culture remains a suggestive rather than a scientific 
concept.”168 
The concept of political culture sets out to answer a number of questions:  “how 
individuals and/or groups are socialized, how different individuals organize their thinking 
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about rules and norms, how discourse affects the legitimacy of political institutions, how 
and why individuals orient their thinking and communications in terms of salient myths, 
rituals, and symbols, and how moral criteria are apprehended and with what 
consequences for political behavior.”169  In my approach to political culture for this 
dissertation, I am not going to adopt a specific theory of political culture, but instead I am 
going to answer a number of pertinent questions in each case study that will highlight the 
features of that country’s political culture as it relates to the crimes committed against 
humanity.  These questions include: 
 - What are the sources of state legitimacy?  What are the boundaries of state  
 power?  What are the ways in which state power may be challenged, criticized  
and changed (e. g., elections, a free press, political parties, amendments, and 
checks and balances within government, just to name a few of the ways)? 
 - Do the moral values of a country place a high value on basic human rights?  On 
 individual rights?  Does the individual have an intrinsic value, or is he or she  
 viewed only or largely as an extension of the community? 
 - Do there exist institutions that are independent of the state?  Is there is a strong 
 civil social?  What is the level of social integration within the country? 
 
For the purposes of these case studies, I am interested in looking at the political culture of 
the country which existed before and leading up to the atrocities under examination.  The 
eras following each set of atrocities have been extremely turbulent in terms of rebuilding 
the countries as well as creating punitive measures for those involved in the crimes 
against humanity, which in turn has often led to wholesale reorderings of the countries’ 
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political culture, and it is simply beyond the reach of this study to take that history and 
activity into account.  The reader may also note that I am leaving out some important 
aspects of political culture such as political socialization and the study of the role of 
specific myths and symbols within each country.  This is again largely due to constraints 
of time and space, and a more robust study would take note of them.   
 
Cambodia 
 
For most of its long political history, Cambodia was a hereditary monarchy, and 
the majority of its people lived in loosely-organized villages centered on subsistence rice 
farming.  These villages were informally governed by elder men, and the life of the king 
and the court were far away from their daily concerns.170  The only indigenous political 
models that the Cambodian people had were those of the monarchy and the mandarins.171  
Political power was exercised from the monarchy through patronage networks, called 
k’sae, throughout the countryside; each leader in the k’sae, or “string,” interpreted orders 
as he saw fit, with a greater or lesser degree of severity, and this practice continued 
throughout the Khmer Rouge period.172  Traditionally, political power in Cambodia was 
measured, not by control over territory, but was based on the number of people over 
which one exercised control through the patronage system.173  Whether with the 
monarchy or with guerrilla groups in the Twentieth Century, those in political authority 
focused less on maintaining territory (though that was certainly a concern in foreign 
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relations with Vietnam) as they did in insuring loyalty in the population under its control, 
usually through patronage but also by force; it is no coincidence that throughout the 20th 
Century, from Prince Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot to Hun Sen, Cambodian political 
leaders have ruled the country on a personal basis, taking any dissent and opposition as 
tantamount to disloyalty and treason.174 
As far as historical records show, Cambodians converted en masse to Theravada 
Buddhism sometime in the 13th century, due to the growing influence of the Thai 
kingdom to the west, and they gradually abandoned the “Angkorean” civilization that had 
marked the highpoint of Cambodian power in Southeast Asia.  Prior to this conversion, 
the Cambodian people held to a belief in Hinduism and the worship of local spirits, and 
elements of these beliefs continued to exist alongside Theravada Buddhism, particularly 
in its national literature and in its kingship rituals.  “Until recent times, the Khmer 
language employed the same word for race and religion:  to be Khmer was to be 
Buddhist.”175  The Buddhist sangha (the monastic community) retained a largely 
independent status within Cambodian society and history, and it was responsible for 
maintaining basic educational institutions, encouraging literacy, and providing a way of 
life outside the relatively limited institutions of the family villages.176 
The territory that made up Cambodia was a protectorate of the French colonial 
empire of Indochina. Under the French protectorate, which lasted from 1863 to 1953, the 
Cambodian people were generally not encouraged to take part in the political process; it 
was only in the 1920s and 1930s that they began to take a larger part in the civil 
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bureaucracy introduced by the French.177  Cambodia gained its formal independence from 
France in November 1953, shortly before the end of the conflict between France and 
Vietnam in 1954; the country was accepted as a member of the United Nations in 1955.  
Under the leadership of Prince Nodorom Sihanouk, Cambodia sought closer alliances 
with North Vietnam and China following France’s departure from Southeast Asia, while 
it increased domestic repression of opposition political parties and political dissent from 
both left and right, as well as Vietnamese and Chinese minorities.  Several attempts were 
made on Sihanouk’s life in the late 1950s, including one orchestrated by the leaders of 
both Thailand and South Vietnam; this was carried out because Sihanouk was allowing 
the Communist Viet Minh to operate openly on Cambodian soil.  These events led to 
Cambodia breaking off diplomatic ties with those two countries, as well as with their ally 
the United States, in the early 1960s. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Khmer Issarak, originally anti-French guerrillas after 
World War II, remained active in the northwestern areas of the country, which had been 
under Thai administration until the area was formally declared to be Cambodian territory.  
In the eastern and southern areas of the country, which were largely rural or forested, 
communist guerrillas, both indigenous and the Viet Minh, controlled large areas after 
independence was declared, perhaps as much as half of the country.178  While after the 
1954 Geneva Conference, many of these guerrillas withdrew into North Vietnam, the 
boundaries between North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos remained fluid as North 
Vietnam began supplying the communist insurgency in South Vietnam along the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail. 
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 The brutal repression of domestic political opposition drove some people out of 
the cities and into the countryside, where the reach of the Sihanouk’s government was not 
as strong.  It was in the countryside that the Communist group led by Saloth Sar, better 
know as Pol Pot, and Ieng Sary began forged closer ties with the Communist Party 
leaders of North Vietnam.  It was also where they began to create a unique identity for 
their organization, the Khmer Rouge, not subordinate to the goals of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which dominated the Communist movements in the region (except for 
that of North Vietnam).  This new identity would culminate in the doctrine of 
“independence-mastery,” the right of Cambodian Communists to determine their own 
strategy for both political and armed struggles.179  It would also lead to a political 
program that sought the cultural, social, and economic leveling of the Cambodian 
population, refashioning “the whole of Cambodian society in the image of [an] authentic, 
autochthonous peasantry, unsullied by the outside world.”180 
 The growing tension within Cambodian society in the late 1960s would 
eventually lead to outright civil war.  Pressures from the Cultural Revolution in China 
caused strained relations with Sihanouk.  Sihanouk then began to seek rapprochement 
with the United States, which by that time was fully involved in the war in Vietnam.  
Guerrilla attacks by the Khmer Rouge increased in the southern and eastern areas of the 
country, leading Sihanouk to rely more on the security forces of General Lon Nol to 
maintain order throughout the country.  In March 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon 
began a series of secret bombing raids against Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia, which 
drove many people back into the cities and which emboldened the forces of the Viet 
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Cong and North Vietnamese Army to begin attacking the Cambodian government.  In 
early 1970, Lon Nol and the Cambodian National Assembly deposed Sihanouk, and the 
monarchy was abolished.   “Each side was deliberately cutting loose from its traditional 
points of reference:  the monarchy, in Lon Nol’s case; the legacy of Indochinese 
communism in the case of the Khmer Rouges [sic].  The normal restraints on thought and 
behavior were eroding.  Cambodia was moving into unknown territory.”181 
The early 1970s marked a turning point for popular support for the Khmer Rouge.  
The United States continued bombing the country, trying to root out the Viet Cong 
presence, and it continued to support the Lon Nol government.182  The pragmatic alliance 
between North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge began to become strained as both the 
Khmer Rouge began to control more Cambodian territory, and the North Vietnamese 
began to move more of their troops into South Vietnam.  It was at this time that 
Cambodians began to get a taste of the wholesale changes that were going to become 
national policy in the next several years.  Village life in the countryside was being 
uprooted, and families were made go live in communes.  Town-dwellers were 
encouraged to return to the country, in order to “re-forge” themselves and to reconnect 
with their traditional Khmer roots.183  For communications, couriers were used instead of 
radios, and there was a growing distrust of Cambodians who were educated, those 
Cambodian Communists returning from North Vietnam, anyone of Chinese descent, the 
native Muslim Cham people, and generally anyone who dissented from the revolutionary 
Khmer Rouge doctrine.184  The language of Theravada Buddhism came to unconsciously 
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permeate the ideology of Khmer communism, specifically with regard to the ideas of 
consciousness and class.  “To ‘proletarianise’ the peasantry, all that was needed, in this 
Buddhist-inspired scheme of things, was ‘proletarian consciousness’. Class, which to 
Marxists everywhere else . . . was determined by a person’s economic activity, was for 
Cambodian communists a mental attribute.”185  For rank-and-file members of the Khmer 
Rouge, there were the “Twelve Commandments,” which mirrored the Buddhist monks’ 
vows of abstinence, and after 1975, Cambodian people in the communes were 
encouraged to practice ‘renunciation’.186  
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took control of the capitol city, Phnom Penh, and 
they immediately began a general evacuation of the city; it is estimated that some 20,000 
people died during the evacuation alone.187  The country’s borders were closed, foreign 
ambassadors and press agencies were expelled, newspapers and TV stations were shut 
down, radios confiscated, mail and telephone use suppressed, and the speaking of 
languages other than Khmer were punished.188  The population was divided into two 
groups:  the new people (neak thmey), made up of urban evacuees and peasants who have 
been living under areas controlled by the Lon Nol government, amounting to about 30 
percent of the population; and the base people (neak moultanh), the peasant majority 
living in areas under insurgent control.189  When people were finally settled into the rural 
communes, they were all required to write a short autobiography, in order to disclose 
their family ties and class backgrounds and how they spent their lives during the Lon Nol 
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years.  Technicians and skilled workers were sometimes allowed to return to the towns, in 
order to reopen production in factories, while civil servants, doctors, engineers, lawyers, 
school teachers, university students, and former military personnel were all sent for “re-
education”, meaning either execution or intense manual labor and further interrogation.190  
In the winter of 1975, the Khmer Rouge opened a high security prison at Tuol Sleng, 
known infamously today as S-21; its purpose was to “provide information as to furnish 
‘proof’ of treason which would then justify purges that the leadership had already 
decided to carry out.”191  It is estimated that some 15,000 to 20,000 people died at S-
21.192   
 To further add to the population’s growing misery, illness, lack of productivity, 
and failure to achieve agricultural production goals were all attributed to opposition to the 
regime or to a lack of revolutionary consciousness.193  During the reign of the Khmer 
Rouge, between one-third and one-half of the population was sick, hungry, and not able 
to work; the rest did as little work as they could get by with. The rural communes, out of 
fear of the political leadership, began falsifying records of their production in order to 
avoid punishments.  In turn, the state assessed levies on the rice to supply its armed 
forces, administration, and strategic reserves, which left around forty percent of the 
population with starvation rations.194  “Democratic Kampuchea was a prison camp state, 
and the eight million prisoners served most of their time in solitary confinement.  And 1.5 
million of the inmates were worked, starved, and beaten to death.”195  Paranoia amongst 
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the political leadership was rife, leading to a number of purges in the following years, 
with as many as 100,000 to 250,000 dying in 1978 alone, accused of collaborating with 
the Vietnamese government.196 
 In the spring of 1977, conflict with the now unified Vietnam increased, and 
Vietnam carried out a full-scale invasion of the country in December of that year.   The 
conflict continued until January 1979, when the Khmer Rouge government collapsed, and 
its leadership fled once again into the countryside.  The Khmer Rouge had been in power 
exactly three years, eight months, and twenty days,197 and this had resulted in the deaths 
of between one and a half million to three million people within the country’s borders, 
most of whom were Cambodia’s own population.198   
 
Argentina 
 
Argentina declared its independence from Spain in 1816, part of a larger wave of 
Latin American independence movements in the early 19th century.  Its bid for 
independence was influenced by both the American and French Revolutions; its early 
constitution combined both American and European elements in the political life of the 
unified country.  The Catholic Church was also an important part of national political life, 
and the church-influenced political philosophy of corporatism later became important in 
public life, as it did throughout Latin America.  “The very idea of democracy, of the 
political representation of social interests, of negotiation first in the context of the party 
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and then in shared political forums, had little prestige in a society long accustomed to a 
situation in which each of its parts negotiated separately with the state.  Politics appeared 
a fiction that served to mask the real negotiations between the true factors of power.”199  
By the early Twentieth Century, patterns of social and economic development in 
Argentina were similar to those of other European settler colonies, except for land 
ownership, which was dominated by oligarchs, consisting of a few powerful families or 
estates (estacias), many of whom would become involved in the mercantile business, 
finance, and secondary industries;200  this was a legacy of Spanish colonial practice.  
Following the growth of the urban population, further democratic reforms were 
introduced in the 1910s, but due to labor uprisings in the 1919 and in the early 1920s, the 
propertied classes began to distrust the government’s ability to put down such rebellions 
as well as the value of democratic government itself.  The first military coup took place 
in 1930; the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that the military could in fact oust a legally 
elected government.201  A succession of military governments ruled until the late 1940s.  
This tendency to intervene reflected the lack of civilian control over the military, as well 
as the corporatist tendency within Argentine society for interest groups to act without 
regard for other groups. 
Throughout the 1940s, the political power of Colonel Juan Peron grew as he 
crafted a political alliance between the military and labor organizations, eschewing the 
traditional partnership of the military and the economic elites.  When elections were 
finally held in Argentina in 1946, Peron was elected president, and members of his 
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Justicialist party won seats in Congress and in the provinces.  Peron sought to reorder the 
social and political life of the country through a number of reforms. His political style 
was at once authoritarian, factional, and anti-Communist.202  He managed to forge a 
broad coalition of political actors across Argentine society - labor and business, youth, 
women, and left-wing movements - all under the influence of his and his wife Evita’s 
charismatic personalities.  He created a much more centralized government and an 
enormous public bureaucracy, and he staffed public offices with his followers, including 
the justice system.  He nationalized all railroads and foreign-owned business, 
strengthened the power of labor unions, and brought about a massive redistribution of 
income towards the working classes.  At the same time, all public media were brought 
under strict control, civil liberties were curtailed, and political opposition was either 
forced into exile or imprisoned.  Union membership grew, but members lost control of 
their leadership, as they were dependent on Peron and his government to intervene for 
them.  At first on good terms with both the Catholic Church and the military, both 
institutions eventually turned hostile toward him as he subordinated their authority within 
Argentinean society to his own.  Peron was reelected to office in 1951, after having 
created a new constitution that would allow him to serve consecutive terms.  Following a 
failed coup attempt, he declared a state of emergency which remained in force until he 
was finally overthrown by another coup in 1955 and forced into exile; the shadow of his 
influence lingered over Argentinean politics for almost two decades.   
The military remained hostile toward Peron’s political movement after his ouster.  
Pedro Aramburu was elected president from 1955 to 1958; Peronist generals attempted an 
unsuccessful coup against his government in 1956.  Also in 1956, special elections were 
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held to reform the constitution, and 25% of the ballots were turned in blank as a protest 
against the government’s anti-Peronist policies.  Arthur Frondizi was elected president 
from 1958 to 1962; he received support from Peron in exile, but during the last year of 
his presidency, the military intervened when Peronist candidates began winning 
majorities in local elections.  Arturo Illia was president from 1963 to 1966; during this 
time, both communists and Peronists were banned from seeking office, and the use 
Peron’s name was prohibited in public life.  In 1966, General Juan Carlos Ongania was 
named de facto president by the military, and this marked the beginning of a series of 
military-appointed presidents.    
Throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s, the Argentinean public was struggling 
with a great deal of social upheaval, much of it in reaction to the decades of military 
interference with elected governments.  A number of left-wing groups, both communist 
groups like the ERP, and Peronist organizations such as the Montoneros, began to adopt 
guerrilla and terror tactics in order to carry on a political struggle against the predominant 
power of the military and to win further public support for their causes. 
 The military coup authorized elections again in 1973 but did not allow Peron 
himself to seek office.  Hector Campora, a moderate, left-wing Peronist, was elected as 
president.  Peron’s political followers also gained majorities in Congress.  At the same, 
the 1973 oil crisis affected the country, generating a great deal of social conflict, 
including acts of terror from both right and left.  Peron returned to Argentina in June of 
that year; his arrival at Ezeiza airport was marked by the murders of a number of his 
supporters in the crowd by a right-wing death squad.  Following this incident, President 
Campora and his cabinet resigned, and new elections were held the following September, 
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leading to the election of Peron and his wife Isabel.  The cycle of violence was continued 
by extremist groups.   
 After his election, Peron sided with the right-wing of his own political movement, 
the trade-unionist bureaucracy, and the Radical Civic Union party.  He sought to exclude 
the more radical left-wing Montoneros from his Justicialist Party.  The Montoneros 
followed suit with other radical groups, continuing to use terror tactics against the 
government in order to push it into repressive actions, seeking to turn popular support 
against the government.  The prospect of the return of Peron had led the military to resist 
attempts to restore democracy throughout the 1960s, and now growing social turmoil had 
led them to make way for his return in 1973; Marchak argues that “the underlying reality 
included military control or a strong military presence in the state from 1930 to 1973,” 
yet it was a presence that was not united in its own interest.203  These divisions continued 
to grow even after Peron’s return.  The military had taken upon itself the mission of 
resisting both Peronism and burgeoning militant communism and became fragmented 
itself in the pursuit of those goals.  These conditions created a “siege mentality” among 
members of the military. As a social class, the military leadership had always been 
generally isolated from the mainstream of Argentinean society, and they often styled 
themselves as the protectors of the country.  They came to believe that “politics had 
exhausted its possibilities without overcoming the destructive effects of terrorism,” and 
that what had to be done was to be done out of necessity for continued existence of 
Argentina.204  Thus, through a number of coups and weak civilian governments in the 
later 20th century, the ideology developed within the military that “the enemy within” was 
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whoever had the greatest chance of winning an election fairly;205 in other words, the 
military high commands had lost faith in the ability of democratic citizenships to lead 
themselves, and more importantly, to correctly recognize threats to their own well-being 
as a people. 
 Peron died of a heart attack in July 1974, and he was succeeded in the presidency 
by his wife.  Throughout 1975, a number of secret directives were issued by Isabel Peron 
and by the military, in which the army was ordered to take whatever measures were 
necessary to quash the activities of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP, Ejercito 
Revolucinario del Pueblo), a radical left-wing guerrilla group which had seized control of 
the northern state of Tucuman, as well as other guerrilla groups.  These directives also 
gave extensive powers to the military over local police forces and jails and prisons, and 
they divided the entire country up into military zones and districts.   The Argentinean 
economy continued to decline, and intra-party conflict and further acts of terrorism 
throughout the country led to her being removed by a military coup in March 1976.   
 A ruling junta was established, called the National Reorganization Process 
(infamously known as the Process), led by Generals Jorge Rafael Videla, RobertoViola, 
and Leopoldo Galtieri.  Argentina always had a tradition of a strong executive, but under 
the junta, the actual authority of the president became weak and subject to military 
control.  Presidential powers were ill-defined and subject to a changing balance of 
alliances and confrontations within the dual chain of command between what would 
become the clandestine terror state and the visible state.  Romero argued that this was “a 
veritable revolution against the state, affecting the possibility of exercising even those 
functions of regulation and control that according to liberal concepts were its rightful 
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preserve.”206  The junta sought to jumpstart the economy through pro-market reforms, 
deregulation, and by attracting foreign investment.  It also began applying harsh measures 
against all political opponents and anyone suspected of opposing the government in what 
they called an “ideological war,” or “The Dirty War.”   
Under the junta, political repression was systematized through the use of forced 
“disappearances,” which made it impossible to bring criminal charges against anyone, 
and a nation-wide system of tracking down subversives was organized.  After being 
abducted, suspects would be interrogated and tortured.  Many were executed by being 
drugged and thrown out of military aircraft over rivers or the Atlantic Ocean.  This went 
hand-in-hand with the efforts of General Auguste Pinochet in neighboring Chile, 
collectively known as Operation Condor.  The disappearances occurred mainly from 
1976 to 1978, when both the ERP and the Montoneros were finally decimated, after 
which the number of disappearances drastically reduced.  More than half of the regime’s 
kidnappings and murders took place in 1977.207  In all, as many as 30,000 people died 
during this time.208 
 Greater efforts toward the centralization of political power in Argentina had 
already taken place under the Peron regime after World War Two.  Later, as noted above, 
during the mid-1970s the military was given the power to divide up the country into 
military districts and to centralize their control over local and regional police forces and 
detention facilities in order to deal with the problem of terrorism.  This was a very easy 
way for the central government to use already existing institutions for the purposes of 
totalitarian control of the entire country.  Under the junta, all of Argentina’s political 
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institutions disappeared, all political activity was prohibited, and only the state apparatus 
remained.  The majority of people reacted by rationalizing the political repression and 
internalizing it, informing on neighbors and censoring themselves.209  The state terrorism 
that took place “was in reality an integral operation of terror, carefully planned by the 
leadership of the three service branches, rehearsed first in Tucuman – where the army 
officially intervened in 1975 – and then executed in a systematic fashion throughout the 
country.”210 
Argentine society had tended to operate in an authoritarian fashion and had failed 
to develop and sustain the rule of law and the legal resolution of conflict, largely because 
any viable form political pluralism failed to emerge.  “A volatile mixture of competing 
interest groups struggled within a society that had already dismantled if not fully 
destroyed its judicial system, its free press, the possibility of independent academic 
inquiry in its universities, its political parties, and independent or disengaged police 
action.  All activities were therefore political in the rawest sense.”211   
Another economic crisis began in Argentina in 1980 with bankruptcies and runs 
on the country’s banks, and massive capital flight followed.  To counter this, the 
government then began devaluing the peso and nationalizing the private debt of 
companies, causing the national debt to grow into the tens of billions of dollars over the 
course of a few years; the same thing was occurring throughout Latin America.  In 1982, 
the Argentine military invaded the Falkland Islands but were soundly defeated by the 
British military within a few months.  Following this, the junta began to fall apart, and 
the military government began covering up its involvement in the worst parts of the 
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repression by giving themselves legal amnesty before stepping down.212  At no point 
during the period of the junta did the military outright deny the murders, tortures, and 
kidnappings; rather, they refused to explain themselves and refused to answer for their 
deeds, using the rhetoric of “the victors cannot be tried after the victory.”213 
 
Yugoslavia 
 
In making sense of the crimes against humanity committed in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many writers and scholars have emphasized the role of ethnic 
identity, but I think a better place to start would be with the political culture of single-
party Communist states.  As with all of the Eastern European countries that fell under 
Soviet influence after World War II, Yugoslavia adopted the Stalinist model of political 
leadership.  All competing parties were banned from the political process, and vocal 
dissent from the Communist Party line was punished in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the loss of jobs and opportunities for advancement to torture, imprisonment, and murder.  
To keep a tight control over dissent, an extensive network of secret police and informants 
and strict control over the public media were created to keep tabs on and shape public 
opinion.  Central control over the country’s economy was also directed by the party’s 
political leadership.   
 What made Yugoslavia unique among European Communist states was the 
consequences of its break with the Soviet Union in 1948.  This allowed Yugoslavia to 
“go its own way,” opening up to Western nations both culturally and economically (and 
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eventually becoming dependent on foreign money markets).  The concept of “socialist 
self-management” grew out of Yugoslavia’s attempts to create a planned economy apart 
from the rest of the Communist world.  Finally, Yugoslavia was at the forefront of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, providing an example for developing nations around the world 
which sought to steer clear of Cold War alliances.214   
 Marshall Josip Broz Tito sought to organize the post-war Yugoslavia around the 
concept of “brotherhood and unity” (bratsvo i jedinstvo).  Throughout modern history, 
the southeastern European region had been the object of numerous power struggles 
between major powers and well as various attempts to assert provincial and ethnic 
independence, often at the expense of neighboring peoples.  The idea of a unified 
Yugoslavia had first appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries; with Western 
encouragement, an independent Kingdom of Yugoslavia was declared following World 
War I.  Following Axis occupation, this idea was reasserted in the form of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Marshall Tito wanted to focus on developing the 
country’s strength from its diverse population, which was organized into six federal 
republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia) 
and two autonomous regions within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina; each republic and 
autonomous region roughly corresponded to the majority ethnic population of the 
territory, although there was a mix ethnic populations within each region that continued 
to grow in the following decades.  Despite this recognition of ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic diversity, it was understood that these federal units were largely administrative, 
as Tito and the Communist Party leadership were not interested in tolerating “negative 
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local patriotism.”215  The republics and autonomous regions were unified under the 
authority of a single government, single party rule, and in an authoritarian fashion.216  
Under this system, “[while] it sought to accommodate the national interests of the most of 
Yugoslavia’s peoples in a federal system, it also assumed an unchanging unity of 
interests,”217 which was turn out to not be the case in subsequent years.   
Much in the same spirit as other Communist parties, Tito’s Yugoslavian model 
sought to move the country forward socially, politically, and economically.  In the 
interests of this end, he sought to forge a new national identity for the diverse peoples 
within Yugoslavia’s borders, but this came at a price.  
  Tito’s policy was to draw a line under the past.  Everyone who had died 
 in the Second World War had either been a collaborator or a Partisan or a victim 
 of the Axis powers and their satellites . . . . The effect of this was not to make  
 people forget, as was the intention, but to leave the wounds unhealed . . . . As  
 Communism crumbled in the late 1980s, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes began to  
 dig up their dead and rebury them . . . . the atmosphere of the times was such that 
 these events inevitably fed the growing nationalist hysteria and was used by   
 nationalist politicians to further their aims.218 
 
Stjepan Mestrovic has argued that after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe 
beginning in 1989, already existing national, ethnic, and religious identities, which had 
supposedly been “supplanted” by a secular ideology, were there to step in and take the 
place of the authority of the Party and the state.219  These alternative identities had neither 
been supplanted nor eradicated by communism.  Besides this, efforts to overcome ethnic 
differences within the country, many recognized within the country that Serbs dominated 
the political life of the country after World War II.  This was largely an accident of 
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history, due to the large number of Serbs among Partisan fighters during the war, who 
were rewarded for their service with political positions in government and in the party.220   
Drawing from the experience of the Second World War, Tito and the elder 
Yugoslavian leadership also realized that any future military conflict would likely 
involve occupation of the country, and the Yugoslavian military would not have the 
resources to carry out full-scale defensive operations of the country’s borders.  Instead, 
the military’s strategy was designed around waging guerrilla war against potential 
occupiers.  Military supplies were placed in each republic, and the command of the 
military was decentralized along regional lines.  While there existed a unified 
Yugoslavian National Army (the JNA), for all practical purposes there existed six 
potentially separate armies within the former Yugoslavia.221   
In the 1960s, there began a series of debates at the national level over political and 
economic issues that eventually reopened ethnic fault lines. There were upsurges of 
nationalist sentiments, beginning in the universities in Belgrade in 1968, in Pristina in 
1969, and during the “Croatian Spring” of 1970-71, all of which were inspired by student 
movements in other parts of the world.  There was also a call for decentralization of 
political authority and economic planning within the country, culminating in the revised 
1974 constitution, which, among other things, created a rotating presidency of the 
country which would not allow a single republic dominate the rest of the country and 
which gave considerably more autonomy to the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.    
Finally, Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment allowed Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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to make contacts with fellow Muslims outside of the country.222 Even with these 
widespread expressions of ethnic identity and the moves taken toward decentralization, 
efforts toward ethnic separatism were still discouraged and often punished.   
A number of Serbians responded to these changes with dismay and anger, and 
they began to perceive discrimination directed at them from the federal government as 
well as from other ethnic groups.  Throughout the early 1980s, stories circulated among 
the Serb population that Serbs were being subject to discrimination, abuse, and even 
murder, although later, most of these stories were shown to be without foundation.223  
There were also a number of outbursts of violence between Serbs and Yugoslav state 
authorities as well as increased emigration of Serbs, particularly from the province of 
Kosovo; this led to a general government crackdown on all nationalist protests.   
 The death of Tito in 1980, political deadlock created by the 1974 constitutional 
arrangements, perceived discrimination against Serbs, and the spiraling national debt in 
the 1980s224 all converged to create an extremely volatile situation throughout the 
country.  Some sense of this volatility received a public expression in 1986 with the 
leaking of the incomplete Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
(SANU) through the news media.  The previous year Ivan Stambolic, head of the Serbian 
Communist Party, had requested input from SANU in order to aid in the reform process.  
The first part of the document was an economic analysis of the condition of Yugoslavia 
in the mid-1980s, tracing the origins of the financial and economic crisis to poor 
decision-making and planning in the 1960s and to the failure of the new federalist 
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arrangements created by the 1974 constitution.  The latter section of the unfinished 
document presented a case for the strengthening of the Serbian nation.  It referred to the 
emigration of Serbs from Kosovo as a result of “neofascist aggression” and as 
“genocide,”225 and it blamed this on the Communist Party’s tradition of “blaming the 
Serbs” for Yugoslavia’s problems.226  The document ended by asserting that “the Serbian 
people must be allowed to find themselves again and become an historical personality in 
their own right.”227 It proposed two steps to do this:  regaining jurisdiction over the 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; and creating a specifically Serbian national 
interest.228   
 The following two years were decisive for Yugoslavia.  There were mass protests 
in Serbia regarding the status of Kosovo.  A Serbian Communist Party official, Slobodan 
Milosevic, took advantage of these protests to engineer his own rise to power and to 
exacerbate already existing Serbian nationalism.  He was able to capitalize on an incident 
in which Kosovo police violently attacked a crowd of ethnic Serbian protesters and which 
led to the resignation of Serbian President Ivan Stambolic in April 1987; Milosevic 
assumed the Presidency the following year.  Once he did so, he began what came to be 
known as the “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” in which staged protests against the 
parliaments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro led to the replacement of their 
presidencies with allies of Milosevic.  This increasing popular rise of Serbian nationalism 
(encouraged, as noted above, by intellectuals and politicians) greatly contributed to the 
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growing self-consciousness of other ethnic groups within Yugoslavia; the assertion of 
Serbian identity forced other groups to define themselves in relation to Serbian 
nationalism.   
By January 1989, Serbia under Milosevic controlled four of the eight votes in 
Yugoslavia’s Federal Presidency, giving it effective control over the Yugoslav Republic.  
At this point, the Kosovo issue ceased to be of interest to Milosevic, and he began to 
focus on gaining control of Yugoslavia’s political identity.229  In March 1989, 
amendments to the Yugoslavian constitution reduced the autonomy of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina; Kosovo Albanians responded by creating a separatist movement.  And in 
June of that same year, Milosevic gave a speech at Gazimestan in Kosovo, 
commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, in which he emphasized 
Serbia’s central role in saving Europe from the Ottoman Empire. 
 Beginning in 1990, the former Yugoslavia began to break apart along ethnic lines. 
Following a Communist Party Congress in January, delegates from Slovenia and Croatia 
protested against Serbia’s dominance of the proceedings and left.  Inspired by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the overthrow of Communist Party dominance in other parts 
of Eastern Europe, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia each held their first free elections; 
Serbia followed suit in December, with a majority victory for Milosevic and his Socialist 
Party.  One problem that stood in the way of national independence for each of these 
republics was control over the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA).  In January 1991, the 
military threatened coups in Croatia and Slovenia unless local police were disarmed, 
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while the military leadership became alarmed over nationalist agitation by state-run 
television and by the nationalist leaders of the republics.230  
 Following this, the situation throughout the country became more violent.  
Clashes between Croat security forces and ethnic Serbians protesters in Croatia became 
frequent after the Serb Republic of Krajina declared its independence from Croatia in 
April 1991.  Both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 
June 1991, and conflict immediately broke out between these republics and the central 
government.  The international community’s response was mixed; Germany recognized 
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, while France and Britain were more reluctant 
to do; the United States treated the matter as an exclusively European problem.  The 
United Nations sought to broker a temporary settlement among the parties to the conflicts 
in order that peacekeepers could be deployed.231  The conflict between Slovenia and 
Yugoslavia was over in ten days, because Slovenia had taken steps to gain control over 
the military command structure within its own borders over the preceding year.  Full-
scale war broke out between Yugoslavia and Croatia in August 1991.  During the seige of 
Vukovar, which lasted from August until November, the world began to see massive 
internal displacements of the population, including deliberate “ethnic cleansing” of 
certain regions.  Numerous massacres of civilians also occured during this period of time 
throughout Croatian territory, committed by both the Yugoslavian and Croatian military 
forces.   
The idea of “one people, one nation” was taken to its extreme in the practice of 
the ethnic cleansing of these regions; individuals not belonging to the ethnic group laying 
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claim to the territory were forcibly excluded from the area, or they were sometimes 
killed.  This happened in the Serbian attack on Croatia, and would occur later in the 
Croatian attack on Bosnia, in the Serbian separatist attacks within Bosnia, and in the 
Serbian attacks against Kosovo.  Here, political sovereignty and ethnic identity were 
made inseparable.  After 1990, the Serbian political leadership began identifying the 
interests of Yugoslavia with the idea of a “Greater Serbia,” which in turn justified 
violence against the “separatist tendencies” of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and later 
Kosovo; there was no recognition of the legitimacy of right to secede, nor was there any 
sense that the future of the region was conceivable without the Serbian leadership of a 
unified Yugoslavia.  The desire for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia to break away from 
Yugoslavia was seen as a threat to Serbian dominance.  A similar course of events took 
place in Croatia when the nationalist leadership of Franjo Tudjman began to practice 
ethnic cleansing of the border areas between Croatia and Serbia and to lend support to 
Croatian separatists in Bosnia.  Even in multi-ethnic Bosnia, the same tactics were carried 
out later in the conflict against both Croatians and Serbians.  Later in the 1990s, ethnic 
cleansing was deliberately undertaken during the conflict in Kosovo by both the KLA 
against Kosovar Serbs and by the Serbian military against Kosovar Albanians.   
Many of these atrocities during the Yugoslav wars were committed by 
paramilitary units, whose members were drawn from Serbia’s criminal underworld.232 In 
many formerly communist nations, there existed an extensive underground economy that 
provided access to otherwise unavailable Western goods, and this economy became 
visible after the fall of communist regimes in the rise of criminal gangs and organized 
                                                 
232
 Nicholas Mills and Kira Brunner, The New Killing Fields:  Massacre and the Politics of Intervention, 
(New York:  Basic Books, 2002), 72 
 101
crime in the absence of authorities.  Figures within organized crime had access to 
resources from outside of the country, they had connections within the country, and they 
had experience with violence.  In a few instances, they created their own militias within 
certain regions.   
At this time, number of other independence movements grew within the borders 
of Yugoslavia.  Macedonia and Kosovo held referendums for independence in September 
of 1991, and the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in October.  
Within Bosnia, ethnic Croats and Serbians declared themselves independent from the 
Bosnia government.   
  By December 1991, the United Nations was able to deploy a protection force 
inside of Croatia, and in January 1992, a successful ceasefire was put into place.  The 
forces of the Yugoslav Federal Army withdrew, although fighting continued on smaller 
scale between these two groups throughout 1992 and 1993.   The European Community 
final gave recognition to both Slovenia and Croatia.   
 Just as the conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia was winding down, problems 
began to rise between Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which declared its 
independence in April 1992.  War broke out immediately, and ethnic cleansing began 
again throughout the territory, particularly in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and 
in the Serb-dominated Republic of Srpska.  The United Nations extended its Protection 
Force Mandate to Bosnia shortly after this, in order to protect the airport in the city of 
Sarajevo.  The following year, a number of peace plans were put forward, including the 
Vance-Owens plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, both of which sought to divide 
Bosnia into ethnic regions; both were rejected by the Bosnian government.  The United 
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Nations Security Council passed resolution 827, which created an international tribunal to 
try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the conflict.233  A successful 
ceasefire was finally declared in February 1994 between Bosnia and Croatia, and NATO 
establishes a no-fly zone over Bosnian territory.   In March, the Washington Agreement 
was signed, ending the conflict between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the Serbians in 
Krajina agreed to the ceasefire as well, and American and German negotiators pressured 
Bosnia and Croatia to form a confederation, but the latter was rejected.234   
 Later in the year, the forces of Serbian Krajina launched another offensive within 
Bosnia, renewing the conflict.  The Croatian military intervened a number of times into 
Bosnia, attempting to encircle the Republic of Krajina.  The Contact Group, consisting of 
the United States, Russia, Britain, and Germany, put forward another peace plan in 
October 1994, which sought to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities, the 
Federation and the Republika Srpska.  In July 1995, a massacre at Srebrenica took place, 
carried out by Bosnian Serb forces under commander Ratko Mladic; over 8000 Bosnian 
Muslims were killed.  In August, Croatian forces take over most of the Krajina region, 
leading to the ethnic cleansing of 200,000 Croat Serbs.  That same month, NATO began a 
bombing campaign in Bosnia against the Bosnian Serb forces.  Finally, in November, the 
conflict came to end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which divided the 
country along ethnic lines and left an UN peace-keeping force in place.   
It is important to be clear about how to characterize the history of the breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia, as either a large-scale civil war, in which a legitimate central 
government attempted to prevent breakaway republics from seceding, or as a situation in 
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which these republics had legitimate reasons for seceding.  Recognition for independence 
was relatively slow in forthcoming to the republics, because many Western nations 
wanted to wait; independent statehood would have implied taking sides in the on-going 
conflict, something most Western governments were loathe to do at the time, preferring 
instead to treat the situation in Yugoslavia as a civil conflict that could be resolved 
peaceably.  Mestrovic argued that this unwillingness to take sides was symptomatic of a 
fundamental flaw within modernity and Western Enlightenment, a refusal to recognize 
the importance of national and ethnic identity in the wake of the Cold War.235  While 
ethnic differences certainly do not imply an automatic claim to self-determination, 
Western nations at the time did not take seriously the danger implied in the claims of 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism and the role of the nationalist ideology in persuading 
people to carry out ethnic cleansing within Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  By 
not taking seriously the democratic decisions of the Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian 
people to secede, Western nations inadvertently fueled the efforts of virulent Serbian 
nationalists.  The country of Slovenia was the first to realize this situation and began to 
create a parallel command structure over its military forces, separate from the central 
command, in preparation for its declaration of independence.  The other republics were 
not able to act with this haste; conflict was waged in Croatia between the JNA and the 
fledgling Croatian military (using JNA equipment).  By the time conflict erupted in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations had already established an arms embargo to the 
Yugoslavia region, so it took a number of years before the Bosnian military was able to 
create forces able to stand on level ground with the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpka, which 
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had inherited the majority of military resources as well as received aid from the JNA 
(now under the de facto control of Serbia).   
In 1996, a new phase of the conflict began.  The Kosovo Liberation Army, which 
at the time was not an organized unit but operated only as small cells, began carrying out 
attacks on Serbian civilians and security personnel in Kosovo.  Much of the KLA’s 
funding and support came from Albanian Kosovars in exile, and its policy was to oppose 
the moderate government of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo.  The following year, the fall of 
the Albanian government led to the looting of stockpiles of military weapons by criminal 
gangs, and many of these weapons wound up in the hands of the KLA, allowing them to 
step up their attacks in early 1998, especially in the Drenica Valley region in southern 
Kosovo.   
 In March 1998, the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Interior Ministry began 
operations to control KLA activity along the border area between Kosovo and Albania.  
International concern in the region led to negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, which led to a halt of Yugoslavian operations and the 
establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission.  However, the conflict 
continued as the KLA brought more territory under its control and moved further north 
toward the capital of Pristina.  A number of atrocities were committed against Serbians in 
Kosovo by the KLA during this time.  In October, the international community demanded 
an end to the fighting through the Kosovo Verification Agreement; the Yugoslav 
government was asked to end all offensives, while the KLA was asked to end its bit for 
Kosovar independence.  To this end, NATO peace-keeping troops would be stationed 
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throughout Kosovo.  A ceasefire began on October 25, and a group of observers from the 
OSCE nations moved into Kosovo.  
 The conflict started up again in December, when the KLA shot up a café in Pec, 
occupied strategic bunkers along the Pristina-Pec highway, and assassinated the mayor of 
Kosovo Polje.  In January 1999, KVM observers gained access to the besieged town of 
Racak and discovered the bodies of 45 dead civilians; two days later, Serbian police 
entered the town and took the bodies away.  This news received universal condemnation 
and set the stage for both the Rambouillet Conference and the announcement of NATO’s 
readiness to launch air strikes against Serbian forces.  The Rambouillet Conference ended 
on March 18, with a  plan in which NATO would administer Kosovo as an autonomous 
region within Yugoslavia, with 30,000 troops on the ground, but the Serbians refused to 
comply with these conditions.  From March 24 to June 11, NATO began its bombing 
campaign.  During this period, ethnic cleansing continued with Kosovo; over 300,000 
Kosovar Albanians fled to neighboring Albania and Macedonia.  By April, 850,000 
people were displaced in the region.  In May, an indictment was read at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia against Slobodan Milosevic regarding 
crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo.  On June 12, Milosevic accepted the 
terms of Rambouillet Agreement, and the NATO peacekeeping force, along with a 
number of Russian peacekeepers, entered the region, and the conflict was ended.   
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Rwanda 
 
The ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi are central in understanding the atrocities 
committed in Rwanda in 1994.  Rwandan society was dominated by a feudal system 
called igikini until the late 1950s.  Under this system, the Tutsi monarchy (the mwami) 
received service in exchange for use of land (under a contract known as uburetwa) and 
for cattle (ubuhake).   Over time, this resulted in the creation of a social hiearchy within 
the region.  
  The nature of divisions between Hutu . . . and Tutsi has [sic] always been 
 complex, especially since the Belgian colonial era.  Before colonialism,   
 ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ signified little more than socioeconomic status, with Hutu the 
 cultivators who worked in the service of the Tutsi pastoral aristocracy.  Hutu and 
 Tutsi spoke the same language, held many of the same religious beliefs, and 
 practiced the same rituals.  The categories were permeable, so that a Hutu who 
 gained sufficient wealth, usually in the form of cattle, could become a Tutsi.  The 
 lines blurred further with widespread intermarriage between the groups over 
 several generations.236 
 
In the late 19th century, Rwanda had been controlled by Germany as part of the 
territory of German East Africa.  Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, control 
over the territory was given to Belgium.   During this period, the Belgians introduced 
their mode of public administration in Rwanda, organizing Rwanda down to the level of 
the street and the household.  “A strict hierarchy of government prevailed.  The country 
was divided into eleven prefectures led by prefets; 145 communes led by burgomestres; 
1,600 secteurs led by conseillers; and tens of thousands of sous-secteurs comprising 
small groups of households.  At each level Banyarwanda [the Rwandan people] displayed 
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a high regard for authority.”237   As Mann points out, this system of public administration, 
combined with a good transportation infrastructure and relatively tightly structured set of 
civil society institutions (churches, agricultural cooperatives, credit associations, and 
development NGOs), created a tight network of social control.238  Another aspect of 
domestic political sovereignty introduced by the Belgian colonial administration was a 
system of ethnic identity cards, distributed after a 1933-34 census of the country, which 
sought to settle ethnic identity between Hutu and Tutsi along racial lines.  “The Belgians . 
. . froze racial, political, legal, and educational privileges, reducing ethnic mobility.”239  
After 1934, the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi took on more than socioeconomic 
significance; ethnicity became a political identity, one that persisted until after the 1994 
genocide, when the system of identity cards was eliminated.   
 Following World War Two, Belgium was given a trusteeship over the Rwandan 
territory under the United Nations.  Under the trusteeship, Hutu political activists began 
to call for political change and social revolution.  In August 1959, the reigning Mwami, 
or king, died while receiving medical treatment in neighboring Burundi, and rumors 
spread among the Tutsi population that he had been poisoned.  A popular Hutu uprising 
occurred the following November, and a number of violent attacks took place against the 
Tutsi population, beginning in central Rwanda and spreading throughout the country.  
The new Mwami deployed royalist troops in a counteroffensive, but the Belgian military, 
in an about-face from its historical support for the Tutsi, supported the Hutu uprising and 
put down the Mwami’s military actions.  In early 1960, the leader of the Belgian military 
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in Rwanda, Col. Guy Logiest, staged a coup and replaced all of the Tutsi chiefs with 
Hutu chiefs.  Communal elections were held mid-year, and the Hutus won 90% of the top 
government posts.  In October 1960, Col. Logiest declared that the Hutu social and 
political revolution was complete and installed Dominique Mbonyumutwa as head of the 
provisional government.  At this point, 20,000 Tutsis had been displaced by the violence. 
The transition to political independence in the early 1960s took place alongside 
the rise of the ideology of Hutu Power.  Much of the driving force for political 
independence came from Hutu reaction against Tutsi hegemony that had been promoted 
sustained by the Belgian government throughout the period of Belgian colonial rule.  The 
idea of Tutsi racial and cultural superiority was turned upside down; the Hutus were 
viewed as a simple, hardworking people whose land had been usurped by the arrival of 
the Tutsis from the north centuries earlier; now, on the cusp of independence, it was the 
task of the Hutus to take back their country from Tutsi dominance.  Politically, this took 
the form of “majority democracy,” rubanda nyamwinshi, the dominance of public life by 
the Hutus and the exclusion of Tutsis from politics.240 Thus, although Tutsis would live 
alongside Hutus in the course of everyday life, public institutions would be controlled by 
the Hutus for the good of the Hutu majority.  The presence of the Tutsis, of course, 
remained a problem for those who subscribed to this ideology, and it was this ideology 
that would ascend both in the early 1960s (during the initial attacks by Tutsi monarchist 
guerrillas) and again during the years leading up to the 1994 genocide (during the RPF 
invasions).  As long as the Tutsis remained within Rwanda’s borders, it was felt that the 
Hutu majority could never feel safe.   
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During the period from 1961 to 1962, the Tutsi monarchy was abolished under increasing 
pressure from both popular Hutu protests and from the Belgium government, which, as 
noted above, had turned its support away from the Tutsis and toward the Hutus.   The 
people voted to create a republic, and Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President in 1962.  
However, in response to increasing guerrilla attacks from Tutsi monarchists, the 
government banned all non-Hutu political parties.  From that point on, the Rwandan 
government has been dominated by single-party rule, while still using the rhetoric of 
democratic participation. 241   Belgium withdrew its military forces in 1962, and Tutsi 
supporters of the monarchy began to carry out guerrilla attacks against the government; 
Hutus responded by attacking Tutsi civilians.  From December 1963 to January 1964, a 
number of massacres of Tutsi civilians occurred following sustained guerrilla attacks 
from across the Burundi border; during this time, almost a quarter of a million Tutsis fled 
into exile.  These early massacres were also met with little or no punishment within the 
country.242  By 1966, the Tutsi monarchists disbanded their guerrilla army and ceased 
their attacks.   
Until 1961, Rwanda and Burundi had been treated as a single entity under Belgian 
colonial rule.  Unlike Rwanda, Burundi chose to retain a monarchy within a 
constitutional framework, with Mwambutsa IV, a Tutsi, as king, after independence.  The 
subsequent history of the two countries is closely intertwined, because of their shared 
colonial history and dominant ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi; the enmity 
between Hutu and Tutsi with Burundi is also instructive.  The monarchy was abolished in 
Burundi in 1966, which set off a period of civil unrest resulting in the massacre of over 
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100,000 Hutus in 1972.  Following this, around 200,000 Hutus fled Burundi and settled 
in Rwanda in 1972, which led to a civil unrest there.  Following a military coup in July 
1973, President Kayibanda of Rwanda was ousted by Major General Juvenal 
Habyarimana, who then declared himself president and instituted one party rule 
throughout the country, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development 
(MRND), seeking to take advantage of the growth of Western development aid money.   
 Pressure on the Tutsi people continued to grow, and by the early 1980s, over 1 
million Rwandan Tutsis had left the country, with half of them settling into refugee 
camps in neighboring Uganda.  Many of these Tutsi refugees joined the rebel army of 
Yoweri Museveni, who eventually overthrew the dictator Milton Obete and became 
President of Uganda.  Realizing the dangerousness of this situation, Rwandan President 
Habyarimana closed Rwanda’s border to all refugees.   
 At this point, Rwanda had become dependent on foreign aid; by the late 1980s, it 
accounted for 60% of Rwanda’s annual budget.243  Because of this, Rwanda’s economy 
was tied to the Western world’s economic fluctuations.   In 1986, the prices of coffee and 
tea, Rwanda’s chief exports, crashed on the world’s markets, and by 1989, the IMF and 
the World Bank were demanding that Rwanda implement a structural adjustment 
program.  Deep cuts in the government’s budget, mismanagement of agricultural 
resources, and a year of drought created areas of famine around the country, leading 
criticism of the government and social unrest, to which the government responded with 
crackdowns and repression.  The dependency on foreign aid also created networks of 
corruption within the government, including the akazu, or little house, the true font of 
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power within Rwanda, which was controlled by Habyarimana’s wife Agathe and which 
had its power base in the northwestern areas of the country.  Despite these adverse 
conditions, the mass violence carried out against the Tutsi population had largely 
disappeared under Habyarimana’s rule.244 
The early 1990s brought more instability to Rwanda.  France had taken Belgium’s 
place as paternal trustee for Rwanda under the Habyarimana regime in 1975, and it began 
to pressure Habyarimana to allow other political parties to have a place in the political 
process following the end of the Cold War; Habyarimana announced in July 1990 that a 
multiparty system would be established.  The following October, Rwanda was invaded by 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army made up of mostly Tutsi refugees who had 
fled to Uganda and who had taken part in Museveni’s seizure of power.  The government 
responded by arresting Tutsi civilians as RPF sympathizers.  This set off a wave of local 
violence against Tutsis throughout the country.  This tense situation also gave rise to 
virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda, including the newspaper Kangura, which was edited by 
Hassan Ngeze, who was a member of the Madame Agathe’s akuza.  In December 1990, 
Kangura published “The Hutu Ten Commandments,” which was a militaristic doctrine of 
Hutu purity.245   
 The first half of 1991 saw numerous attacks against Tutsi civilians in 
northwestern Rwanda.  The country’s multi-party system began to operate during the 
summer of 1991; while most of the parties were fronts for Habyarimana’s  MRND, it is 
interesting to note that only one party had significant Tutsi membership, and the rest were 
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divided between reformers and Hutu extremists.  The main issue that dominated debate 
was the necessity of Hutu security; this gave rise to a new “Hutu Power” movement.  The 
RPF invasion continued, and France began sending soldiers to advise and to fight 
alongside Habyarimana’s army as well shipments of arms.   The war quickly drained the 
government of funds, so the army began a lucrative drug trade, setting up marijuana 
plantations in the forests.  By early 1992, the Hutu Power extremists had become very 
well-organized, stockpiling weapons and creating youth militias, known as the 
interahamwe, “those who work together.”  Further massacres of Tutsi civilians continued 
throughout the year.  
 The social divisions continued to grow between Hutu and Tutsi peoples 
throughout the country.  By early 1993, all of the opposition parties had split into two 
factions, supporting either Hutu Power or not.  This same year, the government granted a 
license to operate Radio Television Libres des Mille (RTLM), the first non-government 
run radio station in the country, which began broadcasting anti-Tutsi programming246.  A 
peace treaty between the Habyarimana government and the RPF, the Arusha Accords, 
was signed in August 1993, and plans were made to create a transitional government 
along with a power-sharing agreement.  That same month, neighboring Burundi held free 
elections for the first time in thirty years, and a Hutu was elected president.  The 
following November, the Burudian president was assassinated by the Tutsi dominated 
military; this trigged a Hutu uprsing in Burundi, followed by a military crackdown, 
leaving more than 50,000 people dead.  These events led Hutu Power activists in Rwanda 
to begin arguing that any peace accord with the Tutsis or the RPF was deceptive.  Also in 
                                                 
246
 Dina Temple-Raston, “Radio Hate,” Legal Affairs, September/October 2002, 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/feature_raston_sepoct2002.msp , accessed 
8/22/2005 
 113
November, the United Nations began deployment of a small peace-keeping force, the UN 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda and Uganda, under the command 
of Major General Romeo Dallaire from Canada.   
 Dallaire was aware that his mission was under-funded and under-manned, yet he 
was able to stay abreast of what was going on within the country and maintain a steady 
flow of intelligence back to the United Nations about the situation within Rwanda.  In 
January 1994, he learned of a plot to murder opposition leaders and UN soldiers, and he 
immediately faxed the information to the UN, but nothing was done.247 
 On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana, the new 
Hutu President of Rwanda, and Habyarimana’s top advisors, was shot down near the 
Rwandan capital of Kigali, as they were returning from Tanzania (as of this writing, it 
has never been determined who shot down the plane, and investigations are still being 
conducted248).  Within an hour of the plane crash, roadblocks had been set up around 
Kigali, and people, primarily Tutsis but also moderate Hutus, were being killed.  
Government radio and RTLM began urging violence against the Tutsi, blaming them for 
the murder of Habyarimana.   
Prior to the genocide, the country’s extensive political organization was utilized 
by the Hutu extremists to prepare to carry out the massacres more efficiently.  Col. 
Theoneste Basagora, who would establish a provisional government in the wake of 
Habyarimana’s assassination, created “self-defense” units in each commune, trained by 
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local military and police officials and instructed to act under the authority of the military, 
police, and local councilors; Basagora also made sure that weapons, including firearms 
but also machetes were distributed throughout the country.249  When the killing began, 
leaders of the killers were given lists of people to kill; according to one account given by 
Philip Gurevitch, “‘[they] had the number of everyone’s house, and they went through 
with red paint and marked the homes of all the Tutsis and moderate Hutus’”. 250 
The capital city was soon overrun with government soldiers, members of the 
Presidential Guard, and the interahamwe,  who were armed mostly with machetes, clubs, 
spears, and farm tools, with their lists of people to kill.  Their primary targets were Hutu 
opposition leaders, including the Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was 
killed along with ten Belgian peace-keepers trying to protect her.  The RPF quickly 
moved its own troops out of the city and launched an attack within the demilitarized zone 
but were met with strong government resistance.   
 The slaughter of Tutsis and Hutu opposition leaders spread from region to region 
after this. Within a matter of days, the Tutsi populations of many villages were 
completely eliminated.251  The slaughter was also accompanied by rape and looting.  
Hours after the death of President Habyarimana, Col. Bagasora had set up a crisis 
committee, ratifying the coup in the name of Hutu Power, and several days later, the 
committee had appointed an interim government and set up its headquarters to the Hotel 
des Diplomates in Kigali.  Fighting between government forces and the RPF continued 
around Kigali, however, and by April 12, the Hutu Power government had to flee the city 
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and take up residence in Gitarama.  On April 21, Maj. Gen. Dallaire requested 5000 
troops in hopes of ending the slaughter, but the UN leadership responded by slashing the 
UN force by 90%, leaving only 270 troops; a week earlier, Belgium had withdrawn all of 
its own troops from Rwanda.   
As the killing continued throughout the country, the international community 
found itself deadlocked.  Because of the deaths of American troops in Somalia the 
previous October, the United States was unwilling to commit any further troops to an 
African peacekeeping mission, and it blocked sending assistance through the UN Security 
Council.  A number of nations pushed for increased UN troop strength in Rwanda, but 
this met with little success. By late May, the killing of the Tutsis had slowed down; it was 
now centered in the country’s western provinces of Kibuye and Cyangugu. Most Tutsis 
who had not been murdered had fled the country.  At the same time, in the eastern part of 
Rwanda, a quarter of a million Hutus, fleeing the RPF, crossed the border into Tanzania 
for safety.  By early June, the United Nations was beginning to consider calling what was 
happening in Rwanda as genocide. 
 Meanwhile, France sought to salvage its political prestige in Rwanda252 by 
protecting the Rwandan government from defeat at the hands of the RPF; France justified 
its position by arguing that the massacres were taking place because of mass outrage at 
Habyarimana’s death.  In mid-June 1994, France began to deploy a humanitarian mission 
under the auspices of the UN; many African leaders, including the RPF, questioned the 
motives of the French and found the plan unacceptable, but with the endorsement of the 
Security Council, the deployment began on June 23.   
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When the French troops began arriving, the RPF controlled the eastern sections of 
Rwanda and were preparing to move westward.  Their engagements with the Rwandan 
national army were easy victories for them.  Within a week of the French arrival, French 
troops controlled a fourth of the country and sought to turn its territory into a “safe zone;” 
despite this, Tutsis continued to be murdered in French-controlled territory, and in most 
cases, the French military supported the local leaders who presided over the massacres.  
In July 1994, the RPF continued its successful offensive westward, taking Kigali back on 
July 4; by the 15th, over a half million Hutus fled the country in advance of the offensive, 
settling into refugee camps in Goma, Zaire.  Two days later, the Hutu Power government 
fled to Zaire, and the RPF announced that it would form a new government along the 
lines laid down in the Arusha Accords.  On July 19th, a new government was sworn in at 
Kigali.  The Red Cross announced that month that one million people had been killed in 
the genocide (current estimates say that 800,000 Tutsi people were killed).253  
 
Sudan 
 
Throughout most of the region of Sudan, the village remains the center of 
everyday life.  Communities are variously settled, semi-settled, or nomadic, and are 
organized around ethnic identity.  Within these villages, descent groups are the primary 
basis of organization, although some are based around occupation of a common territory.  
These descent groups control religious rituals and access to political power and social 
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prestige.254  Although villages can exist largely independently of one another, most 
peoples identify with one of the major tribes of Sudan.  Until recent years (as will be 
explained below), Arab tribes have not been regarded as a cohesive group and are divided 
into Juhanya, Jaali, and Kawahla, living in the northern regions of Sudan. The Nubian 
tribes live along the Nile River in far northern Sudan, including Darfur.  The Beja tribes 
live in eastern Sudan in the Red Sea Hills region.  The Fur remained an independent 
sultanate until 1916, as noted above, and they live in the central Darfur region.  The 
Zaghawa tribes live in northern Darfur and across the border in Chad.  Other smaller 
tribes living in northern Darfur include the Masalit, Daju, and Berti.  Most of Sudan’s 
non-Muslim peoples live in southern Sudan; the largest group is the Nilotes, which 
include the Dinka and the Nuer tribes; the Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari tribes; the 
Murle and Didinga tribes, along the border with Ethiopia; the Azande of southwestern 
Sudan; and a number of other smaller tribes.255   
Regional differences have dominated the political landscape of Sudan.  Before 
independence in 1956, southern Sudan was already rising up against the perceived 
domination of national affairs by the peoples of northern Sudan; throughout the late 
1960s and again after 1983, the central government did not exercise effective control over 
the southern half of the country, due to the existence of armed militias opposed to the 
government.  This rift resulted in two major long-term civil wars which have lasted to the 
present day.   The conflict in Darfur began in 2003, but its roots extend back through the 
entirety of modern Sudanese history, as the region was variously ignored by the central 
government or treated as a territorial pawn in conflicts with neighboring Chad and Libya.   
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The subsequent civil conflict in Darfur emerged from dissatisfaction over how the 
government had treated peoples in the region over the last two decades, and by May 
2008, the rebel forces had made inroads almost to the capital city of Khartoum before 
being repelled.  Although not chronicled in this case study, shortly after the turn of the 
millennium, conflict also began in the eastern section of Sudan, along the border with 
Ethiopia.  The common element in all of these conflicts is the role played by the 
overrepresentation of northern politicians in the central government as well as the 
promotion of northern interests at the expense of other regions.  These regional 
differences within Sudan, particularly between north and south, have prevented the 
country from being governed as a unitary political entity.   
Except for periods of military rule from 1958 to 1964, in 1969, and in 1989, 
Sudan has been governed as a parliamentary democracy.  A number of political parties 
have been active since independence, and their number has grown over time.  At the 
same time, the existence of strong political parties in country is also indicative of deep 
divisions within Sudanese society regarding how the country is to be governed, 
particularly with the distinctly religious parties, such as the Umma Party and the National 
Congress Party.  Until 1983, President Nimiery sought to govern Sudan as a secular state, 
but continuing pressure from Islamist groups led him to adopt an Islamic form of state.  
The majority of people in Sudan are Muslims, so support for this form of government is 
not surprising, but a substantial number of people, living in the south and in the Darfur 
region, are not Islamic, but rather are Christians and practitioners of animist religions, 
and they have suffered both discrimination and active persecution, since they fall outside 
of the dar al-Islam (domain of Islam).   
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Following the Second World War, the country of Sudan remained a colonial 
possession of the British government and was ruled jointly by Britain and Egypt as a 
condominium.  Petitions for independence had begun just prior to the end of the war, and 
political parties grew up around a number of group interests:  those committed to 
remaining in union with Egypt, those seeking to regain an independent Mahdist 
government (which had ruled the region from 1884 to 1898), those promoting 
Communism, and those belonging to a local section of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953, with the Hizb al-Ittyaddiyin (the Unionist 
Party) winning the majority of seats, followed by the Umma (the pro-Mahdist party).256  
Prompted by the revolution in Egypt in 1952, the British signed an agreement with Egypt 
to leave Sudan, which became independent in January 1956.   
 During the period of British colonial rule of Sudan, particularly from the 1920s to 
1956, Sudan was governed as two separate countries, divided between north and south, 
between the 8th and 10th parallels.  The northern area was mostly Muslim, economically 
developed, more urbanized, and had traditional ties with Egypt and the rest of the Arab 
world, while the south was divided between Christian and tribes with animist beliefs, 
largely undeveloped, and had closer ties with sub-Sahara Africa.  The British had carried 
out this policy in order to contain the spread of Islam from the south and to allow 
Christian missionaries to convert the animist believers of the region.257  Just prior to 
1956, northerners began to dominate the civil administration of the country as the British 
began pulling out; out of almost 800 civil positions, the southerners held only six of 
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them.258  In 1955, an insurgency began in southern Sudan as military units mutinied and 
seized control of Equatoria province, but the national government quickly quelled the 
revolt.  However, this uprising would sow the seeds of further rebellion in southern 
Sudan, beginning again in 1963. 
 During this early period of Sudan’s modern history, the Darfur region was largely 
ignored.   Darfur had been an idependent sultanate from the 15th to the early 19th 
centuries, when it was conquered by the Egyptian army in 1821.  The Mahdiyya uprising 
in 1881 threw off Egyptian rule for a time, until the intervention of the British in 1898.  
The Darfur region itself remained largely autonomous until 1916, when the British army 
finally subdued Ali Dinar, the ruler of Darfur, out of fear that he might lend his support to 
the Ottoman Turks during the First World War, and the region was made a part of Sudan.    
 As noted above, the ethnic and religious make-up of the Darfur region has been 
(and remains) complex and shifting.  The dominant tribe in the region is the Fur, whose 
lives are largely based around settled cattle herding in the central Jebel Marra mountain 
region; they are Sunni Muslims and speak both a Nilo-Saharan language as well as 
Arabic.  Until recent years, they shared the same land as the Bagarra, a Bedouin tribe 
who also live in other countries in northern central Africa; they, too, speak an Arabic 
dialect, are Sunni Muslims, but they nomadic, grazing their camels and cattle from one 
area to another seasonally.  The Zaghawa people live in western Sudan and Chad, are an 
ethnically African (Saharan) tribe who are semi-nomadic, and practice Islam; they are 
related to the Bidayat, who live in the same region and are more nomadic.  The Masalit 
tribe also live in western Sudan and Chad and speak a Nilo-Saharan language, but who 
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also practice Islam.   The Berti tribe lives in northern Darfur and is related to the Masalit 
people, and they practice settled agriculture and husbandry; their Nilo-Saharan language 
today has been largely replaced by Arabic.  These groups had settled in the region by the 
end of the 16th century and were followed by two more larger migrations of peoples from 
the east, the latter of which was the awlad al-Bahar, Arab tribes who lived along the Nile 
River and its tributaries and who settled almost exclusively in towns and came to control 
the economy of the region.259  
 Following independence, the Umma Party came to power in the Sudanese 
government, but these years were marked by economic instability and the growing 
rebellion in the south.  In 1958, the military seized the central government; the country 
finally gave way to civilian rule again in 1964, with Umma Party still in power under 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the party’s founder.  During the period of military rule, 
opposition forces in the south coalesced into the Anyana guerrilla group and fought 
against the government’s promotion of Islam as the official religion throughout the 
country; the subsequent civilian government refused to accept this group’s demands for 
regional autonomy and continued with the goal of establishing an Islamic republic in 
Sudan.  Prior to national elections in 1968, the Umma Party split into two factions.  The 
Darfur region had traditional lent its support to the party, but after the split, both factions 
began making appeals to the different tribes, seeking to split the support along ethnic 
lines.  It was during this time that the rhetoric of “African” versus “Arab” was introduced 
into political debate and which would later become a factor contributing to the 
polarization of ethnic identities in the region.260  Another military coup in 1969 brought 
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Col. Jafaar al-Nimiery to power, whose government initially sought to emulate Nasser’s 
socialist reforms in Egypt and which was opposed to the predominance of religious-based 
political parties.  In 1972, Nimiery came to a peace agreement with the southern 
insurgency, and in 1973, a new constitution was introduced that gave significant 
autonomy for the south and recreated Sudan as a secular state.   
 In the mid-1960s, civil war was beginning in neighboring Chad.  Chad had 
achieved independence from French colonial rule in 1960 and had come under the 
autocratic rule of President Francois Tombalbaye.  Resistance to his rule coalesced in the 
mid-1960s throughout the country, and a number of organizations arose in opposition to 
his government.  In Sudan, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) was 
formed in Nyala in 1966, and its forces grew in the following years, with the 
establishment of bases in Darfur.  The Sudanese government supported the insurgency 
against Tombalbaye’s government because of his opposition to Islam in the name of Pan-
Africanism.  FROLINAT was eventually expelled from Sudan in 1971 after fighting with 
the Chadian government spilled over onto Sudanese territory in Darfur.   
 Another complicating factor with the civil war in Chad was the rise of Col. 
Muammar Gadaafi in neighboring Libya in 1969.  He became involved in the civil war in 
Chad, lending to support to FROLINAT and allowing them to establish bases on Libyan 
soil.  Gadaafi initially had cordial relations with the Sudanese government under 
Nimiery, but this went sour after in 1971 after Nimiery rejected Gadaafi’s suggestion that 
Sudan and Libya form a union of their two countries and made peace with the southern 
insurgency in 1972.  To further his own revolutionary ends in the region, Gadaafi 
established the Failaka al-Islamiya (the Islamic Legion) to help overthrow the Chadian 
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government, and he supported the Tajammu al-Arabi (Arab Union), a pan-Arabist 
organization in Darfur; both orgaizations operated on Sudanese soil.261  Gadaafi also lent 
his support to Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had been jailed following the 
Nimiery coup but who was released in 1972 and moved to Tripoli.   
 The Tombalbaye government in Chad fell in 1975 after the president’s 
assassination, and the Sudanese government sought some rapprochement with the new 
government under Gen. Felix Malloum in order to diffuse growing civil unrest in the 
Darfur region.  However, Libya’s Gadaafi had already established bases in a disputed 
border region between Libya and Chad and was aiming to conquer the country and join it 
with Libya.  Gadaafi also supported a coup against the Sudanese government in 1976, led 
by Sadiq al-Mahdi and Baggara tribesmen, which gained controlled of Khartoum for 
three days before being defeated; this was followed by brutal acts of repression against 
civilians in Darfur who were accused of sympathizing with the coup attempt, leaving 
some 3000 dead.262 
 In an effort to avoid further instability inside of Sudan, President Nimiery brought 
prominent Muslims into his government in 1977, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and al-
Madhi’s brother-in-law, Hassan al-Turabi, hoping to appease critical opposition in the 
north.  Al-Turabi was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan and had been 
involved with Islamist politics since the 1960s.  Oil was discovered in southern Sudan in 
1978, and that led to renewed regional tensions between north and south; the south was 
already suspicious of Nimiery’s growing rapprochement with Islamic political groups.  
The southern government had initially sought the construction of an oil refinery in the 
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south, but the Nimiery government instead built a refinery in the north and had a pipeline 
constructed directly to the Red Sea for direct export of crude oil.263  By the end of the 
1970s, the Sudanese government was also lending its support to Hissan Habre and his 
Northern Army (FAN) in Chad because of his opposition to both the Malloum 
government and Libya’s designs on Chad.  The FAN began using Darfur as a base and 
staging area for attacks upon Chad.264  “This rough handling of Darfur by the Libyans, 
the Chadians and the Khartoum forces decisively worsened the regional ethno-political 
landscape.  Tribes which had seen themselves primarily in local terms were suddenly 
catapulted into a broader artificial world where they were summoned to declare 
themselves as either ‘Arab’ or zurqa [Arabic for black, a euphemism for African]. . . . 
Darfur did no seem to matter enough to be taken seriously at the level of good 
governance, but it certainly mattered enough to become an increasingly racialized 
battleground between Khartoum, Tripoli, and Ndjamena.”265 
 The Nimiery government began to undertake a number of reforms throughout the 
country.  The Regional Government Act of 1979 sought to make provincial governments 
more responsive to their local populations by appointing solely local leaders.  In the 
Darfur region, the central government attempted to appoint an outsider to the area as 
governor, in order to oversee Hissan Habre’s military efforts, but this was met with 
popular protest, and Ahmed Diraige, a respected Darfurian leader, was appointed in his 
place.  In 1983, due to pressure from al-Turabi, then the Attorney General, and from 
other prominent Muslims in the north, Nimiery declared an “Islamic revolution” and 
began to institute Islamic legal reform over the country and to support the establishment 
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of Islamic banks.  He also undid the 1972 peace agreement with the southern provinces 
and tried to redraw the boundaries of the northern provinces to include the oil fields and 
agriculturally productive land in the Upper Nile region.   
The changes had dire consequences for the country.  Civil war erupted again with 
the south; national army troops in the south deserted and reformed themselves across the 
border in Ethiopia as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Col. John Garang 
de Mabior, a member of the southern Dinka tribe.  They received support from both 
Ethiopia’s government and Libya’s Muammar Gadaafi.  A drought in 1983 led to 
catastrophic food deficits in the region, including Sudan, in 1984 and 1985; Nimiery at 
first refused to acknowledge the problem, but by the second half of the year, camps for 
internally displaced persons began appearing outside of Khartoum.  At least a quarter of a 
million people died before the government began to accept food aid, and 95,000 died in 
Darfur alone.266  Economic problems increased, including a growing national debt and 
inflation.  Popular protest against Nimiery grew, and in April 1985, he was overthrown 
by his own military.   
 Elections were held in 1986, and with the assistance of millions of dollars in 
election funds from Libya, Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Umma Party won.267  In return, 
Gadaafi began sending convoys of humanitarian relief and military troops into the Darfur 
region; he also began arming the Baggara tribes, whom he saw as “Arab” allies in the 
region.  Because of his renewed ties with the Sudanese government, Gadaafi began to 
lend his support to government forces in the southern civil war.  The government under 
al-Mahdi remained a firmly Islamic state, maintaining the changes introduced by Nimiery 
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in 1983.  He too began arming the Baggara tribes (known as the murahaleen militia), in 
hopes of using them in the civil war, and he allowed them to attack the Dinka and Nuer 
tribe civilians in Bahr al-Ghazal in southern central Sudan.  At the same time, because of 
the drought of 1983-84 and the increasing desertification in Darfur, the traditionally 
cooperative relationship between settled and nomadic peoples in use of the land was 
becoming more difficult to maintain, as farmers began fencing off areas through which 
nomads herded their livestock and began burning off wild grasses that nomads were 
hoping to use as fodder for their animals.268 
 Libya also continued its efforts to overthrow the government in Chad, and it was 
using its troops and local Arab recruits in Darfur to that end.  In April 1987, the Chadian 
army crossed the border into Darfur and attacked these forces, wiping out most of their 
fighting capacity.  “Arab” tribes increasingly supported the central government’s efforts 
to defeat the south in the civil war and to support Libya’s efforts in Chad, while 
“African” tribes like the Zaghawa and Salamat fighting in the Chadian civil war turned 
against the Fur, who in turn began to organize their own militia.  Further incursions by 
the Chadian army into Darfur in 1987 and 1988 only increased these tensions.    
The role of Arab identity has been prominent feature in the Darfur conflict.  The 
conflict between Pan-Arab versus Pan-African affiliation from the 1960s was felt in the 
reigion; the civil war in Chad and the long presence of the Libyan military in the region 
also contributed to polarization of ethnic identity.  This was even further exaggerated 
with conflicts among different tribes over land and water rights follows desertification 
and the rise of the el-Beshir regime beginning in 1989.  The central government 
continued to favor the “Arab” tribes, eventually recruiting a number of them for the 
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Janajaweed (more below), while neglecting and eventually attacking “Africans” in the 
region.  Despite this forced attempt to impose identity on the different tribes in the 
region, as noted earlier, the ethnic make-up of each tribe is different.  Some tribes speak 
Arabic as their main language, while others do not; many of the tribes are Muslims, 
despite being considered “African;” and there is a mix of both settled agriculture and 
nomadic herding among both “Arab” and “African” tribes.  All peoples in the region are 
dark-skinned, and because of centuries of immigration and inter-marriage, physical 
features are not indicators of identity.  Yet, the idea of a distinct “Arab” identity remains 
an active belief.   
In 1988, all of these problems came to head when there was another drought in 
Sudan, and the Nile River flooded Khartoum, disrupting communications and 
transportation and leading to another famine throughout the country.  There was mass 
starvation, particularly in the south, and there were refugee movements to the north in 
search of food, where over three million people settled into the slums of Khartoum.269  
By this time, the Darfur region was in chaos, with the Libyan government in de facto 
control, and members of the government and the military were pressing al-Mahdi to 
accept some sort of peace agreement with the forces of the SPLM in the south, yet this 
was opposed by members of the National Islamic Front, later known as the National 
Congress Party.  Finally, in June 1989, a group of pro-NIF army officers led by Col. 
Omar al-Beshir overthrew the al-Mahdi’s government.    
A key concept to understanding many of the problems that would follow in Sudan 
is the use of the Islamic term jihad.  The central government, now controlled by the 
National Congress Party, sought to turn Sudan into an Islamic state and to impose 
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shariah law throughout Sudan, first after 1983 and again after the 1989 coup.  In the 
1990s, the government began lending support to various Islamic terrorist organizations 
regionally and throughout the world in the name of the Islamic struggle (jihad).  This was 
influenced in part by the successes of Gadaafi’s coup in Libya and the Shi’ite revolution 
in Iran as well as by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian group whose 
own influence has been extremely far-reaching throughout the Sunni Muslim world since 
the 1920s.  Sudan, because of its proximity to Egypt, has had close connection with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but the group’s ideas did not gain in popularity until the late 1970s, 
with the rise of Hassan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front party.  Within the 
ideology of this group, modernity and its political institutions, in the form of the secular 
state, are viewed as a source of evil and disconnection from the will of Allah.  It is 
believed that the devout Muslim will bring back a kind of “natural” order to the world by 
taking over the reigns of the state and reestablishing the centrality of sharia law 
throughout the land.  Al-Turabi pursued this course through a “top-down” approach while 
in office, seeking to place sympathetic believers in top political positions and change 
institutions through the power they gain.  Al-Turabi was regarded by the government as 
“Guide” of this Islamization of Sudan until his arrest in 2003.   
Prior to the coup, local tribal leaders in Darfur began to consult with one another 
and initiate their own peace process in the region.  All parties were exhausted by the 
conflict, and many were aware that much of the fighting was being engineered by Libya 
for its involvement in Chad.  By the summer of 1989, the situation in the region had 
largely, if not precariously, settled down.  At the same time, the new Sudanese 
government sought help from Libya to carry on its war against the south; in return, Libya 
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wanted to remain in Darfur to carry on its war against Chad.  By September 1989, 
conflict was reignited in Darfur as Idriss Deby, former supporter of Hissen Habre, fled to 
Sudan and later formed the Patriotic Salvation Movement (with Libyan backing), which 
would eventually overthrow the Habre regime in 1990, all the while bringing the Chadian 
civil war into Darfur once again.   
 The Sudanese government under al-Beshir continued the country’s movement 
toward “Arabization” and “Islamization,” under the guidance of Hassan al-Turabi and his 
National Islamic Front.  Throughout the 1990s, more and more strict regulations were 
introduced throughout the country, and the use of Arabic was required in government and 
education, while the cultures of non-Arabic peoples were denigrated.270 Any dissent was 
quashed, people could be detained without trial, and a number of secret prisons were set 
up where torture and rape were used to extract confessions.271  A militia was created, the 
People’s Defense Force, used to suppress civilian demonstrations and later to supply 
manpower to the war effort in the south.272  The central government also undertook 
efforts to reorganize the federalist structure of the country, creating twenty-six states out 
of the existing nine and re-establishing tribal administration in each of them; this was 
done in order to increase support for the NIF among tribal chiefs and to undermine the 
local electoral influence of the Umma and Union Parties.273  During this time, Sudan also 
became a supporter of Islamist militant activity around the world against what it saw as 
American imperialism following the 1991 Iraq War; this included giving aid and comfort 
to individuals such as Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Osama bin 
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Laden, as well as offering to recruit and train mujahideen for involvement in Islamic 
conflicts around the world.   
 The situation in Darfur began to “settle” once again.  Another drought in 1990 
had led to food shortages for the following year, but this had been met only with a 
lackluster response from the central government.  John Garag of the SPLM in southern 
Sudan had attempted to link his group with the dissatisfaction of peoples in Darfur with 
the central government, culminating in an attempted insurrection in 1991-92, but this 
ended in failure.    The conflict between Chad and Libya had now come to an end, and 
the Libyan presence in Darfur was slowly disappearing.  “[Nothing] had been solved in 
depth, but on the surface things had slowed down.  It was not exactly peace, but it was no 
longer open war – just a state of diffuse insecurity where villages would be attacked once 
in a while, where trucks traveling to and from the markets were liable to get ambushed 
but where long periods of calm would give the impression that things were basically all 
right and that all this was simply an expression of some kind of ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ 
violence.”274 
 The civil war in southern Sudan continued throughout the 1990s, now as a 
“regional jihad” by the central government.  It sought to exploit growing factionalism 
within the SPLM by offering Riek Machar, an opponent of John Garang within the 
SPLM, a separate peace agreement in 1997 as well as hinting at a share in future oil 
revenues.275  The latter became a reality with the creation of the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company in 1997 and the opening of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline in 1999, 
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and Riek’s forces, as well as Baggara militias, were employed to secure the oil fields and 
pipelines by driving out the local populations of Nuer and Dinka peoples.   
In August 1998, the United States government responded to a series of al-Qaeda-
linked car bombings of its embassies in Africa by a cruise missile attack on a 
pharmaceutical plant north of Khartoum, suspected at the time of producing chemical 
weapons.   “The combination of Sudan’s record of supporting international terrorism, its 
savage conduct of the war in the south and its repression of all opposition had made 
Bashir’s government one of the most reviled in the world.”276  The central government 
also began dealing with internal pressures.  Low-level guerrilla activity by the Masalit 
tribe in northwestern Darfur against the government took place from 1996 to 1999 and 
ended with government forces occupying Dar Masalit, killing thousands and sending tens 
of thousands fleeing as refugees.277  The relationship between Hassan al-Turabi and 
Omar el-Beshir was growing strained as well.  International pressures to curb support for 
terrorism, to reach a settlement in the south, and the government’s desire to increase 
international investment in the burgeoning oil industry led el-Beshir to distance himself 
from al-Turabi and the more extreme Islamist policies of the NIF.278  In December 1999, 
al-Turabi was ousted from his position as President of the Parliament, and in 2000, 
Parliament was dissolved, the offices of the National Congress Party were closed, and a 
state of national emergency was declared.   
That same year, a xeroxed book was anonymously published and publicly 
distributed, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan; a second part 
was published the following year.  The book described how Sudanese political life had 
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been dominated since independence by northerners, to the detriment of peoples from 
other regions.279  In February 2001, al-Turabi’s breakaway political party, the Popular 
National Congress, signed a cooperation agreement with the SPLM, and al-Turabi was 
subsequently arrested (though released several months later).  Finally, in the summer of 
2001, the SPLM launched an offensive from Bahr el-Ghazal province into southern 
Darfur, in order to link up with discontent created following the Dar Masalit uprising, but 
the central government unleashed a counter-offensive later in the year that began 
targeting civilians, using both aerial attacks and the local Murahaleen milita. 
Given these growing internal divisions within the country and continued 
international pressure following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 
2001, el-Beshir sought to further distance himself from radical Islamic politics by 
publicly denouncing terrorism and vowing the cooperate with the United States in 
measures aimed at al-Qaeda.  The United States, through Senator John Danforth, was 
instrumental in brokering an end to the war in the south, culminating in the signing of the 
Naivasha Agreement in January 2005.   
While the rest of the world focused on the peace process to end the war in the 
south, the situation in Darfur was once again deteriorating.  From November 2002 to 
February 2003, a low level of conflict broke out against government and police targets, 
seemingly of no different character than other localized conflicts in the region in recent 
years; the government referred to them as nothing more than attacks by “bandits.”280 
However, these attacks had been undertaken by members of the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement (SLM), an organization created from the remnants of Fur self-defense militias 
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in the late 1980s, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Khalil Ibrahim, 
former Minister of Education for Darfur in the 1990s and reputed author of the Black 
Book.  The insurgency launched an offensive that lasted throughout the summer of 2003.  
In response, the central government reorganized the administration of the Darfur region 
and began to recruit militias, which came to be known as the Janjaweed, to carry on the 
fighting on the ground.281  In the mid-summer, the government began carrying out a 
pattern of attacking civilian targets, under the guise of fighting a counter-insurgency, 
using bombers and helicopters to attack villages from the air, then unleashing the 
Janjaweed (sometimes with army assistance), who would loot homes and steal livestock, 
rape girls and women, and kill anyone who did not flee.  This created hundreds of 
thousands of refugees in the region in a few weeks, who often moved toward the cities or 
over the border into Chad.   Often, the Janjaweed would harass the refugees, stealing 
from them and continuing to capture and rape girls and women who ventured outside safe 
areas for water and firewood.282  By early 2004, a million people had fled their homes, 
and at least thirty-thousand had died.283  The government also began arresting hundreds 
of people in the region that it suspected of having connections with the rebel group, 
holding them in prisons and in many cases torturing them.   
As news began to leak out of Sudan about the conflict in Darfur later in 2003, the 
al-Beshir government denied that a rebellion was taking place; by early 2004, it changed 
its position and said that the rebellion would soon be under control.  It blocked access to 
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the region to outside observers, and it took control of food aid coming into the country 
slated for Darfur.  The government launched another offensive in the region in early 
2004, using ten of thousand of regular army troops.284  Fighting also increased along the 
border with Chad; this eventually led to instability inside of Chad and a coup attempt 
against President Idris Deby by members of the Zaghawa tribe, who wished to force him 
to drop his support of the Sudanese government’s policies.  By the spring of 2004, a 
humanitarian presence was beginning to grow in the region, but the rainy season, lack of 
security, and government interference kept many of the food convoys from reaching the 
camps where aid was most needed.  The Chadian government brokered a ceasefire 
agreement in April between the rebel groups and the government, and the African Union 
sent observers to monitor the ceasefire, but attacks continued.   In July, the U.S. Congress 
passed a resolution calling the killings a genocide, and the UN Security Council placed 
an arms embargo on Darfur region; this was followed in September 2004 by statements 
from both the European Parliament and American Secretary of State Colin Powell 
supporting claims of genocide, but neither committed themselves to take action beyond 
providing relief supplies.  At the same time, the United Nations opened a Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate whether a genocide was in fact taking place in the region.285 
Shaky negotiations had been ongoing between the rebel forces and the 
government, but rifts were beginning to emerge between the rebel groups.  At the time of 
the ceasefire agreement, The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) 
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broke away from the JEM because it felt that its demands were not focused enough on the 
needs of the Fur people.  The JEM had a strong Islamist agenda and was allied with al-
Turabi’s Popular National Congress, while the SLM was more regional and secular and 
had allied itself with the Northern Democratic Alliance, a northern group opposed to the 
el-Beshir regime and the NIF, and also allied with the SPLM in the south.  Fighting broke 
out between these two main rebel groups in Darfur in November 2004.   
The massive amount of violence had led to a point where the society had 
almost ceased to function.  Communities were not only at each other’s throats, but 
they were quickly becoming incapable of regulating themselves on a day-to-day  
basis.  The whole of Darfur was turning into a lawless refugee camp where social 
patterns were under severe strain.  The Janjaweed had been delinquents and  
socially marginal people from the start, but the guerrillas were now increasingly 
losing control of themselves and bandit groups were quickly springing up.286 
 
Another government offensive began in December 2004, just prior to the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLA in the south, aimed at “clearing” 
the roads in Darfur.  The UN Security Council referred the Darfur case to the 
International Criminal Court in March 2005.  By the summer of 2005, the provisions of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement took effect, and a government of national unity was 
created, making SPLM leader John Garang First Vice-President of the Sudanese 
government, but he was killed in helicopter crash on July 30, shortly after taking office.  
Following a brief lull in the summer months, reports of government air attacks against 
civilian targets in Darfur began to increase beginning in September 2005. 287   
Despite media worldwide media attention and international outcry over the events 
in Darfur, attacks on civilians continued to take place, and access to humanitarian relief 
supplies continued to be limited in the region.  In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement 
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was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, by breakaway SLM leader Minni Minawi; this agreement 
laid out changes in the governance of the Darfur region as well as increased participation 
in the central government; it also established the Transitional Darfur Region Authority, 
which was to be implemented the following April.288  The other rebel groups, including 
the JEM and the remaining faction of the SLM, opposed the peace agreement and joined 
together as the National Redemption Front, headed by long-time Darfurian leader Ahmed 
Diraige.   The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1706 in August, 
creating a mandate for a peace-keeping force in the region;289  this received support from 
both the SLM and the Chadian government. 
Conflict on the border between Sudan and Chad continued throughout 2006.  By 
January 2007, Chad had taken some 200,000 refugees from Darfur,290 and on more than 
one occasion, Chad accused the Sudanese government of lending support to anti-
government rebels in its own country and had closed its own consulate in Darfur.  These 
conflicts seemed indicative that the Sudanese government was not honoring the peace 
agreement it had signed in May; in fact, observers noted that in the latter half of 2006, 
attacks against civilian targets continued unabated.291  This pattern continued into 2007, 
culminating in an attack on African Union peacekeepers in April. 
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In February 2007, the International Criminal Court handed down indictments, 
against Ahmed Haroun, former interior minister for Darfur in 2003 and 2004, and against 
Ali Khushayb, a Janjaweed leader.292  El-Beshir and President Idris Deby of Chad signed 
a peace agreement in May, attempting to ease tension between the countries as fighting 
continued along the border region; the agreement, brokered by Saudi Arabia, stated that 
the governments of either country were forbidden to support rebel groups aimed at 
destabilizing the others’ country.  In the same month, Amnesty International released a 
report stating that Russia and China were supplying military equipment to Sudan in 
defiance of the UN arms embargo that was being using in the Darfur conflict.293  The UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1769 in July, which approved the creation of a hybrid 
UN/AU peace-keeping force which was set to merge with the existing African Union 
force by December; its deployment began in October 2007. 
Cooperation among the different rebels groups was sought during a conference 
held in Arusha, Tanzania, in August, in order to smooth out difference among themselves 
and to allow the peace agreement to be put into place more effectively.  During peace 
negotiations with the government sponsored by the UN and AU in subsequent months, 
there were still disagreements among the rebel groups, and this delayed progress in 
discussions.  Finally, in November 2007, six of the groups signed a Charter of 
Unification and agreed to take on the SLM name.294  Throughout 2007, unity among the 
tribes making up the Janjaweed was weakening, as fighting broke out between the 
                                                 
292
 International Criminal Court, “ICC Prosecutor Presents Evidence On Darfur Crimes,” February 27, 
2007, ICC-OTP-20070227-206-En, http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=230&l=en.html 
accessed 7/17/08 
293
 Amnesty International, “Sudan:  Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur,” 
May 28, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/019/2007/en/dom-AFR540192007en.html 
accessed 7/18/08 
294
 JUBA, “Nine Darfur rebel factions reunite under one structure,” Sudan Tribune, November 15, 2007, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24751 accessed 7/18/08 
 138
Terjem and Mariah tribes, the Habbaniya and Salamat tribes, and the Habbaniya and 
Falata tribes, all in southern Darfur; most of the fighting took place over water, land, 
livestock, and the ability to tax travel through certain trade routes.295  
The UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) officially began its mission 
in January 2008.  Although peace talks between the rebels in Darfur and the Sudanese 
government were still ongoing, in February 2008, the government began another 
offensive along the border with Chad, leaving between 8000 and 10,000 refugees trapped 
between the army and Chadian border.296  In April, John Holmes, UN undersecretary for 
humanitarian affairs, announced to the Security Council that according to new estimates, 
the number of dead in the Darfur conflict is close to 300,000 people.297  Much attention 
was brought upon China throughout early 2008, which was hosting the Summer 
Olympics in August, regarding its role in the Darfur conflict.298  In May, the JEM militia 
advanced to the city of Obdurman, across the Nile River from Khartoum; government 
forces managed to re-secure the area in a few days.  Conflicts also began again on the 
border between northern and southern Sudan between rival milita groups later in May. 
Also, as of May 2008, the UNAMID deployment remained only at 9500, short of its 
authorized strength of 19,000 troops.  In July 2008, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor for 
                                                 
295
 Mohamed Osman, “200 Die in Darfur Water Feuds,” Sunday Republican, January 14, 2007; also Jeffrey 
Gettleman, “Chaos in Darfur Rises as Arabs Fight with Arabs,” New York Times, September 3, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/03/world/africa/03darfur.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt accessed 7/18/08 
296
 “New wave of Darfur refugees flees into Chad,” CNN.com, February 12, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/02/12/chad.refugees/index.html , accessed 7/18/08 
297
 Roxanne Escobales et al., “Darfur dead ‘could number 300,000,’” The Guardian, April 23, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/23/sudan.unitednations accessed 7/18/08 
298
 for example, see Eric Reeves, “Beijing’s Propaganda Campaign Can’t Obscure Complicity in Darfur’s 
Genocide,” March 5, 2008, http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article207.html accessed 12/26/08 
 139
the International Criminal Court, announced that the court was seeking an arrest warrant 
for Omar el-Behsir for crimes against humanity committed during the Darfur conflict.299 
 
Conclusions 
 
Now that I have explored these five cases of crimes against humanity, I want to 
mention a few caveats.  In writing the chronological narratives, I have sought to focus on 
the major political, social, and economic events that led up to the incidents of crimes 
against humanity against a certain segment of each country’s population, and to note the 
international community’s response, if any, to these crimes; and in making the analytic 
distinction between political culture and sovereignty, I wanted to draw attention to the 
relative influence that each concept contributed to the situations in which crimes against 
humanity occurred.   One of the things that stands out in each case, and across all five 
cases, is the great complexity involved in attempting to articulate each concept and the 
weakness of relating contemporaneous historical events.  Political culture is a concept 
borrowed from the field of comparative politics, and my efforts to apply the rigorous 
standards and practices of that field, I am certain, will fall short of what is expected.  The 
analysis of sovereignty has a number of dimensions which I have not attempted to 
explore or have touched upon only slightly in these case studies, such as the role of the 
census in constructing social and ethnic identity, the physical construction and control of 
a country’s infrastructure, and the role of print and electronic media in state 
legitimization.  Finally, as I write this, events in Sudan are still unfolding, and 
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prosecutions for the various crimes committed in Argentina, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the 
former Yugoslavia are ongoing, so new information is still being added to the historical 
record.  Thus, my efforts, of necessity, will remain incomplete.   
That said, I want to now turn to a number of conclusions that may be drawn with 
the information and the concepts that I had available.   
 
Political Culture and Identity 
 
As the reader might have noticed throughout these case studies, the line between a 
country’s political culture and the place of identity within sovereignty is not clear-cut.  In 
fact, it is extremely difficult to separate the role of sovereignty in the enforcement of a 
country’s national identity and the sense of identity that political culture creates.  As I 
stated in an earlier chapter, sovereignty includes both a sense of belonging as well as the 
means of policing and defending the boundaries of belonging.  It might be said that 
sovereignty is the “container” of political culture in most countries; this holds true for 
both long-established countries and former colonies.  To use two examples, Cambodia’s 
government in 1975 was controlled by a Communist regime which set out to eliminate 
“subversives”, while in 1976 Argentina was controlled by a right-wing military junta that 
also wanted to eliminate “subversives;” their enemies largely came from the same sectors 
of the population: students, union members, the professional classes, intellectuals, and 
political opponents.   Cambodia had a new revolutionary government that set out to 
defend itself from a set of class enemies and enforce a sense of identity and belonging in 
the process.  The Argentinean tradition of military juntas in times of crisis allowed a 
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process to unfold in which the “essence” of national identity was perceived as threatened 
by leftist and Peronist enemies, creating the necessity for extreme measures.   
At other times, crimes against humanity have occurred because of the failure or 
weakness of the nation’s existing political culture, followed by the rise of an alternative 
sense (or senses) of belonging in its place.  This can be seen most clearly in Yugoslavia 
and to a lesser extent in Sudan.  The political culture created by Tito in the former 
Yugoslavia (“brotherhood and unity”) sought to forge a national identity based on 
communist ideas of class that transcended the ethnic identities that made up the different 
regions of the country.  After Tito’s death, the central government was no longer able to 
actively suppress expressions of ethnic identity.  At the same time, Serbian nationalists 
began to see saw themselves as the successors and guarantors of the Yugoslavian nation.  
When the different republics began to demand their own independence from Serbian 
domination, civil war erupted in the region, which then degenerated into mutual instances 
of ethnic cleansing and mass murder.  Sudan is a more ambiguous case, but traces of this 
problem can be seen there as well.  The secular aims of the Nimiery regime began to 
weaken during the late 1970s and early 1980s; until that time, military coups were largely 
secular affairs, seeking to restore order and stability to a country with one of the most 
ethnically diverse populations on Earth.  Islamist activists pressured the government, and 
by 1983, religious changes were taking place throughout the country in an effort to make 
Sudan into an Islamic state.  This reignited the civil conflict with the southern region of 
the country, which resisted the sectarian state, and more deeply involved Sudan in 
ongoing wars with its neighbors Chad and Libya, which in turn destabilized the entire 
Darfur region.   
 142
 Rwanda remains an interesting case in that categories of ethnicity dominated the 
politics of the post-colonial period (as they had during the colonial period, particularly 
under Belgian rule).  The “Hutu Revolution” of 1960 was framed in the country as a 
triumph of majority rule, but one in which the minority Tutsi population was politically 
disenfranchised.  The country’s weak economy lead to dependency on development aid, 
which in turn fostered patronage-client networks throughout the country.  By the late 
1980s, the economy of Rwanda was once again weak, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic 
Front was ready to attack from Uganda, and there was pressure from the international 
community for democratization.  This combination of social instability, civil war, and the 
growth of Hutu Power political parties contributed to renewed demonization of the Tutsi 
population and to the eventual genocide carried out against them.   
 In this light, political culture becomes a useful analytic tool for drawing attention 
to the ways in which a national identity is formed and to the institutions which sustain it.  
Political ideology drove the governments of Argentina and Cambodia to carry out crimes 
against humanity, but it is questionable whether these would have happened on a massive 
scale if the proponents of these ideologies did not have the means of state power at their 
disposal; if not, they might have remained vocal political movements carrying out 
isolated acts of violence, but nothing on the level of what actually happened in those 
countries.  The initial tacit support of the people of Argentina for the junta in 1976 soon 
gave way to terror as they learned that the new government was engaged in mass arrests 
of neighbors and co-workers and encouraged people to spy on one another and to act as 
informants.  The Khmer Rouge did, in fact, begin its regimentation of public and social 
life a few years before it seized governmental power in Cambodia in the regions of the 
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countryside under its control; communal living was enforced, and the people of these area 
became known as the “base people;” this would distinguish them from the “new people” 
who came under Khmer Rouge control only after central power was seized.  “New 
people” were held to a higher standard of scrutiny, and in many cases, this led to their 
eventual murders.  But until the Khmer Rouge actually gained control of most of the 
population, such murders were not common, even the midst of ongoing civil war against 
the government.  Had the Argentinean junta remained only a plot in the minds of its 
instigators, had the plans of the Khmer Rouge remained only half-carried out within 
Cambodia, it does not seem as if we would have seen the high levels of torture and 
murder committed in these countries.   
 Ethnicity is a much more complex element of a country’s political culture.  In the 
cases of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sudan, ethnicity was a driving factor in the violence 
committed, but one can also see periods in the histories of those countries when ethnicity 
did not play a major role or was not considered a dominant factor in political life.  Tito 
spent most of his life attempting to restrain expressions of ethnic identity within 
Yugoslavia, often in a brutal fashion, in the years following Tito’s death, ethnic conflict 
would prove to be Yugoslavia’s undoing as a unified country.  Both in Rwanda and 
Sudan, the legacy of colonial rule left deep socio-economic and ethnic divisions within 
those countries, where one or more ethnic groups had been favored or had been ruled 
over separately.  The subsequent histories of both countries have been largely defined by 
coming to terms with those divisions, largely through conflict.  In these cases, ethnicity 
was the immediate cause of the atrocities committed, and the control of state sovereignty 
was both an object of conflict as well as the means of carrying out that conflict.   
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Sovereignty, Stability, and Civil War 
 
Civil wars are, for the most part, fought within a country in order to either 
determine who will control the central government or to achieve autonomy for some 
group within the country; on the one hand, they are fight over sovereign control of the 
entire country, and on the other, they are attempts to gain some stake in the sovereign 
government or to achieve a measure of autonomous sovereign control for a group.  
Cambodia is an example of the former aspect of civil war, in which a faction within a 
country fights to gain control of the central government; the other countries are examples 
of the latter aspects.  Leftists in Argentina sought to gain representation within the central 
government, and being barred from it by both the Peronist party and by the military, they 
turned to armed struggle.  The republics of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo 
sought to establish independence from the dominance of Yugoslavian politics by Serbia.  
Tutsis born in exile created a military force in Uganda and invaded Rwanda, hoping to 
return to their homeland, to gain a measure of representation in the Rwandan 
government, and to topple the Hutu-dominated regime.  Native tribes of the Darfur region 
rose up against the central government of Sudan in order to draw attention to how the 
region was being ignored.   
In all of these cases, crimes against humanity were carried within a context of 
civil war:  in Argentina, a number of leftist organizations were targeted as well as those 
suspected of being involved in anti-government activities, by the ruling military junta; in 
Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge acted to eliminate enemies of the their regime once they 
took control of the capital city; in Yugoslavia, the break-away republics of Croatia and 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina fought with one another and with Serbia in order to establish their 
independence from the central government, and later, a group in Kosovo began an armed 
campaign for independence from Serbia; in Rwanda, the Hutu-controlled government set 
out to kill members of the Tutsi tribe, following a peace agreement which brought a halt 
to the civil conflict; and in Sudan, the government began employing air warfare and tribal 
militias to destroy tribal villages in the wake of an insurrection.   
In three of these five cases, stability in the post-colonial period of independence 
was an issue:  Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sudan.  Deep social divisions and economic 
inequalities continued to exist within these countries following independence, eventually 
leading to political instability and civil war.   Cambodia was largely rural and 
agricultural, and divisions existed between the majority of people living in villages in the 
countryside, wealthier merchants living in the cities, and the extravagant lifestyles of the 
monarch and his entourage; the Khmer Rouge was able to effectively exploit these 
divisions through both political and military struggle.  For many decades in Rwanda, the 
Belgians favored the Tutsis over the Hutus; following independence, the “Hutu 
Revolution” reversed this at the political level, practically barring Tutsis from political 
participation, while Tutsis remained economically dominant.  In Sudan, there remains the 
persistent control of the central government by peoples living in the northern sections of 
the country, to the exclusion of those living in the south and the west.  In none of the 
cases did the former colonial masters attempt to right the economic and social 
inequalities before granting independence, nor did they attempt to intervene or mediate 
once problems began because of these issues.  In fact, in these three cases, the colonial 
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masters contributed greatly to the exaggeration of these differences and divisions during 
the period of their rule.   
The cases of Argentina and Yugoslavia take place outside of the post-colonial 
context.  Both countries had been independent for most of the 20th century (with the 
exception of Yugoslavia prior to the First World War and during the Second World War, 
when it was under proxy control by Nazi Germany).  Beginning in the 1930s, Argentina 
had developed the practice of allowing the military to seize control of the government 
during periods of political and social unrest, so the establishment of the junta in 1976, 
while not welcome by most citizens, was not an unusual occurrence.  Yugoslavia 
experienced one-party, Stalinist-style rule after the Second World War while it remained 
relatively open to the rest of the world, unlike other communist nations with a similar 
form of government.  The central governments in each of these case responded to civil 
and political unrest with extreme levels of violence; in the case of Yugoslavia, groups 
within the break-away republics also carried out a great part of the crimes against 
humanity.   
The extreme measures taken to resolve the civil conflicts examined in these case 
studies point to a deep sense of insecurity and urgency on the parts of those who control 
the central governments.  The rules of war no longer now no longer seemed to apply, 
since it was not two sovereign states fighting against one another, but rather two or more 
groups within a sovereign state vying for control of that state.  The stakes were both 
political power and what political power enforces, the identity of the state itself.  Civil 
wars are threats to the existence of a given central government’s identity and existence, 
and this is why central governments have tended to respond with particular viciousness in 
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these cases; the unitary identity of the sovereign state is drawn into doubt with the 
existence of competing identities.   As I showed in an earlier chapter, within modernity 
sovereignty always assume the form of a unitary body and a singular will, without 
exception; it is simply the nature of sovereign power to resist division within itself.  Other 
examples of this tendency include the Thirty Years’ War in early modern Europe, the 
American Civil War, the Russian Civil War following the First World War, and the 
presently ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Crimes against 
humanity on a large scale in these cases are an extension of civil conflict within a 
sovereign state.   
 
Sovereignty and the Failure of Constitutional Order 
 
In most Western nations, we take it for granted that a government will normally 
act within its constitutional limits, even in times of crisis or emergency, simply because, 
according to this line of thought, legitimate governments never violate their constitutions.  
Yet, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this has become an important issue in all countries 
with traditions of rights, limited government, and popular sovereignty, as governments 
have often been pressed constitutional restrictions to the limit, and in some cases, 
breaking those restrictions, in the pursuit of an elusive enemy.  If we look back over the 
history of the second half of the 20th century, we can see how this has generally been the 
case – the Cold War, the war on drugs, and at present, the war on terror.  These remained 
essentially low-level crises, and in the minds of some within the central government, they 
were authorized to do what was necessary in order to ensure that the threat, whatever it 
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happened to be at the time, was contained.  Considerations of national security may then 
be used to override constitutional limits.300 
What this situation in the West has in common with these case studies is the way 
in which sovereign authority reacts in times of crisis, or when the sovereign authority 
declares that a crisis exists and then responds to it.  In both Argentina and Yugoslavia, 
there was a great deal of political instability in the time periods under examination here, 
without there being full-scale civil war at the beginning.  Instead, dissident political 
movements sought to either show up the weaknesses of the central government 
(Argentina) or to secede from the country entirely (Yugoslavia).  Within the theories of 
sovereignty examined earlier, a common thread running through them all is that 
governments exist primarily to provide security, to protect citizens from both internal and 
external threats.  Theories of popular sovereignty take this a step further and allows for 
citizens to rebel against unjust governments.  However, as I have also showed, neither set 
of theories provides a clear set of conditions under which this might legitimately take 
place.  Resistance to unjust government remains under-theorized within the compass of 
sovereignty, and this has allowed central governments to essentially categorize any armed 
opposition, legitimate or not, as threats to the existence of the sovereign authority itself.    
This same tendency within central governments also shows up in situations where 
a group seizes power within the government, effectively suspending an existing 
constitutional order and ruling by decree or creating another constitution for the state.  
While the ruling group is in power, opposition and dissent are often silenced and, in the 
cases examined here, they become the objects of violent repression and outright murder.  
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This happened in Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge seized power and to a lesser extent 
when the National Islamic Front carried out its coup in 1989 in Sudan.  In Cambodia, the 
Khmer Rouge banned all opposition parties, while in Sudan, popular elections were 
eventually reinstated, though with substantial restrictions.   
Rwanda and Yugoslavia are interesting cases because the mass murders 
committed were tied to broader movements within those countries towards greater 
democratization following the end of the Cold War.  The prospects of greater popular 
participation in the central government, the desire to oust oppressive political parties 
from the past, and the international pressure to democratize the political process, were all 
influential factors in this trend.  The proliferation of political parties and popular 
movements in these two countries after 1989 was in part based on the centrality of ethnic 
identity in ongoing political debates.  The divisiveness and win-lose mentality created by 
this issue eventually led to the rise of parties in power that established the dominance of 
one ethnic group (Hutus, Serbians) at the expense of others, effectively disenfranchising 
those other ethnic groups that sought representation.  In Rwanda, Tutsis were barred from 
holding higher political office prior to the 1990s, but the invasion by the RPF and 
eventual stalemate between the RPF and the Habyarimana government led to negotiations 
which would have returned political rights to the Tutsi people.  These events aided the 
rise of the Hutu Power movement within the nascent democratic reforms within Rwanda, 
and it eventually seized power by force and carried out the genocide against the Tutsi.  
Slobodan Milosevic’s “anti-bureaucratic revolution” was presented as a popular 
movement to ouster Communist Party apparatchiks from power after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, but its true intent was to allow the province of Serbia to have dominance 
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within the rotating presidency of the country.  When the republics of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and eventually Kosovo attempted to break away from Yugoslavia and 
achieve independence, conflict between these republics and Serbia began.  In the name of 
holding together the “southern Slavic” nation, numerous acts of violence were carried out 
by Serbian nationalists, both in the Serbian government and by Serbians within Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo; Croatian nationalists also committed atrocities against 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In both of these countries, ethnic identities were already writ large 
into political life, and movements toward democracy exacerbated these conflicts to 
extremely violent proportions.  These were places that turned ethnic identity into a 
distinct political interest group and in which political power was ultimately conceived of 
as a zero-sum game that undermined the goals of democratic reforms and an orderly and 
non-violent political process. 
A final aspect of the failure of constitutional order to which I would like to draw 
attention is the awareness of culpability on the part of those who committed crimes 
against humanity.   In all of these cases, various measures were taken to cover up 
instances of rape, torture, and mass murder committed by the central authorities.  Secret 
prisons are a common way to hide this grim handiwork (Argentina, Cambodia, and 
Sudan) as is the use of mass graves in uninhabited areas (Cambodia, Yugoslavia).  In 
conditions of civil conflict, central governments tend to assume control over the main 
channels of the public media, or bars media access to areas of conflict; in many instances, 
the conflict itself effectively bars members of the media from reporting the conditions on 
the ground.  Central governments also resort to using proxy armies and privately- 
controlled militias to carry out their handiwork, creating a veil of impunity.  Average 
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citizens, including children, were actively pressed into service for the Khmer Rouge.  
Militias have been used to deadly effect in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, with the 
advantage of allowing these central governments to maintain the appearance of non-
involvement.   
Rwanda remains an interesting exception to this last point.  Both within the 
country and to outside observers, there was an awareness of a great deal of unrest within 
the country, and the country’s only radio station was regularly using propaganda to turn 
the population against the Tutsi people; while the genocide was being carried out, public 
radio broadcasts became a source of coordination for members of the Interahamwe as 
they went about their “work.”  Once the genocide began, no effort was made to cover up 
the murders that were being committed; bodies often lay on the roadsides for weeks 
before being carried away.   
It is this last point to which I want to draw the reader’s attention.  The horrific 
events that took place in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and that are ongoing in Sudan, all 
happened in full view of the world.   Newspaper and television reporters were on the 
ground in these regions and gave day-to-day accounts of these events as they unfolded.  
The advent of twenty-four hour-a-day television news has been a blessing and a curse, in 
this respect.  The world viewing public was able to witness atrocities being committed, 
often first-hand, but as time passed, attention to and concern over what was happening in 
these countries flagged.   The civil war in the former Yugoslavia dragged on from 1991 
to 1995, and again in 1999.  The events in Rwanda took place over the course of a several 
months in 1994.  And the world has been aware of the atrocities being committed in the 
Darfur region of Sudan since the summer of 2003.  This is in direct contrast to the crimes 
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against humanity that took place in Argentina, which at the time was viewed as just 
another military coup, and in Cambodia, where the media was only allowed very limited 
access; it was only in the early 1980s that the public became aware of what happened in 
these two countries.   
This raises some very difficult questions about sovereign authority and how to 
deal with massive crimes against humanity committed by a central government.   Within 
Western theories of sovereignty, it is assumed that authorities are accountable (to natural 
and divine law or to the people) and subject to the rule of law (members of government 
are held responsible for their actions under their own legal system), but if one looks at the 
history of sovereign authority, this assumption is not iron-clad; it may even be incorrect.  
Who can holds murderous sovereign authorities accountable when they themselves hold a 
monopoly on the means of violence?  How may they be held accountable if they subvert 
the political process and the very institutions of public life? Can a government have a 
duly constituted authority if it does not respect basic human rights?   
Oftentimes, citizens have been unable to act against their own governments when 
that government is responsible for committing abuses of human rights, and it has fallen to 
the international community to respond to these crimes.  The rise of various human rights 
regimes under the auspices of the United Nations and regional organizations points to 
some level of commitment on the part of the international community that these violent 
actions by governments can violate basic norms of treatment of human persons.  
Although the idea of humanitarian intervention was already current by the early 1990s, in 
large part due to the situation in Somalia, it gained greater currency after the mass 
murders that took place in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.  In Kosovo, “NATO was acting upon 
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a new premise that had emerged during the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia.  Military 
intervention against sovereign states, so this embryonic doctrine proclaimed, is legitimate 
if it prevents or halts the abuse of human rights by a state against its own citizens . . . 
Humanitarian conditions alone justify war.”301  NATO’s willingness to act was also 
emboldened by the criminal tribunals going on against the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda as well as the Spanish government’s attempt to bring former Chilean dictator 
Auguste Pinochet to trial around the same time.  Subsequently, this doctrine was further 
developed into the form of “responsibility to protect,” which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 Impunity for crimes against humanity, under the concept of “sovereign 
immunity,” has also been under legal assault through a number of venues around the 
world.  Ad hoc tribunals were created by the United Nations in the wake of the atrocities 
committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.   A quasi-international tribunal was also created to 
deal with crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.  Following a 
change of government, a number of civil and criminal trials began in the late 1990s in 
Argentina to deal with crimes committed during the 1976-1983 junta.  By July 2002, the 
International Criminal Court began to operate, and as of this writing, six cases are before 
the court, dealing with situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the 
Central African Republic, and Sudan; the Prosecutor has also recently asked for an arrest 
warrant against the President of Sudan, Omar el-Beshir, and international debate has 
ensued over its viability while peace negotiations are ongoing in the conflict in Darfur.   
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 Finally, in the years following the Cold War, international pressure for 
democratization has grown.  The demise of Soviet communism and its system of one-
party rule opened the way for the spread of Western-style democracy around the globe.   
But as I have shown above, democratization contributed to the exacerbation of existing 
political and ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Furthermore, the 
imposition of the culturally-bound Western democratic institutions upon non-Western 
contexts has some problems in its implementation.  Democratization by force or by 
external pressure may do more harm than good in the long run for the cause of 
democracy around the world.   
 These three themes, humanitarian military intervention, the role of the 
International Criminal Court, and the process of democratization will be explored in more 
depth in the next chapter.  These case studies have showed that, in the latter decades of 
the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st century, crimes against humanity 
remain an ever-present possibility, requiring the need for a range of effective 
international responses.  Sovereign authority, originally created to hold threats to a 
population at bay, in all of these cases has been the greatest source of threat to a 
population’s well-being and existence.   
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CHAPTER 5 
TAMING LEVIATHAN? 
 
Introduction 
 
 In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, sponsored by the Canadian government, issued its report entitled 
Responsibility to Protect, which set out to reformulate the concept of state sovereignty 
with an eye toward determining under what circumstances humanitarian intervention was 
justified.  In the contemporary world, sovereign authority is no longer synonymous with 
mere “control” over a population and territory but rather exists to protect its population.  
By becoming a signatory to the United Nations’ Charter, a state “accepts the 
responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature.”  The authors of the report go 
on to define a state’s responsibility as three-fold: care for the security and well-being of 
its citizens; an obligation to all the world’s citizens through UN membership; and 
accountability to the international community of states for its actions.302  This redefinition 
of sovereignty was incorporated into the United Nations’ human security agenda in the 
2004 report A More Secure World:  Our Shared Responsibility.303   
 This effort to re-craft the concept of sovereignty indicates the degree to which it is 
perceived at the international level that the authority of the sovereign state remains a 
problem in pursuing the goals of promoting human rights and development and providing 
                                                 
302
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa:  International 
Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 13 
303
 (New York:  UN Department of Public Information, 2004), http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf  
 156
for the security needs of people in areas of political instability and conflict.  As I showed 
in the above case studies, the major incidents of crimes against humanity in the 20th 
century have occurred during civil conflicts within states and that the state authority itself 
was complicit in those crimes.  Are there ways in which the power and authority of a 
sovereign state may be curbed which may prevent the further occurrence of large-scale 
crimes against humanity?   
 This chapter will explore three possible solutions to this nagging problem of 
sovereign authority:  humanitarian military intervention; the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); and the process of democratization.  At this point in 
history, humanitarian intervention, or military intervention for humanitarian purposes, 
appears to be the world community’s primary instrument of dealing with ongoing crimes 
against humanity.  Despite the development of its legitimacy in the international 
community, much controversy surrounds this principle of intervention.  The 
establishment of the ICC has been greeted by the majority of nations as a great 
advancement in the ability to try crimes against humanity without ambiguity and undue 
political influence, but many questions remain as to its efficacy, especially without the 
support of the United States.  Finally, the international promotion of democratization is a 
more ambitious goal - the spread of democratic institutions of government around the 
world in order to achieve a deep-rooted respect for human rights within states.  This 
seemingly worthy goal is not without its problems and criticisms: claims of imperialism; 
a lack of respect for alternative modes of authority and cultural differences; the 
difficulties of grafting Western political ideas onto non-Western political institutions; and 
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the cost of democratic nation-building would be extremely prohibitive to the West and to 
the entire community of nations.   
Given these alternatives (by no means the only ones304), it would seem as if the 
authority of the sovereign state might be brought into line with the rules established by 
international law and human rights norms.  However, in all of these solutions, 
sovereignty remains the central organizing principle of action.  Humanitarian military 
intervention brings other sovereign states to the rescue of a given population, but then the 
problem becomes how to insure that those people will be protected, once the other states 
withdraw, indeed, if they are able to withdraw.  The International Criminal Court has the 
potential to hold leaders of states accountable for crimes against humanity committed 
under their rule, but without enforcement powers beyond what is granted to it by the 
United Nations or voluntarily by states party to the ICC statute, its rulings remain hollow.  
And democratization seeks to spread the “blessings of freedom” throughout the world 
while recreating the pole of popular sovereignty introduced in the first chapter of this 
dissertation.  In the end, sovereignty remains inherently paradoxical, absorbing all of 
these solutions into its orbit without mitigation of its more troublesome aspects.   
  
Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 While the term “intervention” covers a wide variety of meanings in the field of 
international relations305, humanitarian military intervention can be defined as the use of 
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armed force by a nation or nations to stop wide-spread human rights abuses within the 
sovereign territory of another nation.306   
On its face, the legality of military intervention into the domestic affairs of 
another nation seems straightforward.  The United Nations Charter specifically prohibits 
such intervention - “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”307  
This sentiment is subsequently reiterated in Chapter 2, Section 7, but with a single 
proviso.  “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter Vll.”308  Given the importance of the status of sovereign statehood to the U.N. 
Charter, the centrality of non-interference is obvious.  The domestic affairs of a member 
state of the United Nations remain essentially under the authority of that state’s 
government.   
However, intervention remains an option under conditions of threats to 
international peace and order.  Chapter VII of the Charter lays out a process by which the 
U. N. Security Council may authorize the use of force to resolve international conflicts.  
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
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inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations.”309  Article 51 describes a nation’s right to self-
defense.  “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”310   
The issue of domestic crises, such as civil war, state failure, internal repression, 
and crimes perpetrated by a government against its own citizens, thus remains outside of 
the scope of the UN Charter.  Subsequent international treaties have defined a general 
opposition to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but the prevention and 
punishment of these offenses remained elusive until the 1990s.   
With the growing number of humanitarian crises in the 1990s and 200s, military 
intervention was often cited as the most useful policy tool in preventing the further abuse 
of human rights and loss of life.311  But the experience of the Western nations that bore 
the brunt of these interventions was mixed.  In a few instances, there was some success – 
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Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone – but in others, there was a marked lack of success – 
Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and some would say, Iraq after the 2003 
invasion – for a variety of reasons, including a lack of commitment.     
 Growing out of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Millenium Report in 
September 2000, the Canadian government sponsored a study of sovereignty and the role 
of intervention in the 21st century and issued the above-mentioned report The 
Responsibility to Protect in December 2001.  This study reconceptualized state 
sovereignty as a “responsibility to protect” the population under the state’s jurisdiction.  
The committee that undertook the study also proposed criteria for determining when that 
responsibility had lapsed and how and to what extent other nations may intervene, to 
continue protecting that population once the state is unwilling or unable to do so.     
 While the doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) is now a part of the United 
Nations’ approach in dealing with large-scale crimes against humanity, problems remain.  
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq was partly justified on the grounds that President 
Hussein was engaged in actively repressing and murdering his own citizens.312  Although 
this aspect of the invasion was overshadowed by the alleged connection between 
Hussein’s government and the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and Hussein’s alleged 
possession of biological and chemical weapons, it has not ceased to be a justification for 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq.  The United Nations/African Union peace-keeping 
mission in Darfur was the first such mission explicitly deployed under R2P,313 but as of 
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September 2008, two years have passed, and the mission still remains undermanned and 
under-equipped; even the peace-keepers themselves have come under attack from rebel 
forces in the region.  There is a marked lack of political and economic interest in the 
Darfur region for most Western nations, while the opposite is true for Middle Eastern and 
African nations and China.  National political interest plays an enormous role in 
determining where and how R2P is applied, which undermines its humanitarian intent.  
Despite having a well-developed set of guidelines for determining in what situations to 
intervene, the lack of political will or the willingness to misuse the R2P always exists.   
 R2P seeks to ultimately restore sovereignty to the afflicted country.  The question 
arises regarding the nature of sovereignty during intervention.  “Intervention suspends 
sovereignty claims to the extent that good governance – as well as peace and stability – 
cannot be promoted or restored unless the intervener has authority over a territory. But 
the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty is only de facto for the period of the 
intervention and follow-up, and not de jure.”314  What is the purpose of de jure 
sovereignty while a country is occupied by foreign military forces?  And if a government 
has sought to carry out large-scale murder and ethnic cleansing, how can it be trusted to 
not do so once foreign military forces withdraw, especially if the doctrine states that 
“[t]he objective overall is not to change constitutional arrangements, but to protect them    
. . .  military intervention means endeavouring to sustain forms of government 
compatible with the sovereignty of the state in which the enforcement has occurred – 
not undermining that sovereignty.”315  These statements reflect the underlying 
assumption that sovereignty, or more specifically, sovereign power, lies in military and 
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police force, and that questions of authority and legitimacy can be answered only after 
security is established.  Thus, sovereignty does not reside in what the state provides, but 
what it is capable of doing, its potential for violence, or its enforcement ability.  While 
sovereign authority can be democratic and can be used for humanitarian ends, it is not in 
itself democratic or humanitarian.  A sword, a rifle, and a nuclear bomb are neither 
democratic nor humanitarian.   
 
The International Criminal Court 
 
The idea of having an international court to try individuals for crimes that “shock 
the conscience” of humanity emerged after the end of World War II, following the war 
crimes tribunals in Germany and Tokyo and the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 
1947.  The UN General Assembly sought to go about creating a judicial institution to try 
the crime of genocide, and the task was given to the International Law Commission.  
From 1949 to 1954, this commission a number of draft statutes for an international 
criminal court, but these were subsequently rejected as the Cold War took center stage.  
In the mid 1980s, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested trying cases of 
terrorism in front of an international court.  In 1989, the country of Trinidad and Tobago 
sent a request to the General Assembly to resume work on an international criminal court 
which would have jurisdiction over drug trafficking.  This, combined with the 
establishment of ad hoc war crimes tribunal in the former Yugoslavia316 and the efforts of 
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the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action317 (dealing with human rights issues), 
led to further work by the ILC on a draft statute.  Differences over the statute were ironed 
out from 1994 until 1998.  In July 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted by a vote of 120 
to 7.318  It was ratified by the required 60 states in April 2002, and the statute entered into 
force in July of the same year.  As of this writing (2008), the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is investigating of four international situations:  Uganda, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.   
Under the Rome Statute, the court’s jurisdiction extends over four categories of 
crime:  genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.  The jurisdiction 
of the court is specifically designed to be complementary, to allow national courts to try 
cases concerning these crimes within their own legal systems, unless they are unable or 
unwilling to do so.319  There are territorial limitations to the court’s jurisdiction; the 
accused individual has to be a national of a state party to the statute, and the alleged 
crime has to have been committed on the territory of a state party.320  Third, there are 
temporal limitations to the court’s jurisdiction.  It has jurisdiction only over crimes 
committed after July 1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute took effect.321 Jurisdiction begins 
to be exercised whenever a situation is referred to the office of the prosecutor of the court 
by a state party or by the UN Security Council or is initiated by the office of the 
prosecutor itself.322 
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The trial process within the ICC proceeds through the office of the Prosecutor.  
Once a situation has been referred to or taken up by the Prosecutor, the office undertakes 
an evaluation of the matter, something along the lines of a fact-finding mission.  Once the 
Prosecutor thinks there is a reasonable basis for a case, the office then submits a request 
for authorization of an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.323  The 
Pre-Trial Chamber is one of the organs of the Court, composed of at least six judges, and 
it acts to assist both the Prosecutor and defense in preparation for the case, authorizing 
investigations for the Prosecutor, issuing arrest warrants and summons to appear, and 
providing assistance to victims, witnesses and defendants.324  Actual trials are conducted 
by the Trial Chamber (also a panel of not less than six judges), and crimes are tried at the 
Hague (unless another location is chosen), and the accused must be present.  The rights of 
the accused are extensive, comparable with those of any Western nations and embedded 
in many human rights treaties.325  Rules of evidence and procedure are already laid down 
in agreements subsequent to the Rome Statute,326 and before a trial begins, relevant rules 
are discussed by the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor and defense before they are implemented 
in a given trial.327 
How will the ICC affect state sovereignty?  It is important to look back to past 
international criminal trials, beginning with Nuremberg and Tokyo and the ongoing 
tribunals in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.  Eliminating the possibility 
of impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity perhaps might act as a deterrent 
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against the commission of future crimes.  This is not like domestic crime, which is 
commonplace and in which many factors play into its occurrence;328 these are widespread 
and publicized crimes carried out by a government against people within its own borders.  
This may force political leaders in the future contemplating committing such crimes to 
temper their methods and perhaps their political objectives (or alternately, to better hide 
their efforts).   
Does the Rome Statute actually impugn upon state sovereignty?  No and yes – it 
is an international agreement, based upon voluntary participation, and it exists to try 
crimes of an extraordinary nature, in situations where national governments are either 
unable or unwilling to try them.   It also provides a forum for cases which are within the 
concern of the international community.  Similar to R2P’s role as a supplement to a 
nation’s own sovereign authority, the ICC’s jurisdiction augments that of national legal 
systems.  But, it does undermine sovereign authority by applying international law to 
domestic situations and by holding a political and military leadership accountable for 
crimes they commit.329  Further, it establishes a judicial process outside of an offending 
state’s territory and holds nationals accountable to the community of states.   
Countries with political cultures with a strong tradition of impunity for violence 
perpetrated against their own citizens will reject the notion of the ICC and its jurisdiction 
altogether, although the UN Security Council retains the power of referring situations to 
the office of the Prosecutor which occur in nations which are not signatories to the 
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treaty.330  Interestingly enough, one of the strongest and most vocal opponents of the ICC 
has been the United States.  Initially supportive of the idea of the ICC, the American 
delegates to the conference on the Rome Statute eventually came to oppose the idea 
altogether, though they remained involved in the negotiations in order to have a hand in 
what the final shape of the court and its powers would be.  Their resistance centered 
around the fear that American, particularly soldiers, would be harassed and tried by the 
court for frivolous causes.  This resistance hardened after the 2000 election, turning into 
outright defiance after the terror attacks in 2001.  In May 2002, former UN Ambassador 
John Bolton described the “un-signing” of the Rome Statute as “the happiest moment” of 
his time at the State Department.331  Bolton accused the ICC of having “an unaccountable 
prosecutor, possibly politically motivated, [and] posing grave risks for the United States 
and its political and military leaders.”332  Afterwards, the United States began pursuing a 
campaign to get other countries to sign bilateral agreements to not turn Americans over to 
ICC custody, under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.333  Later that same year, the U.S.  
Congress passed the American Servicemember Protection Act, which set up a number of 
prohibitions regarding participation in the ICC and which threatened to cut military aid to 
countries party to the Rome Statute unless they signed the Article 98 agreements.334   
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The lengths to which the American government has gone to extricate itself from 
the reach of the ICC are instructive.  And in relation to this, it should also be noted that 
neither Russia nor China are parties to the Rome Statute.  The world’s superpowers do 
not view themselves as being subject to the universal jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, 
and by implication, to the community of states.  Further research might look at the 
historical record of how these nations have responded to international efforts at creating 
and enforcing human rights and human security measures in the 20th century, but here, I 
only want to note that their present actions seem to indicate that, because of their material 
power, they simply view themselves as being “above the law” embodied in the Rome 
Statute.  This puts them in good company with Syria, Iran, Sudan, and North Korea, 
nations which have been labeled by the United States as a part of the “Axis of Evil” and 
which are also not signatories of the Statute.  It remains to be seen how the ICC will be 
able to operate effectively without some level of cooperation from prominent members of 
the UN Security Council. 
 
Democratization 
 
 The process of democratization is the transition from authoritarian forms of 
government toward more democratic forms.  Here, democracy is broadly defined as a 
form of government in which people periodically elect their officials and are able to 
enjoy protection of their human rights.  In the contemporary world, democracy has come 
to be synonymous with representative or parliamentary institutions as well as the 
enjoyment of a range of political, civil, social, and economic rights.  Throughout this 
 168
dissertation, I have deliberately avoided using the term democracy to describe popular 
sovereignty simply because its early modern proponents of popular sovereignty were 
themselves not supporters of democratic government as they historically understood its 
existence in ancient Greece.   The value and shape of democracy has changed over time, 
and it remains an evolving concept.  “Democracy is an ephemeral phenomenon rather 
than a settled system.  We might think of it as protean and amorphous, embracing a wide 
range of possible forms and mutations that are responsive to grievances on the part of 
those who have no means of redress other than to risk collectivizing their small bits of 
power.”335 
 Within the United Nations, a commitment to democratic forms of governance has 
existed since its inception; Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
makes direct reference to the participation of people in their governments, the will of the 
people as the basis for government’s authority, and the need for periodic elections to 
insure that this will is genuinely expressed.336 This commitment has shown up time and 
again, from the Covenant on Civil and Rights in 1966,337to the Millennium Declaration in 
2000,338 Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s follow-up report to the 2005 Millennium 
Summit,339and the establishment of the United Nation’s Democracy Fund, also in 
2005.340 
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 Studies of democratization in recent years have shown that an increasing number 
of nations have begun to adopt democratic institutions and practices, particularly since 
the end of the Cold War.  Samuel Huntington’s seminal The Third Wave (1991) identified 
two “bursts” of democratization occurring after 1974, one following the democratization 
of Portugal and Spain, and another following the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union.341  By 2008, some 94 countries could be 
classified as democracies, prompting Marshall and Cole to remark that “for the first time 
in human history, the world has become a predominantly democratic one, at the global 
level.”342  
 It would seem intuitive that the growth of democratic institutions in a country 
would inhibit the excesses of authoritarian governments, and for the most part, that seems 
to be the case.  However, in two of the case studies examined here, in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the attempt to build democratic institutions actually preceded 
the occurrence of crimes against humanity.  The removal of authoritarian constraints on 
potential conflicts between ethnic differences in these two countries was one cause of the 
rise of exclusionist policies on the part of political authorities.  The attempts of Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo to secede from the former Yugoslavia led to civil 
conflict with the Serbian-dominated central government.  In Rwanda, pressure from the 
international community was one of the factors which encouraged the rise of the Hutu 
Power movement which had a central role in the genocide carried out against the Tutsi 
people.  Following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the establishment of a 
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democratic constitution created conditions in which a number of militant groups took 
advantage of more open public institutions to instigate terror and civil conflict throughout 
the country.  In late 2007 and early 2008, an outbreak of violence in Kenya during 
contested national elections led to fears that the tribal loyalties of the two main political 
parties would lead to large-scale ethnic conflict; swift diplomatic intervention by the 
United Nations and the international community helped lead to the creation of a coalition 
government and a defusing of violence.343  Democratic government, particularly 
relatively young institutions, remains susceptible to this sort of violence.   
 The “third wave” of democratization describes cascades of transitions from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic institutions following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, but it does not touch upon the difficulties of encouraging democratic transitions in 
countries with well-entrenched authoritarian governments.  This is especially relevant in 
considering the on-going conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan; the prospects of 
encouraging more democratic reforms within that country do not seem promising at this 
point in time.  The same is true in countries with authoritarian governments such as 
China, North Korea, Syria, and Zimbabwe.  Democratization remains a contingent and 
haphazard process, and the willingness of the international community to more firmly 
encourage democratic reforms in deeply entrenched authoritarian governments seems 
limited at this point in history.   
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Conclusion 
 
 While humanitarian military intervention, the International Criminal Court, and 
the process of democratization all place constraints on the exercise of sovereignty, they 
do not affect sovereignty in substance.  Most nations in the international community have 
agreed to abide by human rights norms, and there are mechanisms in place for 
enforcement, punishment, and the prevention of abuses, but these remain voluntary and 
contingent upon state participation.  Sovereign states remain in charge of the process.  
Humanitarian intervention, now in the form of the Responsibility to Protect, and the 
International Criminal Court has been legitimated by collective decision-making within 
the international community.344  Democratization, although regarded as a worthy goal 
upon by most nations, remains more ambiguous and problematic in its implications.  And 
rarely will all of these measures be implemented with pure motives; as long as sovereign 
states make the policy, there will be considerations of national interest, strategic thinking, 
and suspicion of the motives of other nations.   
 Prevention and prosecution of crimes against humanity are going to take a 
commitment on the part of nations to priorities other than that of national self-interest, 
which remains the basis of most foreign policy making.  At the very least, it requires a 
willingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nation-states.  At another level, it 
requires a willingness to put a nation’s own military in harm’s way in defense of a 
population other than one’s own.  Efforts to put a halt to situations such as ethnic 
cleansing and large-scale instances of violence and mass murder would have to be 
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undertaken quickly, without necessarily having recourse to past processes of international 
debate in the UN General Assembly and Security, such as what occurred during the 
Rwandan genocide and the present conflict in Sudan.   The International Criminal Court 
is still in the early years of its institutional life, and it remains to be seem if the indictment 
handed down by the Prosecutor Ocampo against President El-Bashir of Sudan will have 
any effect on the ongoing conflict in that country.  Finally, while there is a great deal of 
rhetorical commitment to democratization at the international level and some amount of 
institutional support, the democratizing project remains ambitious and uncertain at this 
point in world history.  The question remains:  will the world’s nations be able to sustain 
these commitments in a consistent fashion over the coming decades?  If so, then the 
abuses of sovereign authority have a good chance of being curbed, but if not, then the 
prospects for these abuses to continue remains.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The sovereign authority of the state remains intact in the first decade of the 21st 
century.  In this dissertation, I wanted to examine how sovereignty came to exist, both as 
a concept and in historical practice.  The idea of sovereignty emerged from the transition 
from the feudal era of European history to modernity, as a characterization of the power 
of the monarchical state.  The constitutional revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries 
transferred sovereign authority away from the king into the hands of the people.  First 
through colonial expansion, then through the creation of the United Nations and 
decolonization in the 20th century, sovereign statehood became the dominant model of 
political organization across the globe.   
 Despite practical, constitutional, and even metaphysical limits placed upon the 
exercise of sovereign authority, all theories of sovereignty maintain that no one should be 
able to limit the power of the sovereign authority in times of emergency or when facing a 
threat to the existence of the country; accountability, whether in the form of adherence to 
natural or divine law, or to the will of the people, is suspended for the purposes of quick 
decision-making and the circumventing of laws and constitutional limits which would 
prevent the necessary exercise of power.  The locus of sovereignty suddenly moves away 
from its original source to decision-makers within government.  It is in through this 
“loophole” that danger enters into the national community, because if none may resist, or 
is able to resist, the demands of the sovereign authority in times of crisis, then no member 
of the state remains safe from the government, and the protection of basic human rights 
 174
and dignity cannot be guaranteed.  In the case studies of Cambodia, Argentina, 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, I focused on the extent to which the power of the state’s 
authority in each case was implicated in the large-scale crimes against humanity 
committed in those countries.  These crimes took place under the guise of civil conflicts 
which began when people within those countries questioned the validity of the existing 
political order and took armed action against it.   
 When I asked the question of how sovereign authority may be limited or curbed, I 
looked at three institutions and practices:  humanitarian military intervention, the 
International Criminal Court, and the promotion of democratization.  Each of these was 
able to place certain limits on what sovereign authorities were able to do, but without the 
political will and commitment of the international community, the effectiveness of these 
efforts remains questionable.  More importantly, each of these institutions and practices 
reproduces the bases of sovereign authority in various ways and does not solve the 
underlying problem of sovereign authority.   
The war on Islamist terrorism initiated by the United States after September 2001 
brought to the surface similar kinds of questions about state sovereignty in the United 
States and its allies in Western Europe.  In particular, questions have been raised about 
the sovereignty authority of the state, in particular about the President’s powers in 
wartime, and about human rights issues that people in the West have assumed were 
settled matters, including the right to privacy, the use of torture to gain intelligence 
information, and the legal status and treatment of individuals captured in this otherwise 
unusual conflict.   
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I was initially reluctant to raise the issue of the war on terrorism because on its 
face, it sounds absurd to compare the recent actions of the United States government with 
the governments of Khmer Rouge Cambodia or present-day Sudan.  The American 
government is not engaged in the mass murder of its own civilians, nor has it drastically 
curbed their civil and political rights.  But the expansion of sovereign power within the 
American government was taking place long before this present conflict, and its 
implications are not about carrying out blatant offenses against human rights.  Instead, 
the expansion of sovereign power in the United States, and more broadly, in the Western 
world, is a by-product of the Cold War era.  The fear of the expansion of Soviet 
Communism abroad and at home led the United States and the threat of nuclear conflict 
altered the foundations of American political life.  The McCarthy era was characterized 
by the suppression of certain forms of political dissent in the United States, aided by the 
development of an extensive domestic surveillance regime by the FBI under Herbert 
Hoover.  An undeclared war was fought in Vietnam, and the government under Richard 
Nixon took this system of domestic surveillance even further in spying on his war 
protesters, civil rights groups, and his political rivals.  In the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration continued the Cold War and, perhaps more pertinent here, declared a “war 
on drugs” which in turn led to a further increase in domestic surveillance and the 
explosive growth of the American prison population which has by now exceeded that of 
every other nation on Earth.   The present war on terrorism and the issues it raises about 
sovereign power and human rights is just another phase of this continuing expansion of 
the sovereign authority of the American government as it continues to protect its people 
from threats both within and outside of the country’s borders.   
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As I have noted before, there is something inherently wrong in this situation, 
when protection against a threat means a greater and greater need for control over those 
protected and the continual exercise of the means of violence against a country’s own 
population.  In the second half of the 20th century, the terms “war” and “enemy” have 
come to encompass a realm of meaning that is less about foes faced in pitched battle than 
shadowy presences seemingly never far away from one’s shores, borders, and even 
neighborhoods.  This is why I am inclined to agree with Giorgio Agamben’s statement 
that “[s]overeign violence opens a zone of indistinction between law and nature, outside 
and inside, violence and law.  And yet the sovereign is precisely the one who maintains 
the possibility of deciding on the two to the very degree that he renders them 
indistinguishable from each other.”345  Sovereign authority, because of its monopoly on 
the (not necessarily legitimate) use of the means of violence, is able to determine exactly 
what the political community will be and who will belong.  The legitimacy of the 
political order becomes a moot point when a government undermines democracy and 
human rights in the name of democracy and human rights.  Another European observer, 
German social theorist Theodor Adorno, made a similar observation in late 1960s. 
[G]enocide, the eradication of humanity, and the concentration of people in a 
totality in which everything is subsumed under the principle of self-preservation, 
are the same thing; indeed . . . genocide is absolute integration.  One might say 
that the pure identity of all people with their concept is nothing other than their 
death . . . . absolute self-assertion and the absolute negation of all that lives . . . are 
the same thing.346 
 
Sovereign authority, brought to its logical conclusion, keeps its charge, the people, safe 
by the exclusion of all other peoples from their space.  The implication that may be 
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drawn from both Agamben and Adorno is that the sovereign is at this point in history the 
ultimate arbiter of life and death, and the protection of human rights and dignity remains 
a sideline.  This threat remains an ever present possibility as long as sovereignty exists. 
As the people of the United States and Western Europe settle into a more 
politically complacent mindset at the beginning of the 21st century, taking the advantages 
of established political sovereignty for granted, the rest of the world continues to struggle 
with their own tasks of building and maintaining their own nations.  For long-oppressed 
peoples, whether formerly under colonial rule and having struggled with decades of civil 
conflict, or having lived for decades under authoritarian governments, this freedom from 
oppression and freedom to participate in the directions of their governments are the ones 
that has been long denied.  But the self-determination of peoples and nation-building at 
the expense of other peoples is another matter entirely.  When this happens, then the 
concept of sovereignty begins to bare its dark side to the world.  What makes nationalism 
and statehood dangerous is not this desire for freedom, but the seemingly inevitable push 
to exclusion that can appear within the practice of sovereign statehood.  The institutions 
of sovereign authority remain with us, for good or ill, and with the awareness of the 
dangers inherent within the concept, it also remains for us to promote to good and to 
reign in the bad as much as possible.   
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